Philip Giraldi writes:
After his confirmation hearing in 2013, CIA Director John Brennan and
other senior managers explained that
the Agency would be seeking to enhance its ability to spy using human agents.
It was an admission that to a large extent the United States intelligence
community had forgotten how to engage in what was once a core capability that
had defined its clandestine services for nearly seventy years.
Now the
Pentagon, which always favored technical spying over its HUMINT efforts because
human spies are both unpredictable and considerably prone to embarrassing
incidents, is essentially saying the same thing.
Everyone is trying to revive
the old-time tradecraft in part because machines have failed to collect the
right kind of intelligence at the times when it is needed.
Secretary of Defense Ash Carter testified before
the House Armed Services Committee on December 1 that a new formation of
special operations soldiers tasked, among other things, with “dramatically
accelerating the collection of intelligence” would be fielded in Iraq.
The unit
would most likely be based in or near Irbil, a Kurdish region and therefore a
safe destination for U.S. forces.
It will likely work together with Kurdish
militiamen though it will also be operating unilaterally without coordination
with the Iraqi military intelligence services, considered to be both unreliable
and possibly even subversive due to reported penetration by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards.
This development means that American soldiers will be
actively engaged in combat operations in both Iraq and Syria without the
consent of any national government.
It raises some significant legal issues and
perhaps even threatens the security of other U.S. troops that are advising the
Iraqi Army, particularly if there is an incident in which civilians are killed.
The U.S. troops are not yet in place and even the numbers
that will be involved are unclear, though Pentagon insiders guess that they
will be in the low hundreds and may even be drawn from or replace some of the
estimated 3,300 U.S. soldiers currently in Iraq.
An important distinction being drawn by the Pentagon is
that the new soldiers will not be limited to advisory roles and will instead be
allowed to actively engage the enemy.
They are expected to conduct raids, free
hostages and capture ISIS leaders in addition to collecting intelligence.
It is
to be presumed that rules of engagement they will be operating under would
allow them to kill ISIS leaders if capture is not feasible, as was alleged to
be the case with Osama bin Laden.
There have been reports that some of the 300
advisers sent to Iraq
in June 2014, which was followed by an additional 50 special ops soldiers in
December ordered to“advise, train and assist,” have already been exceeding their mandates by directly participating in fighting
between local militiamen and ISIS.
This has been denied by the Pentagon even
though Kurdish officers have confirmed their presence with cell phone photos.
Other U.S. special forces units have been involved in
separate raids on targets inside Syria, most notably an operation in October
that freed 70 Iraqi prisoners and an earlier Delta Force raid in May that
killed ISIS financier Abu Sayyaf.
Operations of that type will likely serve as
templates for future actions.
There is, of course, a question of whether the new
deployment will involve anything beyond collecting battlefield intelligence,
but the clear implication of the Carter comments is that the JSOC soldiers, who
are trained in recruiting, training and running spies, will be doing just that
in an effort to locate and engage ISIS cadres.
Jeff Stein, a well-informed
former military intelligence officer writing for Newsweek, believes that “American spies are going to be back
in action in a big way against the Islamic State…”
Human agent spying, the second oldest profession if not
the first, has oddly been eschewed by many in the federal intelligence
community’s war against terrorist groups because of its alleged expense.
In
reality, the costs of HUMINT are far lower than technical collection, which
requires a large initial outlay for development and construction of equipment
combined with an expensive infrastructure to operate.
Indeed, the cutback in
the spy culture at CIA came about because running drones and surveillance
satellites was taking so much out of the budget.
It was part of a shift in
priorities that also brought a rise in the power of Agency paramilitaries, recently supplanting the senior operations officer managers
in the clandestine services division that supervises spies.
Traditional espionage was also looked down upon by
elected and appointed government officials who, lacking any appreciation of
intelligence sources and methods, demanded instant answers in the pressure
cooker world of Washington policymaking.
Recruiting a spy to penetrate ISIS or
al-Qaeda requires lots of time, patience, and a large measure of genuine
understanding of the potential target.
It could take months or even years to
seed in an agent and develop access to a terrorist group, while a satellite
with a camera and microphone could be activated instantaneously.
Lost in the transition was the fact that the spy would
collect information that a camera could not while he might well be in place and
effective for a long time.
Human agents, unlike machines, can also provide
information on plans and intentions, actually permitting the frustrating of
planned attacks.
And they can do so in real time through sophisticated
miniaturized electronic devices that link to communications satellites.
Follow the money: Once human spying ceases to be the
first priority in the budget it also becomes increasingly ignored as the weapon
of choice.
There were also practical reasons to abandon traditional
clandestine practices.
The terrorist enemy proved adept at using double agents,
meaning that CIA case officers began to go to meetings armed, which was rarely
the case before 2001.
Armed officers gradually evolved into the Agency’s
fielding of security protection teams that would guard the meeting, even in
some cases picking up the agent, moving him to a debriefing site with a hood
over his head, and dropping him off on a street later after a case officer had
finished talking to him.
It was hardly old fashioned spying and did not follow
the cardinal rule for agent management, which was to build rapport so the
source would be cooperating willingly or even enthusiastically.
The old ways
also suffered a major setback when in 2009 a Jordanian double agent blew
himself up at Khost Base in Afghanistan, killing seven American employees of
CIA.
But as terrorist targets become more savvy about how they
are being spied upon by satellite they are able to exploit the vulnerabilities
inherent in collecting by microphone and camera.
Using phones to plant false
leads exhausts resources and confuses those who are doing the targeting and
tracking, making the whole process less effective.
The consumers of
intelligence within the U.S. government have unsurprisingly frequently
expressed displeasure with the product resulting from all the tens of billions
of dollars of investment in satellites and other technical gear.
So on balance a return to HUMINT is almost certainly a
good thing, but it will take considerable time to develop as both the CIA and
Pentagon will have to relearn old skills and then apply them to situations on
the ground that are volatile to say the least.
There will inevitably be a
learning curve and the questions will certainly come from Congress and the
White House as the process plays out.
It is unclear whether government
consumers will have the patience to persevere or will instead turn again to the
deceptively reliable eye and ear in the sky technology.
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