Organically Self-Regulating

Miriam Cates writes:

Boris Johnson is a clever and educated man. As a King’s scholar at Eton, classics scholar at Oxford, President of the Oxford Union, and author of numerous books, no one can doubt the former Prime Minister’s literary talents. Yet I am sure that even Johnson himself would admit that maths was never his strong point. The previous government’s woeful response to the Covid pandemic may have been significantly less destructive had our former Prime Minister’s grasp of statistics been half as a good has his knowledge of Greek mythology.

Last week, Johnson’s innumeracy struck again, this time leaving him struggling to grasp the implications of falling global birth rates.

Writing in the Daily Mail last week, Mr Johnson claimed that rapidly declining global birth rates are not a “crisis, but a sign that the human population is organically self-regulating” and that “after years of demographic strain we are in sight of a demographic dividend”.

Online, Johnson has been roundly derided as a hypocrite. For a man who has fathered at least nine offspring to publicly celebrate a global fall in the number of children demonstrates a lack of self-awareness to say the least. And it is somewhat galling for a former PM who oversaw record levels of immigration and population growth to welcome a decline in national births. Yet Johnson’s views on falling fertility rates are not just hypocritical; they are plain wrong.

In his article, Johnson recognises that, across the world, ageing populations are transforming societies. He writes that in Italy there are now more funerals than weddings, in Tokyo children’s playgrounds are deserted, in India schools are empty and in China thousands of family apartments lie empty. Yet the former occupant of 10 Downing Street mocks leaders who are raising the alarm about this worrying trend – such as Italy’s Georgia Meloni and Emmanuel Macron of France – accusing them of having ‘spasms’ and saying ‘Crisis? What crisis?’

But the global ‘baby bust’ is no joke. Here in the UK, our total fertility rate (TFR) now stands at just 1.4 children per woman. This means that the number of yearly births is around a third lower than what is necessary to maintain a stable population. Who will care for the elderly when there are not enough young people to go around? Who will pay the taxes that fund pensions and healthcare when each year, more people leave the workplace than enter it? How will our business and technology sectors grow without the young minds that drive innovation? How will our economy be revived when the most important driver for growth – the labour force – is shrinking not growing? How will we survive the ravages of inflation and shortages as the productive workforce declines?

Below-replacement birthrates will not result in a one-off population reduction like after a war or pandemic. Rather each generation will be a third – or in some countries a half – smaller than the one before, in a tailspin of decline where the old always outnumber the young.

As a classicist Boris Johnson must be familiar with the fall of the Roman Empire, which was brought about in part by collapsing fertility rates. Yet he fails to recognise a parallel impending catastrophe of our own times. In fact, Johnson says that falling populations are a “blessing” and a “ray of hope”, because of the “crippling burden” human beings place on nature.

But are people not part of the natural world? Are not the desires to grow, reproduce, harness nature and build civilisations a core part of what it means to be human? Of course it is true that human beings have had an impact – in some cases negative – on the environment and other species, but is Johnson seriously suggesting that the world would be a better place without us in it?

Johnson admits that the dire prophecies of Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 book The Population Bomb have not come to pass. As the global population has grown, we have not, as Ehrlich predicted, run out of food and natural resources. In fact the opposite is true; as the demographer Paul Morland writes in the Telegraph: 

“At eight billion, humans as a whole live immensely longer, healthier and richer lives than when we were four billion, at four billion living standards were higher than when we were two billion and at two billion, people were living much better than when, at the start of the 19th century, there were just one billion of us.”

Global food production has already increased by over fifty per cent in the first quarter of this century. Meanwhile, the proportion of the world living in absolute poverty has fallen from around half in 1970 to under ten per cent today. It turns out that population growth catalyses rather than curbs human flourishing. We should certainly be concerned – and try to mitigate – the impact of global warming, yet over the last century, the risk of dying from natural disasters has decreased by an astonishing 98 per cent, as technological capabilities (driven by population growth) have enabled us to save countless lives from the ravages of earthquakes, floods and famines. Cold-temperature related deaths – which account for nine times as many deaths as heat-related mortality – are also falling.

It is true that the global population is still rising; we are in a lag phase where falling birth rates are still masked by rising life expectancy. But even if we were to arrest the fertility decline tomorrow, the earth’s population will peak some time in the 2080s, followed by rapid collapse.

Yet despite these undeniable facts, Boris Johnson is far from alone in his misguided belief that falling birth rates should be welcomed. The message of The Population Bomb and generations of relentless environmental campaigning have been so pervasive that it now seems counterintuitive to worry about population shrinkage.

In Britain, high levels of immigration in recent years have also disguised the problem of low birth rates. Since 2010, the UK population has increased by seven million people, almost entirely as a result of new arrivals. As is now abundantly clear, this kind of ‘transfer’ growth (as opposed to natural growth driven by births) has had a negative and deeply unpopular impact on our economic and social conditions. Adult immigrants compete for housing and infrastructure. Language, cultural and educational differences create friction and reduce social trust. Mass migration has transformed our cities, and not for the better; it’s unsurprising that many British people might be relieved to hear that we may be moving towards population decline.

But natural population growth – the birth of new babies – carries none of the downsides of mass immigration. Babies are born into existing families, without requiring any additional housing, and making negligible contributions to consumption or infrastructure demand for at least eighteen years, by which time natural deaths will have freed up housing stock and other resources. Children born in Britain are educated in the British education system, learning our language, culture and the skills they require to positively contribute to our society and economy. While net migration of 300 000 or more foreign adults each year has placed huge strain on society, an additional 300 000 babies born each year – the gap between current annual birth numbers and population sustainability – would have little impact in the short term but store up a bountiful demographic dividend for twenty years time.

It is sadly ironic that Johnson’s gravest political error – the “Boriswave” – has become the greatest political barrier to understanding the consequences of falling national birth rates. But it is a barrier we must try to overcome; the fact that the ratio of working age people to retirees has continued to decline despite such an enormous influx of young migrants should be an indicator of just how serious Britain’s birth dearth really is.

As a former Prime Minister and prolific columnist, Boris Johnson is still an influential figure. Yet it is noticeable how far the debate has moved in the last three years. Back in 2023, discussions about falling birth rates were derided as ‘far fight’ moral panics by much of the mainstream media, yet all of our national news outlets now regularly profile this issue. Just last week The Guardian published a comprehensive report on the economic impact of declining fertility.

Johnson is now an outlier in his demographic denialism as more and more of his peers are becoming worried about the baby bust. But worrying isn’t enough – we must act. Most young people still want to become parents, and the average desired family size is a healthy 2.2 children. The task of government and society is to break down the barriers that stop these dreams from becoming reality. If we could devote half as much time and energy into saving humanity as Johnson has devoted to saving the polar bears, perhaps we might have a fighting chance.

That Guardian report, by Linda Geddes, is here:

In Japan, there are now companies that specialise in cleaning the apartments of elderly people who have died alone and gone undiscovered for weeks or months, while adult incontinence pads have outstripped nappy sales for more than a decade. In Italy, depopulating villages are selling homes for €1 to attract new residents and keep services running. In the UK, falling pupil numbers are already closing schools and classrooms in parts of London.

These are not isolated curiosities, but signs of a broader shift taking place across much of the developed world. “In the EU in 2024, 21 of 27 countries had more deaths than births,” said Prof Sarah Harper, the director of the Oxford Institute of Population Ageing. Across Asia and the Americas, too – from Japan and South Korea, to Cuba and Uruguay – many countries are seeing the same pattern.

It reflects two long-running demographic changes: people are living longer, and the average number of children they are having – something demographers refer to as fertility – is falling.

In the UK, the latest projections from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) suggest that deaths will outnumber births every year from 2026 onwards, driven by falling fertility and the large, postwar “baby boom” generation living longer than previous generations, but now reaching later life. The population is still expected to grow, but more slowly than previously forecast, peaking at about 72.5 million in 2054 before beginning to gradually decline. Earlier projections had suggested growth would continue until 2096. 

“Although the point where there are more deaths than births is emotionally significant, it’s part of a long process,” said Dr Paul Morland, a demographer and author of No One Left: Why the World Needs More Children. Life expectancy has been rising since the late 18th century, while fertility has been declining since the late 19th century, aside from a brief mid-20th century rebound.

“There comes a point when these two lines cross,” he said.

The reasons people are having fewer children are complex. A fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman is typically needed for a population to replace itself over time. The UK rate is 1.44.

“Recent fertility declines in the UK have been especially marked in those under 30, indicating some postponement,” said Prof Melanie Channon, of the University of Bath. “However, even accounting for the trend towards later parenthood, fertility is still declining.”

These changes are already being felt. “In the short run, those in sectors that serve children – maternity care, schools, childminders – and new parents are feeling the falling number of births,” said Dr Bernice Kuang, of the University of Southampton. Falling enrolment is forcing some schools to close, while businesses such as soft play centres and childminders are struggling. Even midwifery training is affected, as students must attend a minimum number of births.

The effects of such struggles extend beyond children themselves. “Working parents – disproportionately mothers – may have to leave the labour force or reduce their hours,” Kuang said, with implications for the economy and gender equality. 

Meanwhile, longer lifespans are contributing to a gradual “greying” of the population, with consequences of its own. As populations age, Morland says, they tend to become more risk-averse, with investment flowing into safer assets rather than innovation, while a smaller, older workforce may be less entrepreneurial and able to sustain economic growth.

The pressures on public finances are also stark, with fewer workers supporting rising spending on pensions, health and social care. Older people require far higher levels of support, placing a growing burden on younger workers.

At the same time, consumption patterns are shifting. Younger people tend to spend more on goods and appliances, whereas older people spend more on care and other services that cannot easily be automated or offshored. “Just as your labour force is drying up, you have more demands for local hands-on labour,” Morland said.

Many developed nations face similar pressures. What is striking, however, is how these trends have spread beyond the richest economies. In many middle- and lower-income countries, fertility is falling despite more limited economic development. Parts of Latin America, as well as countries such as Jamaica and Thailand, and states in India including Tamil Nadu and Kerala, have fertility rates comparable with – or lower than – those in Britain. 

“There are countries that will grow old before they grow rich,” said Morland.

All this marks a shift in how demographic change unfolds. Historically, falling birthrates followed rising incomes, urbanisation and education – the so-called demographic transition. But now fertility is declining more rapidly than economic development, driven in part by changing aspirations and social norms.

Even so, the pattern is not uniform. Israel remains unusual in maintaining much higher birth rates – about 3 children per woman – suggesting that culture may play a role. The UK, too, may be more resilient than some of its neighbours. “There is a very strong and persistent two-child norm in the UK, which means our fertility rate is slightly more buoyant than some other European countries where single children are more accepted,” said Channon.

In parts of sub-Saharan Africa, fertility remains high and populations are growing rapidly, even as mortality declines. In parts of central Asia, meanwhile, economies have grown without the same decline in births.

Migration also plays a crucial role. While deaths may outnumber births, the UK’s population is still expected to grow for now, largely because of net inward migration, albeit at lower levels than previously assumed.

Demographic projections are not destiny. They do not account for unexpected shocks or policy shifts, and migration is particularly difficult to predict. As the ONS puts it: “Projections are not forecasts.”

If the direction of travel is clear, the question becomes not so much whether demographic change can be reversed, but how societies respond to it.

Some changes are already “baked in”, reflecting what demographers call population momentum – the way large generations moving through populations continue to shape their size and age structure. “Population growth will slow down, but it will be a long time before it reverses,” said Kuang, pointing to China, where decades of low fertility have only recently translated into population decline.

This means there is time to act. Morland argues that countries with low fertility rates face difficult trade-offs between economic growth, migration and birthrates – though others suggest the picture is more complex.

Rather than trying to “fix” falling birthrates, policymakers should prepare for an older population – from rethinking how old age support is funded, to enabling people to remain in work for longer. “Simply telling people to have more babies is unlikely to work,” said Kuang.

These changes may need to be far-reaching. As Harper, the author of the forthcoming book Ageing Societies: Risk and Resilience, puts it: “The main challenge is that 20th-century labour markets, pension systems, family norms, healthcare institutions and long-term care arrangements were built under demographic conditions that no longer prevail.”

Adapting to longer lives will therefore require rethinking how people work, retire and are supported in later life. “The traditional linear life course – education, continuous employment, abrupt retirement – is increasingly obsolete,” said Harper. Instead, longer lives may involve more flexible patterns of work, retraining and phased retirement, alongside efforts to tackle ageism and support lifelong learning, as well as redesigning homes, transport and public spaces to support independence and connection in later life.

And even if telling people to have more children is unlikely to work, there may be ways of supporting them to have the children they want. “Everyone should have the right to decide how many children they have, and when,” said Channon. Yet, many are unable to do so: in three-quarters of surveyed countries, more than 40% of women end their reproductive lives with fewer children than they would like, reflecting economic insecurity, work-family conflict and wider social constraints.

Policies that support families, particularly affordable childcare and parental leave, can make a difference, said Channon, but are more effective at helping people realise their intentions than dramatically raising birthrates.

She and others also call for more comprehensive reproductive health education in schools, noting that “curricula often don’t include important topics such as fertility, preconception health, pregnancy and miscarriage”, which might impact young people’s ability to make informed choices, Channon said.

Migration can help ease labour shortages in the short term, as those who move for work are typically young and economically active, but it is not a magic bullet. Migrants also age, meaning a fixed level of migration would not be enough to keep pace with reduced fertility and an ageing population.

“And I am also wary of the ethics of encouraging migrants to come to the UK solely to fill labour gaps while making a path to settlement, or any kind of viable long-term future here, extremely difficult,” said Kuang.

Others point to wider ethical questions, including the impact on countries that lose skilled workers to richer economies.

The good news is that demographic change rarely arrives with a jolt. It unfolds gradually until its effects are visible everywhere – in classrooms, in health and social care, and in the shifting relationships between generations.

The question now is whether those changes continue to accumulate quietly, or whether governments and societies begin to confront them more openly, and work on ways to adapt.

Celebrate the full compatibility between the highest view of human demographic, economic, intellectual and cultural expansion and development, and the most active concern for the conservation of the natural world and of the treasures bequeathed by such expansion and development in the past. That means growth, industry, what someone once nearly called “the white heat of technology”, and the equitable distribution of their fruits among and within the nations of the world, for everyone to enjoy at least the standard of living that we ourselves already enjoyed.