Douglas Alexander writes:
The Middle East is today defined by a level of turmoil and
disorder reminiscent of some of the darkest days of the region’s bloody and
tumultuous history.
Three years on from the start of
the Arab uprisings, hundreds of thousands of lives have been lost and millions
have been forced to flee their homes, as sectarian, religious and political
fault lines open.
For decades the hopes of citizens
in the region for freedom and prosperity have been trapped between repressive
dictatorships and illiberal opposition groups.
Despite this leaving little
space for civic society or pluralist politics to develop in 2011 the Arab
uprisings seemed to herald a new beginning.
Yet – with the possible exception
of Tunisia – despite the hopes of millions, these uprisings ultimately failed
to create the space for democratic, peaceful national reconciliation.
They instead precipitated a
period of unprecedented turmoil in Syria, Egypt and Libya – the spillover
effect of which has in turn brought to the fore historic sectarian and
religious tensions across the region, most recently today in Iraq.
In the face of such seismic
challenges, it is clear that any Western strategy for engagement with the
Middle East must begin with humility.
Humility because it will never be
possible for outside powers to fully anticipate the outcomes of what is being
played out on the dusty battlefields of Iraq, Syria and on the streets of
Beirut, Amman or Gaza City.
Combatants are drawn from
different countries, sects, factions and often answer to different leaders and
commanders.
Humility also because ultimately the fate of the region is
primarily in the hands of its peoples and its leaders.
But that humility must not give
way to passivity.
Instead the UK should now be striving, along with allies, to
develop an approach that reflects the complexity of the challenges we face, but
also the necessity of tackling them.
The first component of any
strategy for helping bring greater stability and security to the Middle East
must clearly begin with an effective response to ISIL – the latest, and
possibly most brutal, manifestation of this period of regional upheaval.
The declaration of an Islamic
caliphate straddling Iraq and Syria, controlling considerable wealth and
weapons – alongside the continued flow of jihadists from and to the West – is
not a sideshow security concern, but a primary security threat.
So firstly, the West must now
ensure Iraq has the political, security and diplomatic support required.
Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani
most recently made clear that “we will never ask you to put boots on the ground
to fight for us”.
But given the US’s unique military capabilities, President
Obama was right to agree to the Iraqi government’s request for military support
in the form of air strikes against ISIL in Northern Iraq.
While military intervention will
at times be necessary, it will not alone be sufficient, and must be in support
of clear political objectives.
That means the West must offer
clear support to the new Iraqi government and promote a power-sharing agreement
in Baghdad, as well as decentralisation of key services.
An effective Iraqi
response to ISIL should not focus only on defeating them, but also on what
replaces them, and so particular concessions for Sunni-dominated areas in the
north may also be needed.
Alongside military and political
support for Bagdad, the international community must do more to support the
Kurdistan Regional government.
Today the Peshmarga are the
effective front line against ISIL, sharing a 600-mile border with ISIL
controlled land.
They need more coordinated international assistance, including
intelligence assets, but also arms and potentially heavy weaponry – the West
must stand ready to deliver that.
Secondly, a strategy for
combating ISIL cannot be confined to within the borders of Iraq alone.
In Syria, ISIL governed territory
in the country is used to draw in, train and radicalise jihadists – including
from Britain.
Of course the UK government needs to ensure effective
counter-radicalisation programs are in place, and sufficient powers and
resources are available to tackle the flow of these people between the UK and
Syria.
And while Assad cannot have a
future in governing Syria, the international community must now return to
trying to achieve a transitional agreement, of the type anticipated in the
Geneva II process, which could help facilitate a more effective security
response to ISIL on the ground.
Clearly the barriers to achieving this remain
significant, but the urgency of the threat posed by ISIL could be a crucial
catalyst.
The West must also wake up to the
intense pressure facing Jordan today – a country with one of the longest
borders with Iraqi-ISIL held territory in the region and an even longer border
with Syria in the North.
The conflict in Gaza is already
stoking resentment among the population, half of whom are Palestinians, and as
thousands of Syrian refugees continuing to flow into the kingdom each day,
adding to the more than 650,000 who are already there, the pressures on the
Jordanian government are mounting.
So alongside the UK’s bilateral
cooperation, the international community should agree a comprehensive approach
to ensuring that Jordan has the economic, security and humanitarian resources
it needs to help stabilise the country and secure the border areas, including a
possible expansion of military training programs for the Jordanian armed
forces.
Third, an international response
to the rise of ISIL must work on bringing together the key regional players.
In recent years, the major
regional powers have been directly fuelling conflicts across the Middle East,
especially in Iraq and Syria.
But the rise of ISIL has now created a threat so
extreme that it unites previous adversaries like Iran and Saudi Arabia, neither
of whom has an interest in allowing it to succeed.
The apparent consensus around the
need for al-Maliki to step aside in Iraq, which Iran ultimately helped
facilitate, as well as Saudi-Arabia’s apparent willingness to use its influence
with the Sunni tribes against ISIL, seem to suggest a move beyond simple
zero-sum regional politics.
The unprecedented extent of this shared interest
among key players only reinforces the need for a regionally-led response to
ISIL.
President Hollande has already
called for an international conference to respond to the threat of ISIL. That
is a welcome initiative, but it would be strengthened if it were to happen
under the auspices of the UN.
So the UK should now propose that
the five permanent members on the UN Security Council – the P5 – convene a
regional summit in the coming days to agree a strategy for tackling the threat
of ISIL.
The UK government could and should lead on convening this summit – as
a permanent member of the UNSC, and as its current Chair – and to secure the
participation of key regional allies including Turkey and Saudi Arabia, as well
as Iran.
The past few weeks have
demonstrated the fundamental danger of the West not possessing a more strategic
approach to the Middle East.
But the emergence of new overlapping interests
among key regional actors could also be a moment of potential opportunity for
the West to re-engage political and diplomatically in order to now pursue how
far this coalition of interests can be extended.
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