Monday 2 September 2013

Conservatism As An Internationalist And Regionalist Conspiracy

Nationalism is a liberal idea. It is not the same thing as patriotism. A patria can mean all sorts of things. A patria does mean all sorts of things.

The Whigs created the United Kingdom, the United States, federated Canada and federated Australia. Even so conservative a figure as Bismarck relied on the National Liberals, often against forces with which he had far more in common. We all know about Garibaldi. There are many other examples. When Germany reunified, the Bloc Party founded by and for former Nazis integrated into the Free Democratic Party as easily as the Liberal Democratic Party did.

It took conservatives, whether in these Islands or anywhere else, a very  long time to reconcile themselves to nationalism, and even then they long kept up, as in most countries they still do, a sharp critique of the liberal opposition to the protection of the agriculture and manufacturing of the nation that the liberals profess to love so much.

They have said, as they still do say, that there is no patriotism without, among other things, economic patriotism. For that among other reasons,  therefore, liberal nationalism is not patriotic at all. Quite so.

The creation of the liberal nation has only ever been brought about by often rather brutal action on the part of the central State, eliminating numerous more local allegiances and customs. In the New World, those have always existed throughout living memory. In Europe, they have routinely been of extreme antiquity.

Mass resistance to such action has been fierce, and fiercely repressed, often over prolonged periods: the English Reformation, the hundred years and more that it took Revolutionary France to make people speak French in half of the country while the monarchists exalted the patois, the corresponding Carlist emphasis on Fueros in general and on Spain's many regional languages in particular, and so on.

The Risorgimento sought to enforce the Florentine dialect, the language of Dante, which it dubbed "Italian". But majority comprehension of it, never mind majority day-to-day use if that exists even now, is a post-War phenomenon, largely attributable to television. At the time of Unification, it was spoken by all of one fifth of the population.

Into the 1960s, the Tories dominated the North of Scotland, where Gaelic was then still spoken far more widely than it is today. As recently as 1979, Margaret Thatcher had to make a General Election manifesto commitment to create a Welsh-language television station, as did Jim Callaghan.

It hardly seems real now, a mere 34 years later, that Welsh Wales was then that important a battleground between the Conservative and Labour Parties, with that many Tory voters speaking Welsh as their language of daily life. By contrast, the attitude to the Celtic languages among today's Tories is pure, tumbrilling Jacobinism.

Catholics, the remnant of the immemorial England, were always regarded as having an allegiance to the international power that had defined the unmentionable Old Order. In fact, Catholics were so regarded in every Protestant State.

Most Catholic States did not contain many, if any, Protestants. But when they did, as most notably in France for a time, those Protestants were regarded in exactly the same way. The Kings of France saw Calvinism precisely as the Kings of Scotland, by then resident in England, saw Catholicism, or indeed saw full-blown Calvinism in their Southern, and soon enough in their Western, rather than in their Northern Kingdom.

Jews have always been so regarded. These days, so are Muslims.

Monstrous calumnies? Not at all. Statements of the obvious, and proper sources of pride and of political organisation. In defence of the ancient indigenous Christians of Syria, for example. Or for the Living Wage, a term and concept of Papal origin; for the full social inclusion of the disabled; and thus against the bioethical terrorist consequences of their absence.

The Church of England has ostensibly stood alone, its very doctrine determined by Act of Parliament, and its organisation only dimly aware of  the existence of an Anglican Communion created almost entirely by its Evangelical and Anglo-Catholic dissidents, with whom that Communion remains in close contact while having hardly any with the central body in England. Next to no one in the Church of England has any concept of belonging to something the beating heart of which is in Africa, where it beats to a very African rhythm indeed.

But the redefinition of legal marriage in England so as to encompass same-sex couples has changed all of that, or it will do so very soon. Deep in the heartlands of the Middling C of E, and for that matter right at the heart of Lambeth Palace, they are waking up to the fact that, since this is now the Law of England, it is now the doctrine of the Church of England.

In 25 or 30 years time, if Prince George wished to contract such a legal marriage, then what would be the reaction from the creature of Henry VIII and of his daughter by Anne Boleyn? That question answers itself. Or if it is not that, then it will be something like that. It may come much sooner. There is talk of cases before the Courts of Law, the rulings of which are doctrinal for the Established Church.

In reply, those who hold to the Biblical principle, the huge majority of the clergy and of the active laity, will and do invoke the Anglican Communion, which will be exactly where it is on this issue in 25 or 30 years time as it is now.

At that point, possibly around 2040 or possibly next year, the huge majority of the Church of England's clergy and active laity will be in the same position as Recusants in England and Huguenots in France, as Jews in the Europe of the eighteenth century and Muslims in the Europe in the twenty-first century.

I hope that they will be very proud of that, and that they will make full use of its myriad opportunities.

13 comments:

  1. Wow. A thousand words exactly. What pro you are.

    But forget the form. Check out the content. You are what highbrow hackery in this country is missing.

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  2. You really are too kind.

    It is missing somewhere that would publish something like this, certainly.

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  3. Orwell's essay "Notes on Nationalism" is, of course, the classic analysis of the separation between patriotism and nationalism.

    Although you won't like what he says about Chesterton- and how he abandoned sensible patriotism when it came to his idealised and abstract love of violent Continental Catholicism, one of the many imperialist and irrational nationalisms which Orwell dissects.





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  4. Haven't read it in years. Orwell, although he is good, is not as good as people think that he is.

    Although I expect that this one will be dredged up by the God-does-not-exist-but-Chesterton-must-not-be-canonised brigade.

    Since it is by Orwell, they will treat it as the last word and be unable to comprehend anyone who does not.

    For the reasons that I set out here, Chesterton was one of the first people to see through Hitler, although he died before being fully vindicated.

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  5. This beautiful, brilliant article makes me think that you are a kind of one man Chesterbelloc in our own time. I have thought that for a while, now that I see it written down.

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  6. Now you really are being too kind. I do not expect that anyone is ever going to try and beatify me.

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  7. Orwell and Chesterton both have their faults, as beatification or canonisation would not deny. You don't agree with many of Chesterton's political ideas much more than with many of Orwell's. But in that political field neither of them was as egregiously wrong as numerous other writers between the Wars.

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  8. You still haven’t read the books on nationalism that I recommended.

    One could get caught up in the boring semantics, but it would be better to say that nationalism *was* a liberal idea.

    As an ideology, nationalism was developed among the emerging bourgeoisie, on whose capital the new absolutist rulers relied, allowing those rulers to remove the political power of the feudal class. This new capitalist class sought an ideological legitimisation of their power, one that rejected older forms of legitimacy and parochialism (no doubt you would have loved the feudal era). It did and does, though, tend to dip into and reinterpret the mythology of one or more pre-existing ethnic groups to create the illusion of ancient, organic roots.

    And yes, the new nationalist elites, via the state apparatus and benefiting hugely from the dislocations of the industrial revolution, did (and continue to) homogenise the previously complex ethnic tapestry.

    In older ‘nations’, though, it’s been a long time since nationalism could be considered a liberal force. Nationalism is an excellent example of Tito’s maxim concerning any progressive force becoming reactionary if it attempts to perpetuate itself. Once the nationalist were in control they tended to become conservative, and to resist the internationalist leanings of the socialist movement or the internationalist (and now increasingly cosmopolitan) leanings of modern liberal thought.

    Nationalism usually began as a means of seeking liberation and formal equality for individuals within a state (at least to those people who belonged to or were willing to be assimilated to the dominant ethnicity) and breaking free of parochial and traditional class ties. Yet it became deeply conservative, and after the failure of 20th socialism (in one country...) this even became true of left nationalists like Labour (you might agree). Having broken down previous parochial identities and create a single identity to which all people were meant to cleave, nationalists allowed that new identity to become the new parochial and restrictive force.

    Liberal thought is increasingly somewhere on the internationalist-cosmopolitan spectrum, recognising as it does that nationalism is just as much of a retardant of liberty and emancipation as its even more parochial predecessors, feudalism and tribalism. Right and wrong and not defined by who you are or where you arbitrarily happened to be born.

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  9. Oliver Kamm has been having a go at Michael Coren over his claim that Chesterton is not an anti-Semite.

    Kamm has threatened to pursue the matter with the publishing house that published Coren's book.

    That man needs to get a life.

    He seems to obsessively pursue and persecute anyone who disagrees with him, from Norman Finkelstein to John Millbank.

    He's even writing an entire book on Noam Chomsky.

    Kamm is quite clearly mad.

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  10. no doubt you would have loved the feudal era

    http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/08/29/why-a-medieval-peasant-got-more-vacation-time-than-you/

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  11. Ben Myring.

    Gellner's notion that nations were a convenient tool of bourgeois industrialists has been torn apart by modern scholarship.

    He made the same mistake as modern liberals in confusing political nationalism with patriotism.

    Gellner presumed that nationhood was a bourgeois invention to mask class differences, fulfil the industrialists goal of turning people into an undifferentiated mass of mobile, easily replaceable labour educated in a common language, (owing their allegiance to a capitalist state rather than to feudal landlords and thus giving the newly-uprooted workers of the industrial society a new locus of identity that would bind them to state instead of to kin and clan.

    Gellner followed Marx in believing the "postal error" fallacy that "the liberationist message intended for the classes was instead delivered to nations".

    This is what the Frankfurt School adherents also believed-that nationalism was false consciousness that stood in the way of the international worker revolution, binding the masses to their territorial states to rupture their solidarity with each other.

    But Gellner has been widely discredited by modern scholars, and his theories of nationalism crumble beneath the criticism they have now faced.

    "The State of the Nation: Ernest Gellner and Nationalism" offers a comprehensive rebuttal from the leading scholars in the field.

    Many scholars have pointed out that the idea of nationhood long pre-dated the 18th-century economic rumblings and, particularly, the French Revolution.

    Gellner's account completely negates national movements in ancient Greece and Rome-while the 19th-century national movements in Latin America and the Balkans had no connection to industrialisation.

    What the French Revolutionaries and industrial capitalists did was not to invent 'nations', but to divorce patriotism from local Christianity and bind it instead to political nationalism-the "Big Government" that modern left-wing liberals cherish and adore.

    The French Revolutionaries actively and deliberately replaced Church with state in every sphere of life, from the registration and tracking of the population (once exclusively done by the French Catholic church) to education and welfare. The French nationalists specifically demanded that people declare their allegiance to state and not to Church.

    But this is not patriotism.

    As Orwell noted in "Notes on Nationalism", patriotism represents fundamental and vital differences over the way in which people like to live, crystallised into borders. It is "devotion to a particular way of life".

    Crucially, patriotism is never imperialist but is always a defensive, conservative force (which seeks to preserve local culture, customs and faiths against external and internal change) rather than a rapacious, intolerant imperialist force like nationalism which (as we saw with Emperor Napoleon) seeks ever to expand outwards and remake the world in its image.

    Nationalism, as Orwell rightly said, seeks to abolish differences because it thinks "human beings can be classified like insects" and aims to accrue more power for the national unit (in which the individual has submerged his identity) at the expense of any rival.

    Real patriotism was killed by the industrial revolution, not created by it.









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  12. @Anonymous

    Rather than Gellner, I tend to admire Anthony D. Smith, whose work (which is the foundation of ethnosymbolism) is essentially a corrective of his tutor Gellner's work and takes into account some of the criticisms that you level. Smith would accept that Rome & Greece (and Jerusalem) had aspects of 'elite nationalism', but they did not have a mass public culture in the way that a modern nation does. Most of the population were slaves or subjects who often spoke a different language to the ruling elite. And city states do not fulfil the modern understanding of a nation either. Gellner’s central thesis – that nations are modern and constructed rather than ancient and organic – is not seriously disputed by any leading scholars or theoretical perspectives in the study of nations and nationalism.

    Modernists like Gellner did not claim that the ideological routes of modern nationalism were founded in the industrial revolution, but in the absolutist period that preceded it.

    The work that you cite was published back in 1998, and contains some important contributions, but those that I know best (Hroch, Brubaker) are hardly organic conservatives, or conservatives of any kind as I understand it, nor do they have truck with patriotism. Nor do they dispute the essentially socially-constructed nature of nations.

    You say that “Real patriotism was killed by the industrial revolution, not created by it”. If you are defining patriotism as support for parochial local identities then yes, these were certainly undermined by the industrial revolution, though they remain in diluted form. But why would anyone want to be trapped by a tribal, parochial and subjective way of life when they can aspire to a rational and universal one? Why should you have to live your life a certain way, and believe certain things to be true, and be condemned to view certain people as ‘the other’, just because of where you are born?

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