Seumas Milne writes:
Diplomatic pronouncements are renowned for
hypocrisy and double standards. But western denunciations of Russian
intervention in Crimea have reached new depths of self parody.
The so far
bloodless incursion is an "incredible
act of aggression", US secretary of state John Kerry declared. In the
21st century you just don't invade countries on a "completely trumped-up
pretext", he insisted, as US allies agreed that it had been an
unacceptable breach of international law, for which there will be
"costs".
That the states which launched the greatest act
of unprovoked aggression in modern history on a trumped-up pretext – against
Iraq, in
an illegal war now estimated to have killed 500,000, along with the
invasion of Afghanistan, bloody regime change in Libya, and the killing of
thousands in drone attacks on Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, all without UN
authorisation – should make such claims is beyond absurdity.
It's not just that western aggression and lawless
killing is on another scale entirely from anything Russia appears to have
contemplated, let alone carried out – removing any credible basis for the US
and its allies to rail against Russian transgressions.
But the western powers
have also played a central role in creating the Ukraine crisis in the first
place.
The US and European powers openly sponsored the
protests to oust the corrupt but elected Viktor Yanukovych government, which
were triggered by controversy over an all-or-nothing EU agreement which would
have excluded economic association with Russia.
In her notorious "fuck the
EU" phone call leaked last month, the US official Victoria Nuland can
be heard laying down the shape of a post-Yanukovych government – much of which
was then turned into reality when he was overthrown after the escalation of
violence a couple of weeks later.
The president had by then lost political
authority, but his overnight impeachment was certainly constitutionally
dubious.
In his place a government of oligarchs,
neoliberal Orange Revolution retreads and neofascists has been installed,
one of whose first acts was to try and remove the official status of Russian,
spoken by a majority in parts of the south and east, as moves were made to ban
the Communist party, which won 13% of the vote at the last election.
It has been claimed that the role of fascists in
the demonstrations has been exaggerated by Russian propaganda to justify
Vladimir Putin's manoeuvres in Crimea. The
reality is alarming enough to need no exaggeration.
Activists report that
the far right made up around a third of the protesters, but they were decisive
in armed confrontations with the police.
The far right Svoboda party, whose leader has
denounced the "criminal
activities" of "organised Jewry" and which was condemned by
the European parliament for its "racist and antisemitic views", has
five ministerial posts in the new government, including deputy prime minister
and prosecutor general.
The leader of the even more extreme Right Sector, at
the heart of the street violence, is now Ukraine's deputy national security
chief.
Neo-Nazis in office is a first in post-war
Europe. But this is the unelected government now backed by the US and EU.
And in
a contemptuous rebuff to the ordinary Ukrainians who protested against
corruption and hoped for real change, the new administration has appointed two
billionaire oligarchs – one who runs his business from Switzerland – to be the
new governors of the eastern cities of Donetsk and Dnepropetrovsk.
Meanwhile,
the IMF is preparing an eye-watering austerity plan for the tanking Ukrainian
economy which can only swell poverty and unemployment.
From a longer-term perspective, the crisis in
Ukraine is a product of the disastrous Versailles-style break-up of the Soviet
Union in the early 1990s.
As in Yugoslavia, people who were content to be a
national minority in an internal administrative unit of a multinational state –
Russians in Soviet Ukraine, South Ossetians in Soviet Georgia – felt very
differently when those units became states for which they felt little loyalty.
In the case of Crimea, which was only transferred
to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s, that is clearly true for the
Russian majority.
And contrary
to undertakings given at the time, the US and its allies have since
relentlessly expanded Nato up to Russia's borders, incorporating nine former
Warsaw Pact states and three former Soviet republics into what is effectively an
anti-Russian military alliance in Europe.
The European association agreement
which provoked the Ukrainian crisis also included clauses to integrate Ukraine
into the EU defence structure.
That western military expansion was first brought
to a halt in 2008 when the US
client state of Georgia attacked Russian forces in the contested territory
of South Ossetia and was driven out.
The short but bloody conflict signalled
the end of George Bush's unipolar world in which the US empire would
enforce its will without challenge on every continent.
Given that background, it is hardly surprising
that Russia has acted to stop the more strategically sensitive and neuralgic
Ukraine falling decisively into the western camp, especially given that
Russia's only major warm-water naval base is in Crimea.
Clearly, Putin's justifications for intervention
– "humanitarian" protection for Russians and an appeal by the deposed
president – are legally and politically flaky, even if nothing like on the
scale of "weapons of mass destruction".
Nor does Putin's conservative
nationalism or oligarchic regime have much wider international appeal. But Russia's role as a limited counterweight to
unilateral western power certainly does.
And in a world where the US, Britain,
France and their allies have turned international lawlessness with a moral
veneer into a permanent routine, others are bound to try the same game.
Fortunately, the only shots fired by Russian
forces at this point have been into the air. But the dangers of escalating
foreign intervention are obvious.
What is needed instead is a negotiated
settlement for Ukraine, including a broad-based government in Kiev shorn of
fascists; a federal constitution that guarantees regional autonomy; economic
support that doesn't pauperise the majority; and a chance for people in Crimea
to choose their own future.
Anything else risks spreading the conflict.
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