Monday, 6 July 2026

Infraction

Who is this Taylor Swift? Is he a footballer? Perhaps he will be the next recipient of the FIFA Peace Prize? But who should be the FIFA Laureates in Physics, Chemistry, Physiology or Medicine, Literature, and Economic Sciences? And why?

Without having to do anything to avoid it, I have managed not to see a single moment of the World Cup, and my life is quite complete. But I should still like to welcome the United States to the club of true footballing countries, defined by their shamelessly corrupt relationship with FIFA. Donald Trump admits that he does not know what a red card is, yet he can still have the ban attached to one overturned, and he is being backed by people who thought that Belgium was trying to play against an American team of only 10 men.

Folarin Balogun's Nigerian parents were happily settled in London when airline staff would not allow them to fly back from a trip to New York because his mother was seven months pregnant. Only for that reason was he born in the United States, returning at two months old to the United Kingdom, where he grew up, giving him his unmistakable Multicultural London English accent. All the way up to under-21 level, as recently as 2022, he played for England. Specifically, of course, he played "soccer". Not exactly Trump's base, is he?

Confronting This Cold, Hard Reality


After his 4 July call with Donald Trump about the war in Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky projected only optimism. “There is a real prospect to put an end to this war,” he said in a statement posted on X.

He’s not alone in this assessment. For weeks, coverage of the war in the Western media has been celebratory, enthusiastically predicting that Ukraine has “turned the tide” and now has a real chance to force Vladimir Putin to settle the four-year conflict on terms favourable to Kyiv.

This new narrative, however, amounts to a mix of intentional propaganda and wishful thinking. To be sure, Ukraine’s deep strike campaign has created new economic and social pressures in Russia. But even if the war looks and feels different to outside observers, its trajectory is unchanged and its end no closer than it was a year ago.

Zelensky has good reason to put a positive spin on Ukraine’s prospects on the battlefield. Not only does the hopeful picture give war-weary Ukrainians a morale boost, it encourages the country’s European backers to redouble their economic and military support. What’s more, it reinforces the view that one final push may be enough to compel Russia into a ceasefire. Zelensky’s message is also aimed at Trump himself, part of an ongoing effort to convince Washington that Ukraine is a horse worth backing.

But there is little evidence to support Zelensky’s version of events. The most visible change in the war over recent months has been the growing success of Ukraine’s long-range strike campaign, which has damaged parts of Russia’s oil infrastructure. As a result, Russia’s war effort has been strained, as has its civilian population, with gas shortages reported in many areas. Ukraine has also used medium-range drones and missiles to disable Russian logistics, slowing its progress on the front line and complicating efforts to resupply Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014.

These developments have changed the character of the war but not its long-term fundamentals. For instance, deep strikes may inflict damage on Russia, but ultimately Ukraine suffers more. That is because Russia has leveraged its superiority in firepower to escalate its response significantly, launching strikes on Ukraine’s energy and transport networks. Kyiv’s industrial base has also been worn down due to insufficient air defence coverage.

The binding constraint on this war is still Ukraine’s lack of manpower. Drones can help offset this disadvantage but cannot turn the scales in Kyiv’s favour. Indeed, in recent weeks Russia’s ground offensive has made slow but important gains. It is on the verge of taking Kostyantynivka, a strategically important city in Donetsk, and is moving closer to other cities along Ukraine’s “fortress belt” as well.

Confident about Russia’s continued offensive progress, Putin has shown no real signs of backing down from his war aims, raising further questions about whether peace is as close as Zelensky suggests. In fact, Putin has signalled an increase in Russia’s territorial ambitions and restated his 2022 conditions for peace, articulated when the two combatants met in Istanbul early in the war.

It would be wrong to say that Moscow is not interested in negotiations. In fact, Putin expressed continued interest in diplomacy in his own 4 July call with Trump. But there is no indication that economic pressure from Ukraine’s attacks is weakening his position internally or causing him to consider an early end to his military operation. As was the case in 2022, it is very unlikely that economic pressure on Russia will determine the end to this war.

But even if Moscow and Kyiv could agree on the need for resumed negotiations, the two combatants face a common obstacle: US disinterest. Ever since the war in Iran began, Washington has had little time to devote to the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Ukraine and Russia can do a lot of negotiating on their own, yet both sides also want security guarantees that only Washington can provide. The US absence is therefore a serious impediment.

Trump has suggested several times that US attention might shift back now that the Iran war’s active phase has ended but, so far, this seems unlikely. With Iran negotiations ongoing and the midterms looming, Ukraine is simply not a high priority for the Trump administration.

For all the happy talk about Ukraine’s new momentum and the potential for a near-term ceasefire, then, the war looks likely to continue, and the pendulum is likely to swing back in Moscow’s favour soon enough. Rather than indulging in fantasy, Kyiv’s interests would be better served by confronting this cold, hard reality.

Testing Manchesterism

Paul Knaggs writes:

By the time you read this, Andy Burnham may be closer to Downing Street than any man has come without a contested election since Gordon Brown glided into it in 2007, then spent three years never quite finding the nerve to ask the country if it agreed. This is not even the open chaos of Tory internal warfare, where the country at least got to see the challengers and hear something of what they claimed to represent. This is a changing of the guard conducted in silence, a straight swap. Meet the new boss. Same as the old boss.

We have written elsewhere about what that kind of succession says about the state of the Labour Party, a leadership settled by a machine that could not produce a challenger from four hundred MPs. That argument stands. We are not going to make it again here.

What has had far less scrutiny is the thing Burnham is actually offering in place of an argument: a decade of Manchester’s economic record, presented as proof of concept for the whole country. That is a testable claim, not a mood. So test it.

The Manchester School: Free Trade Then, Public Control Now

There is a nice irony buried in the word itself. The Manchester School of Richard Cobden and John Bright stood for unfettered free trade and the removal of any state hand from the market. Burnham has taken the same word and turned it inside out: public control of the buses, council housing, active use of the state to attract and steer capital, all offered as the cure for what he calls Britain’s low-growth, high-inequality trap.

Words get recycled in politics more often than convictions do. What matters is not what he calls it. What matters is what it does.

The Bee Network, Good Growth Fund and the Productivity Miracle 

On the figures Greater Manchester supplies about itself, the record is genuinely strong, and in places startling. The city region has averaged 3.1 per cent annual growth since 2015, roughly double the national rate. The Productivity Institute’s own analysis of the underlying ONS data sharpens that further: GVA per hour worked in the City of Manchester rose 42.0 per cent between 2015 and 2023, against 29.2 per cent for the average of the nine other large UK cities outside London and 28.1 per cent for the UK as a whole. Manchester’s output per hour now stands at 115 per cent of that nine-city average, up from 104 per cent in 2015. It is, on this measure, the most productive large English city outside the capital.

The Bee Network brought buses back under public control through franchising, knitting buses and trams into one integrated system in a way no English region outside London had managed. The Good Growth Fund began as a billion-pound revolving investment platform and has since won a further commitment of at least £500 million from the National Wealth Fund, aimed at pulling private capital into transport, regeneration and clean energy. Five growth clusters organise the industrial strategy; Live Well, the region’s prevention programme, tries to shift spending from crisis response to early intervention in health and work.

Even those figures need a caveat Manchester’s boosters rarely supply themselves. The Economics Observatory has warned that part of the apparent productivity miracle rests on shaky data out of Trafford, and that correcting for how hours worked are measured cuts the recent growth figures considerably. That does not erase Manchester’s real success. It does mean the most triumphant version of the story does not survive contact with its own footnotes.

Burnham Inherited Manchester’s Success – He Didn’t Build It 

There is a second caveat, and it matters more to the argument about Burnham personally than to the argument about the model. Burnham did not build this. He inherited it and ran it well. Greater Manchester’s advantage rests on four decades of policy continuity that predates him by a generation, on the work of earlier leaders such as Howard Bernstein and Richard Leese, on the Oxford Road Corridor’s universities and research institutes, on airport connectivity most English cities do not have.

The Productivity Institute is careful on this point. It does not claim devolution alone caused Manchester’s productivity, only that a particular configuration, the university-industry interface built around the Corridor, UMIP and Bruntwood SciTech, differentiated Manchester from Birmingham, Leeds and its other peers. That is a narrower and more honest claim than “Manchester grew because Burnham arrived,” and it is worth remembering exactly as the country is asked to hand him the premiership on the strength of a personal record that was, on the evidence, mostly institutional. 

Can Manchesterism Be Exported? The Economists Weigh In

None of this makes the case for national transfer absurd, and Heartlands readers should hear it stated as its supporters would put it, not as a straw man. Burnham’s own argument is that Britain’s stagnation is inseparable from over-centralisation, and that moving decisions on transport, housing, skills and utilities closer to the places they affect is a genuine fix, not a gimmick. Centre for Cities, no soft touch on regional policy, argues that big cities have to be the starting point for any national growth strategy because they hold the densest concentrations of skilled labour and productive industry. Philip McCann’s research goes further, concluding that scaling elements of the model, transport integration, cluster-based industrial policy, could reduce regional disparities if paired with reform of how infrastructure is financed and planned. Even the Institute of Economic Affairs, in a piece pointedly titled “Whither Manchesterism?”, credits the decentralisation and the planning flexibility with improving outcomes, while noting drily that the word itself was borrowed from nineteenth-century free traders and turned to precisely the opposite purpose.

Grant Burnham all of that. It still leaves the harder question unanswered: does what worked in one city region, with a bespoke settlement and 40 years of continuity behind it, transfer to a whole country that has none of those advantages built in?

The Replication Problem: Not Every Place Is Manchester 

The evidence says, cautiously, not easily. Diane Coyle, no critic of devolution, has written plainly that the Manchester model with its foreign inwards investment cannot be precisely replicated at the national level, because a city region’s development strategy and a national government’s macroeconomic programme are different instruments answering to different problems: taxation, defence, trade, the sequencing of infrastructure across a whole country rather than one conurbation. Centre for Cities puts the obstacle in blunter terms: the UK remains the least fiscally devolved country in the G7, and any serious transfer of the Manchester model would require a design for tax-sharing and equalisation that does not yet exist on paper anywhere in Whitehall. Reuters and the Associated Press have both noted, in their reporting on Burnham’s own speeches, the absence of detail on how a national version would balance tax, spending and borrowing. The Financial Times has gone further, arguing that radical localism on its own will not solve a national malaise this deep. 

Nor is every place Manchester. The research is fairly consistent that replication is plausible chiefly where cities already have the mass for agglomeration and the institutional stability to bring private capital in behind them, places such as Birmingham, Leeds, Bristol, Glasgow or the Liverpool City Region. It is far less plausible where the research base, the transport network or the institutional capacity simply is not there, which in England is most places. 

Even inside Greater Manchester itself, growth has stayed stubbornly concentrated in the city centre. Oxford Economics found that outer boroughs have generally outperformed the national average, but not on anything like the scale that spillovers reach London’s outer boroughs. The Good Growth Fund’s own existence is the clearest evidence of that. It was built, on Centre for Cities’ own account, because the earlier pattern of growth was not spreading fast enough across Greater Manchester’s ten boroughs on its own. A fund built to fix a spillover problem is not proof the spillover problem has been solved. It is proof it has been noticed. 

Neoliberalism, or Something Else 

That brings the argument to the word the online left keeps reaching for, and keeps getting only half right. The case that Manchesterism is simply neoliberalism in a hard hat starts with what the money actually does: dense city-centre development, commercial office and lab space, private developers, an explicit courtship of global capital. Manchester City Council’s own Good Growth material shows a large share of the fund going into city-centre offices, science space and mixed-tenure housing built to keep the commercial pipeline moving. Left critics, not only the right, have called Manchester a site of state-led gentrification and working class displacement dressed up in devolution’s language. The New Statesman put it in four words worth remembering: Manchesterism is not socialism. 

The counter is that Burnham’s own language is genuinely, not cosmetically, anti-privatisation. He frames the whole project as a reaction against deindustrialisation, austerity and the sell-off of essential services. Bus franchising is presented, correctly, as a return of public control. On the campaign trail in Makerfield he put it in his own words: a plan for “more public control over water, energy, transport” to bring bills and fares down and give people and businesses what he called breathing space. He backs more council and social housing, and links growth explicitly to prevention in health and community support. That is not the vocabulary of a man simply repackaging Thatcherism for the north.

It is worth pausing on the small print of that phrase, because control and ownership are not the same thing, and the difference is measured in wage packets. A government can set the rules for a service and still contract the work out to whichever firm bids lowest, which means the cleaner, the care worker and the depot hand stay outsourced, on worse pay, worse pensions and weaker job security, while the profit leaves the service at the end of every quarter. Ownership brings those same workers in-house and keeps the surplus inside the service that generated it. Bus franchising is real, and it is a genuine improvement on deregulation. It is also, on Burnham’s own careful wording, control rather than ownership, and nothing he said in Makerfield commits him to the second. The distance between those two words is exactly where a future government could quietly decide how much of good growth ever reaches the people who produce it. 

The honest verdict sits between the two readings, and the evidence does not let either side claim the whole prize. Manchesterism is neither straightforward neoliberalism nor a clean break from it. It is a hybrid: state-steered, genuinely more concerned with public control and prevention than the orthodox model, but still dependent on mainly foreign investment in one urban core and hoping, eventually, that enough of it walks out to the boroughs that did not get the towers. 

Call that trickle-down if the phrase pleases you. It undersells the machinery Burnham has actually built to move money outward. But it also flatters what that machinery has not yet achieved. Manchester itself, by its own government’s admission, has not yet managed good growth in every postcode within one city region. The fund exists precisely because it has not.

No Contest, No Scrutiny: The Questions Burnham Won’t Answer 

Nominations for the Labour leadership open on 9 July and close a week later. In the time between, no one in the parliamentary party has forced Burnham to answer for any of this the way an opponent would: how the fiscal plan survives contact with the Treasury, where the equalisation money comes from that his own sympathetic economists say national transfer requires, and whether Birmingham, Bristol or Glasgow have anything like Greater Manchester’s 40 years of institutional continuity to draw on before being asked to repeat the trick. 

Al Carns, the one Labour MP still weighing whether to stand, has spent the fortnight since Starmer’s resignation asking Burnham to publish that vision rather than committing to make him defend it in a contest. Darren Jones did not even wait to be asked. “Andy Burnham is going to be the next prime minister,” he told Sky News, and stood aside. Wes Streeting endorsed him within hours. 

What is happening here is not a leadership election. It is a transfer of the baton from Starmer to Burnham, and without a meaningful challenge before the sixteenth, he enters Number 10 without any real scrutiny at all: the fiscal plan unpublished, the equalisation question unanswered, 40 years of Manchester’s collective institutional effort quietly repackaged as one man’s personal gift to the nation.

A genuine contest would have made these questions unavoidable. A coronation lets a popular man become prime minister on the strength of what a city built collectively over four decades, without ever being made to explain, under real pressure, how the rest of the country gets the same deal without the same universities, the same continuity, the same Treasury indulgence that took generations to accumulate.

Good growth in every postcode is a fine slogan. Manchester does not have it yet, which is why the fund exists. Burnham wants three years to deliver in the whole country what a decade has not delivered in the 10 boroughs he already ran. That’s some ask.

Sunday, 5 July 2026

No Bearing On The State?

I told you this from the start. Abul Taher writes:

Bridget Phillipson has been accused by a former neighbour of 'exaggerating' her claims of a poverty-stricken upbringing.

The intervention comes after the Education Secretary described The Mail on Sunday's revelation that her family made a 900 per cent profit selling their council house, as a 'manufactured smear'.

Ms Phillipson, 42, told Times Radio their property in Washington, Tyne and Wear, was in a 'terrible state,' with no upstairs heating and rotten windows when her mother bought it under right-to-buy in 1990.

She added: 'There was no prospect of there being any improvement in our living conditions unless [my mother Clare] took that decision to buy our home because of a sustained failure to invest in that house.'

But others who lived on the street at the time have disputed Ms Phillipson's account, insisting the council houses were properly heated and well maintained.

Tracey Morgan, 61, has lived a few doors from the former Phillipson home since 1989, a year before the family bought their council house.

'The upstairs rooms had electric bar heaters, and downstairs rooms had radiators heated by back boilers,' she said.

Coal-fired back boilers provided hot water for washing and central heating. Ms Morgan also said she could not recall rotting windows on the street, saying there were sash windows at the time.

However, she said the local Sunderland Council did maintain the properties, and in 1996, all council tenants were moved out of their homes for four months so that the houses could be renovated.

Ms Morgan added: 'I remember seeing Clare and her daughter, I thought they looked comfortable, and not poor.'

One neighbour, who did not want to be named, said she was sceptical of the minister's claims.

'I think a lot of this stuff is being fabricated. These are old houses, but as long as I've lived here it's been fine,' she said.

Clare Phillipson is believed to have moved to the street in the early 1980s, with her daughter living there since her birth in 1983.

Ms Phillipson bought a former council house three doors away in 2006 with her then partner, now husband, Lawrence Dimery, before the couple sold it in 2016.

Her mother sold the family home in 2023 and is thought to live eight miles away, close to her daughter's constituency home.

Last night a source close to Bridget Phillipson said: 'Claims by apparent neighbours as to the state of their homes in the 90s have no bearing on the state of Bridget's mum's home in the 1980s.'

Reports of Russia’s Imminent Defeat Are Greatly Exaggerated

Dubbed into Ukrainian, Masha and the Bear is hugely popular in Ukraine, and that is before considering the large audience that the Russian original would also have there, where John Ratcliffe claims that Russian recruits have a life expectancy of 20 minutes. Life expectancy at Stalingrad was 24 hours, so the Director of the CIA would have us believe that for the Russians, the war in Ukraine was 72 times deadlier than the bloodiest battle in human history, with a logistically impossible hundreds of thousands of deaths per day, supposedly thanks to the drones that were very much the flavour of the month from the future employers of those parroting that line. Yet people are lapping up and regurgitating this pap. Thankfully, those people do not include Mary Dejevsky:

Vladimir Putin is showing a new frankness about the damage being done by Ukrainian strikes on Russia and Russian-occupied Crimea. In the past, the rule seemed to be silence or denial. Now, Putin has admitted that Ukrainian strikes are ‘creating problems’, that there are widespread petrol shortages, and that if the problems persist, this year’s harvest could be hit. A state of emergency has been declared in Crimea at the start of the holiday season.

The obvious reason for the new frankness is that Moscow can no longer ignore reality. The war is indeed starting to come ‘home’ to many city-dwelling Russians for the first time, with the risk that it could ignite popular discontent.

Putin’s admissions also play into a narrative that has been running in much of the Western media, according to which, after a difficult winter, Ukraine has turned the tide and now has a good chance of forcing Russia into concessions. This in turn reinforces the argument that not only must Ukraine push on, but that its Western backers – now mostly Europe – must also step up support for Ukraine.

So far, this narrative of Ukrainian success has been widely accepted outside Russia, with few questions asked. But it is far from the whole picture. In particular, it leaves a very big Donbas-shaped gap, where the story is rather different. In recent weeks, Russia has been accelerating what had been its glacial advance towards the key ‘fortress’ cities of Kramatorsk and Sloviansk, and so to controlling the whole of the Donbas. Ukraine has been desperate to prevent these cities falling into Russian hands, for fear that it could open the way for Russia to reach Kyiv or Odessa (if that is its aim).

Two towns on this route have been crucial: Pokrovsk, which has been in Russian hands since February (but has never been acknowledged lost by Kyiv) and Kostyantynivka, which is now reported to be mostly or entirely controlled by Russia. The significance of this was pointed out two weeks ago in a long article that suddenly appeared on the BBC website, completely against the grain of its long-standing successful-Ukraine, failing-Russia message. Other outlets, including Sky News and the New York Times, followed suit.

It would appear from these reports that, whatever setbacks Russia might have suffered in Crimea or from damage to refineries inside Russia, these are secondary. Moscow is still pursuing its central aim of capturing the Donbas, undeterred. Indeed, a Russian view is that the recent strikes by Ukraine are designed primarily to divert attention from its losses in the Donbas.

The mostly absent Donbas aspect of recent Western reporting also underlines something else: that much of the news of the war originates in Ukraine and comes complete with its own Ukrainian and Western ‘spin’. Any view from Russia has been at best partial.

There are other angles largely missing from Western mainstream reporting, which also tend to foster a rosier picture of the situation in Ukraine than may be warranted. Ukraine has suffered a devastating loss of population to exile and war. That Ukraine is running short of fighters is demonstrated by the spread of ‘busification’ – essentially the press-ganging of civilians into military service by recruiters – with frequent videos on social media showing local people trying to rescue the victims. First-hand reports also suggest broken supply lines in places, which have led to Ukrainian troops going hungry.

Corruption in Ukraine continues, with those in the frame including president Volodymyr Zelensky’s former chief of staff, Andriy Yermak. A senior Ukrainian intelligence officer – Dmytro Kozyura – has also just been convicted of spying for Russia.

An argument can be made that it reflects well on Ukraine that such inconvenient truths see the light of day at all. But this ‘bad news’ from Ukraine receives a lot less attention than today’s dominant message that Ukraine has turned the tide and is on course to win – a message repeatedly reinforced by the ‘bad news’ from Russia.

This tends to focus on two areas: the casualty figures, which have become a big part of the propaganda war for both sides and will probably never be established until the fighting is over, and forecasts of Russia’s imminent economic collapse as a result of the war or Western economic sanctions, or both. Yet while eyewitness reports of full supermarket shelves may be questionable, there are credible ways in which Russia has actually profited from the war – most recently, from higher oil prices and sales during the conflict in the Middle East.

None of this is to say that the tide of the war has been turning decisively in Russia’s favour, or that periodic reports of dissent in the Kremlin – between hawks and relative doves (with Putin, by the way, in the latter camp) – do not have some truth to them. It is rather to cast doubt on the certainty that Ukraine is now in the stronger position, and that it is Putin, not Zelensky, who will be forced to negotiate.

The reality, insofar as it can be gauged, is that Russia is advancing towards its goal of capturing the whole of the Donbas. Predictions that it is running out of troops or weapons, or the will to fight, disregard the fact that it is many times bigger and richer in resources than Ukraine. Its war objectives have also remained remarkably consistent, and there is no sign of Putin buckling, nor is he under domestic pressure to do so.

Discussing the Ukrainian attacks and the petrol queues, Putin offered his own rationale: having largely failed on the existing battlefields, he suggested, Ukraine was now trying to destabilise Russia itself by sowing division, sapping support for the war and forcing Russia into negotiations. ‘We will not give them that chance’, he said, insisting that Ukraine’s long-range strikes would do nothing to alter Russia’s war aims.

It is just about possible – as indeed it was in the first year of the war – to imagine a scenario where Ukraine is able to isolate Crimea and use it as a bargaining chip. But it is hard to see Russia surrendering territory that it sees as crucial to its security as it does the Donbas. And it is even harder to see Russia being bombed into submission by Ukraine, both because of the sporadic nature of the strikes, and because of precedents – including in Ukraine itself – that suggest such attacks only stiffen national resolve.

Ukraine’s dependence on outside help also places it at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Russia. How soon, and on what terms, the war ends could now be determined by whether, or how soon, Russia can gain control of all the Donbas – and how long Europe’s ability and will to support Ukraine will last.

Where Are We This Morning?


Where are we this morning?

George Cottrell’s lawyers acknowledged he paid for Nigel Farage’s staff and security. He did so via electronic transfer from bank accounts in his name.

On the townhouse, they said their client “does, and did” let Farage stay there.

Farage has sought to dismiss both.

On failing to declare funding for operation, he said he didn’t need to: he wasn’t a politician at the time.

On failing to declare use of house, he said he didn’t need to: Cottrell is a friend, so it is exempt.

Sources close to him are also downplaying this dimension generally, saying stays extremely infrequent.

The parliamentary rules say any benefit exceeding £300 in value that is not “purely personal” — i.e., romantic partner or family — and is in any way related to an MP’s “political activities” must be declared. This includes the 12 months before a new MP’s election.

Please read our article but also Reform’s statement, in which we are described as having a pro-Labour government bias and seeking to promote our podcast.

School Report

What to make of the closure of Durham High School? The Headmistress had been under investigation for misconduct.

And both it and Ruthin had been bought by Global Galaxy Education, a Chinese asset-stripper that had already closed Malvern St James, having bought all of them, and Plymouth College, during this Parliament, meaning that it had known full well about the impending imposition of VAT on school fees.

There is a much deeper story here.