As a comment on an earlier post pointed out, no one whom anyone seriously imagined to have voted Leave has ever been Prime Minister. But having been Parliamentary Private Secretary to Gordon Brown, the most Eurosceptical Prime Minister since Attlee had sent back the blueprint with the words “The Durham Miners would never wear it” written at the top, only one member of the Shadow Cabinet Minister in 2015 nominated a Leadership candidate whom no one seriously imagines went on to vote Remain. And now, Jon Trickett MP writes:
There is a strong case for not rejoining the EU, as some would want.
The British are not xenophobes or narrow-minded. There are 12 main reasons why going back in would be bad for British democracy, our economy and our sense of fair play.
1. No new divisive Brexit vote
Organising a second referendum would be divisive and reopen bitter differences within Britain. It would divert attention from the urgent task of rebuilding our broken economy. This does not mean that we cannot renegotiate some of the terms of the Brexit that Boris Johnson put together in a hasty and even careless way.
2. Unaccountable EU power
In any event, on this central democratic question, since we left the EU has continued to concentrate power in the institutions (its central bank, commission, presidency and court). None were elected to their roles and all insist on making decisions, which are at times damaging to the member nations’ working people.
3. Political instability on the rise
There are rising tides of dissent within the EU triggered by political and economic resentment. Look at the political instability and the rise of hard-Right populist parties, and the rioting in some of Europe’s major cities. There is widespread popular dissent throughout the continent. It is hard to see what benefit the UK can achieve by rejoining. Given these movements, on what basis would we advocate becoming members?
4. Brexit did not cause our economic problems
Much of the argument for rejoining rests on the erroneous idea that our economy has suffered as a result of Brexit. The Office for National Statistics, which invariably makes mistakes in its calculations, has recently admitted it made an error in calculating British productivity. We can now see that rather than falling behind after Brexit, our productivity actually went up substantially. Data from before Brexit show UK productivity growth similar to that within the EU as a whole.
5. The EU entrenches regional divisions
Although the UK is outpacing the EU with productivity growth, we are still far behind. This is not because of membership of the union – it’s due to an over-centralised City financial sector, as well as the imposition of aggressive fiscal austerity. The Chancellor and the Prime Minister, as well as the Foreign Secretary, all represent former coalfield seats. If we re-enter the single market without a major programme of reinvestment, it is inevitable that – with such low levels of productivity – there would be a wave of bankruptcies and redundancies as we face much more efficient enterprises.
6. The EU is not a progressive harbour
The argument that the EU helped as a backstop against entrenched neoliberalism in Britain has started to crumble. Much of the criticism of the UK has focused on gross inequality. But is the EU’s record any better? The richest 10 per cent of households in the eurozone hold 57.16 per cent of total net wealth, while the top 5 per cent hold 44.21 per cent. The bottom 50 per cent of households hold just 5.19 per cent. Of course, it may be argued that the situation in the UK is also problematic. But since when did we make decisions based on the principle that we ought to get out of the frying pan to get into a fire?
7. Essential regional economic investment banned
Britain’s enormous regional economic differences desperately need a Government that will drive to restructure the way the nation works. But the EU rules work against this. The structural funds allocated to reconstruction of geographic inequalities by Brussels have been inadequate. In any event, the Central Bank has adopted a tight set of fiscal rules, which have driven austerity and cutbacks. In addition, state aid rules prevent nations from using their powers of procurement and reflationary expenditure to reconstruct national and regional economies.
8. The EU’s regulatory floor is becoming a ceiling on social advance
One alarming recent development in the EU includes the proposal for an “EU Inc” – otherwise known as the 28th regime – which creates a parallel EU-wide corporate regime that would effectively create a company form that is easy to exit national rules through. These proposals are also being brought forward whilst the EU continues to deregulate in other areas, particularly in relation to workers’ rights.
9. Inbuilt economic instability
The EU consists of very different nations, each with their own distinct economic trajectories. But the constraining rules imposed by the European Commission, the bank and the court, as well as the eurozone, have led to friction between the needs of the Euro and of each nation state’s management of their own economy. Thus it was that elected nation states’ actions became incompatible with their membership of the Eurozone.
10. The EU wants to be a state
In geopolitical terms, some would argue that the EU should have its own foreign and defence policy. They want a unitary Europe to take its place alongside the major supranational power blocs and even have its own army. If this turns out to be the direction of travel, the central governmental task of defending the national interest would then be lost, and with it the key function of our nation state.
11. EU imperialism
It’s wrong that the EU’s external trade policies cause neocolonial imbalances. Its Economic Partnership Agreements force developing nations to dismantle domestic market protections in exchange for trade access, often undercutting local industries and smallholder agriculture.
12. Cost
There are various estimates of the likely cost of payments to the European Commission if we rejoin. Suffice it to say, it would be in the billions of pounds.
On Monday night, Andy Burnham stood in the Guildhall, the oldest dining room of the City of London, and delivered his verdict on ten years of British independence. “The hard Brexit we were given is not good enough for Britain,” he told the bankers, and we had “lost more than we have gained in the last 10 years”. He compared the country’s post-Brexit settlement to the emperor’s new clothes, a truth everyone could see and nobody dared to say. It was a striking choice of fable, because the Prime Minister’s case is the one with nothing on.
THE GOVERNMENT’S OWN FIGURES
Begin with the government’s own numbers, not those of its critics. In August, the Chancellor, John Healey, greeted the latest growth figures with something close to triumph: “We’ve seen the fastest growth in the G7 this year”. The Office for National Statistics confirmed that Britain was the fastest-growing economy in the G7 in the first half of 2026. The pace did not slacken over the summer. The economy grew by 0.7 per cent between July and September, the second-fastest rate in the G7, just behind the United States. Over the same three months, Germany grew by 0.2 per cent, Italy stood still and France contracted by 0.1 per cent. The eurozone as a whole managed 0.4 per cent.
So Britain, outside the European Union, outgrew Europe’s three largest economies and the eurozone average. That is not a Leave campaign leaflet. It is the official record. Either Britain can prosper outside the European Union, as the Chancellor says, or it cannot, as the Prime Minister says. No government can sustain both stories at once. It cannot claim the credit for leading the G7 in the summer, then tell the City in the autumn that the country is failing because it left the EU. Burnham has picked the version that justifies the agreement he wants to sign on Friday.
Honesty requires a caveat, and this one strengthens our argument rather than weakening it. One good year proves little on its own, and GDP per head remains 6.6 per cent below its pre-pandemic trend, a reminder of how much ground was lost after 2008 and the pandemic. Nor is this year’s growth evenly spread. In the third quarter, services grew by 0.9 per cent, led by a 4.4 per cent jump in computer programming and consultancy, while production barely moved and construction fell. The boom is in AI investment and business services. It has not reached Barnsley, Middlesbrough or Wigan.
That is exactly where Burnham’s diagnosis goes wrong. The towns being left behind are not being held back by customs paperwork at Calais. They are being held back by forty years of British governments deciding that the money was in the Square Mile and not in the workshop. Brussels did not cause that, and Brussels will not cure it.
DECLINE INSIDE THE CLUB
The Prime Minister’s case rests on the idea that closer ties with the European Union will revive British industry. The history of our membership says otherwise. The Office for National Statistics records it without sentiment: the number of workers in Britain’s production sector fell from 8.6 million in 1970 to 3.0 million in 2016, a fall of 65 per cent. The pits closed, the steelworks went cold and the shipyards fell silent while Britain was a full member of the European Community and then the Union. The single market did nothing to stop it.
By the end of membership, Britain’s former industrial regions were among the poorest in north-west Europe. Checking the claim against EU data, Full Fact found that in 2016 the UK had six of the ten regions with the lowest GDP per person among its nearby neighbours. Over the same decades, the City of London grew rich on financial passporting, drew capital away from productive industry and was rescued by the taxpayer when its gambling brought the banking system down in 2008. That was membership’s settlement for Britain: a gilded capital and a hollowed-out industrial heartland. It was fitting, then, that the Prime Minister delivered his verdict on Brexit to the one part of the country that did best out of the arrangement.
Nor has Europe escaped the decline Burnham blames on Brexit. Germany, the continent’s industrial engine, is shedding manufacturing jobs year on year. According to its own statistics office, German manufacturing employment fell by 2.7 per cent in a year, while its car industry lost 42,300 workers and now employs fewer people than at any time since 2005. If membership protected industry, the EU’s strongest manufacturing nation would not be in retreat.
A PROMISE TO MAKERFIELD
None of this would carry the same weight if Burnham had asked the country’s permission. He has not. In May, campaigning in Makerfield, a constituency that voted 65 per cent to leave, he said Brexit had been damaging but that “the last thing we should do right now is re-run those arguments”. Makerfield believed him and returned him to Parliament. He then entered Downing Street through a Labour leadership contest, not a general election. Not one voter in this country has put Andy Burnham into Number 10 on a promise to reopen Brexit. The only voters who were asked were told it was closed.
The retreat began almost at once. By September he was telling his party conference that “Brexit has done more harm than good”. This month he accused his opponents of “misreading the public mood” and said Friday’s summit “doesn’t need to be the end of our ambition”. On Monday he went further still. Brexit, he told the City, was “exactly what our enemies wanted”.
Seventeen million people cast their votes in 2016, many of them in towns like Makerfield, and their Prime Minister now tells a banqueting hall that they handed Britain’s adversaries a victory. “Brexit is not being reversed in a single dramatic act. It is being hollowed out one regulation at a time.” That is the language of a politician who has decided he knows better than the electorate, and who means to get his way through a run of technical agreements rather than an honest vote.
His own constituents do not appear to share his confidence. A Survation poll of Makerfield, commissioned by the campaign group Britain Unbound, found that 74 per cent believe Britain alone should decide its food standards, the very powers Friday’s agreement hands to Brussels. Some polling suggests opinion on Brexit itself has softened in Makerfield, as it has across the country. But souring on how Brexit was handled is not the same as asking for laws to be written elsewhere. Even voters with regrets still want those decisions made here.
VOICE, BUT NO VOTE
Friday’s food agreement shows how. It rests on dynamic alignment: when Brussels changes its food, plant and animal health rules, Britain changes its own to match. The House of Lords European Affairs Committee warned last week that this will make for a fundamental change in the UK-EU relationship. Its chair, Lord Stirrup, said that the food agreement alone might generate at least 780 pieces of in-scope EU law a year. Many are amendments and technical updates, but that is still roughly two a day, written in a parliament no British voter elects.
What Britain gets in return is a seat at the side of the room. It would have a part in EU “decision shaping” but not decision-making, and would be bound by rules without a vote on their adoption. These rules become British food law, so they bind the butcher in Ashton and the farm shop in Wigan as firmly as the exporter at Dover, even if neither ever sends a product to the continent. Parliament, meanwhile, has been kept away from the detail. The Lords committee recorded that the Government declined to provide a Minister to appear before it until after the summit.
The Prime Minister has already said the agreement “will mean presenting legislation to Parliament next week”. MPs will be asked to approve the machinery after the deal is done, not before. Ministers call this administrative housekeeping. It is not. It is political authority being handed over without an honest account of what is being given away.
THE PRICE OF GOING BACK
Burnham insists he will not cross Labour’s red lines before the next election. But he has said he hopes to see Britain rejoin in his lifetime, so the public is entitled to know what rejoining would cost. Before we left, the Treasury put Britain’s net contribution to the EU budget in 2018 at £8.9 billion. That bill was kept down by Margaret Thatcher’s rebate, worth £4.5 billion in 2018. The rebate is gone and would not return automatically. New member states are also bound by the treaties to adopt the euro in time, and Britain’s old opt-out went when we left. No minister has explained how putting sterling on the table would rebuild a single steelworks, factory or shipyard. Even the smaller agreements carry a bill. A Commons Library briefing records that both the food and emissions trading agreements involve a UK financial contribution, and a draft electricity text concedes that participation in parts of the EU’s internal market “requires an appropriate level of financial contribution”. None of these payments has been costed in public, and none will be put to a vote.
FREE MOVEMENT AND WAGES
Then there is free movement, the issue that decided the referendum in towns like Makerfield. Ten years ago, Andy Burnham understood it. He attacked a system of free movement “used by multinationals to undermine wages”, and he was right. Cheap, mobile labour suited employers who wanted to hold down pay and avoid training anyone locally. Last month, as Prime Minister, he said the country needs an “honest discussion” about returning to the EU’s free movement rules. Friday’s package already includes a youth mobility scheme for young people to study, work and travel in each other’s countries, with annual numbers in each direction expected to be between 80,000 and 100,000. He has not explained how the rules that undercut working class wages in 2016 have become a remedy for working class towns in 2026.
THE COST OF LIVING ALIBI
Every step back towards Brussels is sold as relief for the weekly shop. Burnham says the food deal will “get food prices down”, and on Monday he promised progress on “bringing down electricity bills” too. Keir Starmer promised exactly the same in May 2025, when even Brussels warned that the effects could take years to reach consumers. Eighteen months on, the deal is still not in force; the government intends it to take effect in mid-2027. The fresh-produce importers who supply half the country’s fruit and vegetables warn that it will add £300 million to the nation’s food bills “for no measurable benefit”.
WHAT BREXIT WAS FOR
The Tribune has never pretended that leaving the European Union would rebuild Britain by itself. We campaigned to leave as democratic socialists in the tradition of Tony Benn, because we believed the people who make the laws should be answerable to, and removable by, the people who live under them. Brexit was never an industrial strategy. It was the return of the power to have one. What it did not supply was the nerve to use that power. Successive governments, Conservative and Labour, inherited the freedom to back British industry with public investment, to take energy and water into public ownership, to buy British for public contracts and to direct capital towards the towns the City forgot. Almost none of it was attempted. The failure belongs to Westminster, not to the referendum.
That work can still be done, and it can be done here. Britain can trade with Europe, co-operate with Europe and be a good neighbour to Europe without surrendering the right to choose its own direction. What it needs is a government willing to rebuild the country it governs, not one looking for a parliament overseas to take the decisions and the blame. Makerfield was promised in May that the argument was over. On Friday, the Prime Minister expects to sign it away in a room where Makerfield has no vote. Brexit did not fail the heartlands. Westminster did, and now it wants to send the power, and the bill, to Brussels.