Actively Changing The Frame

Rachel Shabi writes:

Does anyone remember Lexit? 

Back in those oblivious days before the referendum vote to leave the EU, it was the leftwing case for Brexit. 

The position cohered around the idea that the EU is anti-democratic – witness the way it dealt with the elected leftwing government in Greece – and an enforcer of devastating unfettered free-market economics and austerity programmes (again: see Greece). 

But any progressive case for leaving the EU was quickly quashed by the rightward thrust of Brexit, which, with its narrow nationalism characterised by hostility to migrants specifically and foreigners in general, became an outright racist campaign. 

To argue for exit from the left in such a climate would fuel this tendency.

At the time, you could say of Lexit: not bad as a theory, but absolutely not now.

Fast-forward to Labour gaining 40% of the vote on a socialist manifesto and a campaign of unity.

It pulled our political spectrum to the left, and voters did not rush in droves to endorse the narrow-minded recklessness of a Conservative departure from the EU.

The conversation has shifted, yet we’re still having the same debate about Brexit: a rightwing version on one side and a reaction to it on the other. 

Within these confines, there’s no such thing as a progressive Brexit. 

There is only a “soft” deal that might make the outcome less awful than a “hard” deal. 

This shows up in the discussions around single market membership. 

It is seen to define a “soft” Brexit although, as others have argued, this position may well amount to little more than false hope. 

Securing the best trade access to EU markets is clearly vital – but in addition some have warned that leaving the single market also imperils hard-won employment rights. 

And that argument presumably holds only if you assume a Conservative Brexit, because in this scenario the government can’t be trusted to put those rights into British law, much less extend them. 

A leftwing case for preferential access to – rather than full membership of – the single market might be to do with manifesto policies Labour could roll out if unconstrained by rules around state aid, competition, collective bargaining or “fiscal discipline” mantras that curb government spending.

If Labour in government wanted to invest in ailing national industries, or increase state spending to boost growth, these could bump up against membership strictures.

Single market rules may not, as is often claimed, be a bar to Labour’s renationalisation projects, although that might depend on the scale and terms of such ventures.

The rewards of a progressively run economy would have to outweigh the cost of giving up full common market membership – but these are among many questions that, within the confines of our current debate, we aren’t even asking.

Some commentators assume Labour’s pro-EU voters have not realised its leadership in reality loathes the EU.

But why premise your second-guessing of party supporters on stupidity?

Perhaps even those certain that Brexit is a disaster would regard a Labour-negotiated exit as preferable.

This isn’t just about a different set of principles it would not compromise on – jobs, say, or guaranteed rights for EU citizens in Britain.

It may also be that a Labour government committed to tackling inequality would better manage any potential Brexit damage: if we end up with less pie, it would be more equally distributed.

Or it may be to do with having a more internationalist approach to – and therefore influence within – European politics, as seen in Labour’s strong affiliation to sister organisations through the Party of European Socialists (the Conservatives cut ties to the European parliament’s centre-right equivalent, the European People’s party, in 2009).

Cast into the future with such affinities, you might see a country still close to the continent, partnered with European nations seeking to reform the EU from the left.

That said, a weak link in leftwing Brexit is still migration, because it’s hard to find an argument to end freedom of movement that doesn’t rely on fallacies around migration’s negative impact on wages or access to public services.

Labour’s election campaign made clear a commitment to ending free movement, though it also championed diversity and the positives of migration while rejecting “bogus immigration targets”.

You might also argue that EU free movement makes migration harder for those beyond the borders of “Fortress Europe”, which a leftwing Brexit could redress.

But none of this yet forms a distinct policy grounded in left values.

Of course, all this is asking for a level of detail that neither party has provided. Labour’s approach seems mostly about keeping its leave/remain coalition together while holding the government’s Brexit negotiations to account, which makes sense, if you’re the opposition.

But meanwhile, most British people now accept that, like it or not, Brexit is happening (bar a significant change in public mood) – and that meant the Labour party could pivot its recent election campaign on to issues such as austerity, ailing public services, ravaging wealth gaps and economic hardship.

It showed the party could gain votes not by trying to fit into a rightwing political framework, but by actively changing the frame of the debate altogether.

If there is public appetite for progressive politics, isn’t it time we applied this thinking to Brexit, too?