Daniel Larison writes:
Dan Drezner considers the
possibility that some Republican policy elites could start moving to the
Democrats, but remains skeptical:
The thing is, that polarization has been going on for
four decades now. Elites within the major political parties of 2016 are more
ideologically distant than they were in, say, 1971.
Indeed, this election cycle
has exacerbated that polarization at the presidential level.
So disaffected GOP
intellectuals would have to travel a much longer ideological space to feel
comfortable as Democrats.
That doesn’t mean that it couldn’t happen, however.
Foreign policy is an issue that’s tougher to fit onto simple left-right axis,
so maybe there will be some migration on that front as the GOP nominees sound
more rejecionist about the rest of the world.
It’s possible that some foreign policy hawks would vote
for Clinton over Trump or Cruz, but in order for many of them to “migrate” to
the other party they would have to conclude that most Republicans are flatly
rejecting them and their views for the foreseeable future.
Maybe they will, but
that will take more than one presidential election with a somewhat fluky
nominee.
It would require their preferred candidates to lose multiple
nomination contests, and it would probably also require a Republican nominee
they don’t like winning an election and governing in a way they can’t accept.
That could end up happening, but that is still a long way off.
If this year is the
GOP’s equivalent of the Democrats’ 1968, we shouldn’t expect neoconservatives
or other policy elites to start abandoning ship for several more years yet.
The big obstacle to switching parties for most foreign
policy professionals in the GOP is that they have spent their entire lives
portraying the Democratic Party as the party of “weak” and “feckless” foreign
policy and radically at odds with what they believe about the U.S. role in the
world.
As Drezner says, the neoconservatives’ move into the GOP made a certain
amount of sense on their terms, and going the other direction would be much
harder and more difficult to justify to themselves.
In practice, many
Republican hawks are much closer to Clinton than they are to some of their
party’s own candidates, but they have bent over backwards to claim otherwise
for years.
It is a measure of how much they loathe Trump (and Cruz to a lesser
extent) that some of them are publicly entertaining a vote for Clinton.
It
doesn’t necessarily suggest a desire to join the other party as anything more
than a protest voter.
For her part, Clinton doesn’t need the added baggage or
headache that would come from embracing the GOP’s failed foreign policy elites,
and her own party is already full of liberal hawks that are quite capable of
helping her make bad foreign policy decisions without any help from
ex-Republicans.
The GOP’s predicament going forward is not that it is
likely to lose the policy elites that it already has to the other party.
The
danger is that younger people interested in policy work will conclude that the
party is now so hostile to expertise and so anti-intellectual in its approach
to policy that they won’t want to be associated with it in any capacity.
The
GOP may hang on to its Bush-era policy elites, for all the good that will do
them, but if current trends continue it will have an increasingly difficult
time getting people from the next generation of scholars and writers to join.
That doesn’t bode well for a party that desperately needs to reform its policy agenda.
If they scatter, the loss of conservative intellectuals
as a somewhat unified force could
mean the end of the era of the GOP as the party of ideas[bold
mine-DL].
To be blunt, that era ended a while back.
If “party of
ideas” means being a party of new, relevant, or constructive ideas, the GOP
hasn’t been that in at least two decades.
Like much of the current Republican
agenda, the conceit that it is “the party of ideas” is a holdover from thirty
years ago.
Even if the party’s current policy elites stay right where they are,
the GOP still isn’t going to be a “party of ideas” until it starts adapting its
policy agenda to address contemporary problems.
That necessary reform is much
less likely to happen if the party retains many of the people responsible for
its bankrupt foreign policy.
Daniel Larison writes: ""In practice, many Republican hawks are much closer to Clinton than they are to some of their party’s own candidates, but they have bent over backwards to claim otherwise for years.
ReplyDeleteIt is a measure of how much they loathe Trump (and Cruz to a lesser extent) that some of them are publicly entertaining a vote for Clinton.""
That's always been the case.
The Democrats are ideologically the natural home for ex-Marxists who support 'nation-building' and multilateral liberal intervention abroad and mass immigration at home.
The nomination of Hilary Clinton will confirm that fact.
As William Buckley said, it was the Democrats who always started all the wars, from Woodrow Wilson in World War One to Kennedy in Vietnam.
Republicans were always elected to end them.
Call it a return to the natural order of things.
Bless.
DeleteIf Trump's voters, in particular, thought that he was anything less than the most hawkish candidate ever, then they wouldn't vote for him.
And he is, with Cruz in a strong second place.
Wars long ago became just what the Republican Party was for. It no longer has any other conceivable purpose.