Doing a lot better than some of his old comrades, Kenan Malik writes:
“This bill is ethnocide.” “They are doing this to erase who we are.” “Should be imprisoned for his genocidal language.” “Absolute genocidal scumbag freak.” The rage of the online far right at a parliamentary attempt to allow black and Asian people to define themselves as English is almost comical in its hysteria.
Liberal Democrat MP Josh Babarinde, together with Labour’s David Lammy and Conservative James Cleverly, introduced a private members’ bill last week to ensure that “Black English” and “Asian English” were among the categories at the next census (currently only white people can mark themselves English). The bill was a performative exercise – it was never going to become law. But the very thought of parliamentarians arguing that whiteness was not a prerequisite for being English set the racists aflame, one nativist organisation even reporting Babarinde to the police for “hate speech”.
The online far right is a tiny cabal of noisemakers. The fact that some of the most bigoted people in society want to preserve a white-only cordon sanitaire around Englishness does not mean, though, that Babarinde’s bill, or the arguments of its proponents, are desirable. Englishness has complex roots and various modes of expression. It can refer to a people, a culture, a nationality or an identity to “a people, a culture, an ethnicity, a nationality or an identity. As in many such debates, the tussle over its meaning pits those who regard national belonging as a primordial, and usually ethnic, phenomenon against those who view it as a more modern development and not simply tied to ethnicity.
Some scholars trace the origins of Englishness to the early Middle Ages, many pointing to Bede’s Ecclesiastical History of the English People, written around 731, as crystalising the idea. Others, such as historian and sociologist Krishan Kumar, argue that Bede was referring not to a unified people but to “still diverse groups of… distinct ethnicities”, and view English peoplehood as a more modern process. Of course, for some in this debate, Kumar’s very name invalidates his argument.
Whatever its origins, most reasonable people would accept that Englishness, like all identities, is not static and that its meaning has changed over time. From this perspective, recognising black and Asian people as English can be seen as the latest threads in the changing tapestry of English identity. There is a distinction, though, between acknowledging a more inclusive vision of Englishness and establishing “white”, “black” and “Asian” as distinct ways of being English. Pluralising Englishness by viewing it through multiple racial lenses rather than a single one is no advance.
We usually think about pluralism as a liberal concept. It is, though, an ambiguous term, its roots running back to conservative hostility to the universalist values that grew out of the Enlightenment. It has since become appropriated, in different ways, by both left and right. In the postwar years, disillusioned by ideas of Enlightenment universalism, many on the left embraced pluralism as a means of understanding human differences, as a basis for social policy, and as an antidote to racism. The far right seized upon pluralism, too, but for the opposite reason - as a means of reviving racial thought that had been shredded by the experience of Nazism and the Holocaust. “The true wealth of the world is first and foremost the diversity of its cultures and peoples.”
That might have come from the pen of a liberal multiculturalist. It was in fact written by the French philosopher Alain de Benoist, a founder of the Nouvelle Droite. To revive the fortunes of the far right, Benoist reworked culture as a synonym for race. Every culture, he insisted, was anchored to a geographic location and could be possessed only by those descended from the original inhabitants. As carriers of alien cultures and histories, immigrants must always remain outsiders. Such “ethnopluralism” links a sense of belonging to intolerance towards those deemed not to belong. It has become absorbed by the far right, and indeed, by sections of the not-so-far right. It lies at the heart of current debates about Englishness.
Challenging such arguments requires us not to racialise identity in a different way but to challenge the very process of racialisation. To make census definitions of Englishness more inclusive, we need to strip out the racial category that now delimits it – “white English” – rather than add new racial boxes into which to pigeonhole people. Part of the problem lies in the messiness of census categories, and the emphasis on ethnicity over other forms of social identities. In this, the census mirrors the wider ways in which, as individuals, institutions and policymakers, we think about social affiliation, ways that often distort our understanding.
Consider education. For years, policymakers were so obsessed with ethnicity that they ignored their own data showing the greater significance of class in shaping pupils’ performance. More recently, as questions of class have come to the fore, class itself has become racialised. In discussions of issues faced by white working-class children, their whiteness has often seemed to matter more than their class location. There has equally been a failure to recognise that patterns of attainment displayed by minority pupils may have less to do with their ethnicity than with their class. The very categories used to make sense of the world too often serve to obscure reality.
The bigotry of the online far right expresses in an extreme fashion many of the distortions that bedevil our thinking about identity and belonging. Beyond dismantling their racist arguments, we need a wider debate about the social categories we use and the ways in which they can warp, rather than clarify, our understanding of the world.
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