Will Hutton writes:
The empress has no clothes or, at least, not the
clothes in which so many want to robe her. Despite all the praise, Mrs Thatcher
did not arrest British economic decline, launch an economic transformation or
save Britain. She did, it is true, re-establish the British state's capacity to
govern. But then, although she wanted to trigger a second industrial revolution
and a surge of new British producers, she used the newly won state authority to
worsen the very weaknesses that had plagued us for decades. The national
conversation of the last six days has been based on a fraud. If the Thatcher
revolution had been so transformatory, our situation today would not be so
acute.
In the 20 years up to 1979, Britain's growth rate
averaged 2.75%, although it had been weakening during the ills of the
mid-1970s. In the years before the banking crisis, there was a vexed debate
about whether the Thatcher reforms, essentially unchallenged by Blair and
Brown, had succeeded in restoring the long-run growth rate to earlier levels.
Certainly, the gap in per capita incomes between Britain, France and Germany
had narrowed, as, apparently, had the productivity gap.
The question is whether any of it was
sustainable. Now, there is a growing and dismaying recognition that too much
growth in the past 30 years has been built on an unsustainable credit, banking
and property bubble and that Britain's true long-run growth rate has fallen to
around 2%. The productivity gap is widening. All that heightened inequality,
the unbelievable executive remuneration, wholesale privatisation, taking
"the shackles off business" and labour market flexibility has
achieved nothing durable.
This bitter realisation has been sharpening in
non-conservative circles for some months. The pound has fallen by 20% in real
terms since 2008, yet the response of our export sector to the most sustained
competitive advantage since we came off the gold standard has been disastrously
weak. Britain's trade deficit in goods climbed to 6.9% of GDP in 2012 – the
highest since 1948 – and February's numbers were cataclysmically bad. Britain
simply does not have enough companies creating goods and even services that the
rest of the world wants to buy, despite devaluation.
The legion of Mrs Thatcher's apologists argues
she can hardly be blamed for what is happening 23 years after leaving office.
But economic transformations should be enduring, shouldn't they? Thatcherism
did not deliver because dynamic capitalism is achieved through a much more
subtle interplay. She never understood that a complex ecosystem of public and
private institutions is needed to support risk-taking, the creation of open
innovation networks, sustained long-term investment and sophisticated human
capital. Believing in the magic of markets and the inevitable destructiveness
of the state, she never addressed these core issues. Instead, the demand for
high financial returns steadily rose through her period of office, along with
executive pay, even while investment and innovation sank. And the trends
continued because none of her successors dared challenge what she had started.
Instead, her targets were trade unions
and state-owned enterprise in the ideological project of brutally asserting the
primacy of markets and the private sector, and thus a conservative hegemony, in
the name of a fierce patriotism. This was real enough: she really did want to
put Britain back on the map economically and politically and the task force
sailing for the Falklands embodied the intensity of that impulse. But she did
not pull it off, as even she acknowledged, in her more honest moments out of
office.
Trade unions certainly needed the Thatcher
treatment in terms of both accepting the rule of law and the need for
responsibilities alongside their rights. But companies, shareholders, banks and
wider finance also needed this treatment. But as "her people" and
part of the hegemonic alliance she aimed to create, they would never get the
same medicine. Instead, her Big Bang in 1986, allowing banks worldwide to combine investment
and commercial banking in London, was a monster sweetheart deal to please her
own constituency. Britain became the centre of a global financial boom, but at
home this meant an intensification of the financial system's dysfunctionality,
helped by little regulation and a self-defeating credit boom, worsening the
anti-investment, short-termist that needed to be reformed. This is now obvious
to all. But for nearly 30 years, the apparent success of Thatcherism hid the
need.
However, in one serious respect, trade unions
were a proper target. By the late 1970s, a handful of trade union leaders in
effect co-ran the country, the beneficiaries of the failure of successive
governments to bring free collective bargaining into a legal framework. This
despite the fact that they could not deliver their members to agreed policies,
and the third year of an incomes policy had collapsed. On this question, the
Labour party was intellectually exhausted and politically bankrupt; the
Conservative government under Heath had been defeated too. It had become a
first order crisis of governability, even of democracy.
This was her opportunity and she seized it . The
early employment
acts and the victory over Arthur
Scargill's NUM decisively reaffirmed that the fount of political power in
the country is Parliament, at the time a crucial intervention. But she wildly
overshot. Trade unions within a proper framework are a vital means of
expressing employee voice and protecting worker interests. Labour market flexibility
– code for deunionisation and removal of worker entitlements – has become
another Thatcherite mantra that again hides the complexity of what is needed in
the labour market: employee voice and engagement, skills and adaptability. When
she left office, 64% of UK workers had no vocational qualifications.
The best thing that can be said about Thatcherism
is that it may have been a necessary, if mistaken, staging post on the way to
our economic reinvention. She resolved the crisis of governance but then
demonstrated that simple anti-statism and pro-market solutions do not work. We
need to do more sophisticated things than control inflation, reduce public
debt, roll back the state and assert "market forces".
The coalition government is developing new-look
industrial strategies, reforming the banking system and reintroducing the state
– as a vital partner – into areas such as energy. New thinking is emerging
everywhere. For example, in the north-east of England an economic commission
chaired by Lord Adonis, of which I was a member, recently
recommended the de facto reintroduction of the metropolitan authority in
Newcastle, abolished by Mrs Thatcher. It would co-ordinate a pan-north-east redoubling
of investment in skills and transport, along with winning more investment. And
it wants the local economic partnership to work in the same building as the
proposed new combined authority, driving forward an innovation and investment
revolution. This complex interaction of private and public the commission is
trying to develop is a world away from Thatcher – and widely welcomed.
The empress really has no clothes. Wednesday's
funeral is a tribute to the myth and the conservative hegemony she created. If
the royal family is concerned, as is reported, that the whole affair will be over the top, they
are right. Mrs Thatcher capitalised on a moment of temporary ungovernability
that, to her credit, she resolved, then sold her party and country an
oversimple and false prospectus. The landslide Mr Blair won in 1997 was to
challenge it, but he did not understand at the time, nor understand now, what
his mandate meant. The force of events is at last moving us on. But Britain has
been weakened, rather than strengthened, by the revolution she wreaked.
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