Peter Hitchens
You might have
thought that the fight against Islamic State, or ISIL, or ISIS, or whatever it
is this week, was the greatest crisis threatening humankind.
You might have thought that NATO, that mysteriously undead Cold War alliance so often cited as crucial in the recent anti-Russian frenzy, was a serious alliance.
You might, though readers here have few excuses, have believed that Turkey’s ‘mildly Islamist’ (Copyright The Economist) government was a firm ally of the ‘West’.
In that case, you’ll be having trouble working out what’s happening at Kobani (or Kobane), a Syrian town on the Turkish border, besieged for some time by ISIS forces and defended rather courageously by Syrian Kurds.
It’s important to stress that they are Syrian Kurds, because the war against ISIS is well-known to have embraced Iraqi Kurds, who are, at the moment, our warm and well-beloved allies.
There’s not much difference between Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, in terms of who they are.
The main difference is that the Syrian Kurds have actually been putting up quite an effective fight against ISIS, whereas the Iraqi Kurds have failed.
Alas, the Syrian Kurds are also closely allied to Kurdish factions in Turkey which have long been at war with the Turkish government; see below.
The other main difference is that our struggle against ISIS is apparently not that urgent in Kobane (despite the fact that an ISIS victory there will not be a pretty sight), because we, the ‘West’ decline to support the Syrian Kurds with the heavy weapons they need.
I believe we have also declined to send liaison officers to them to co-ordinate with US airpower, thus making the air attacks on ISIS near Kobani far less effective than they would otherwise have been.
My own impression is that there may have been a shift in this last policy in the past few hours, but I am only guessing. If so, I doubt that it will be officially acknowledged, and it may be too late.
Then there’s the Turkish problem.
For many months, Turkey has been allowing foreign fighters to surge across its border with Syria, in the hope of overthrowing the Assad state, which Turkey took against very severely a few years ago, having formerly been on rather good terms with Damascus.
But Turkey absolutely forbids Kurdish fighters from within Turkey to head across the same border to aid their compatriots in the battle for Kobani.
This policy has caused severe street clashes with Kurds in many parts of Turkey, and looks like ending President Erdogan’s long alliance of convenience with Turkish Kurds, many of who backed him in the belief that he would end Turkey’s policy of discrimination against them.
I find it very hard to work out what Mr Erdogan’s aim is, as he veers so much, but he seems to have decided to line himself up completely with Sunni Saudi Arabia in the new Shia-Sunni confrontation in the Muslim world.
His last election campaign is said to have shown signs of being quite blatantly pro-Sunni, or certainly felt that way to Turkey’s understandably sensitive Alevi minority, who are more or less Shias.
The Assad State in Syria is dominated by Alawis, a grouping hard to describe but certainly more Shia than Sunni, and Syria is allied with Shia Iran, and with Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah.
Anyway, the naïve beliefs of some reporters, who greeted the arrival of Turkish tanks on the border near Kobani as a threat to ISIS, have since been exploded by the inaction of these tanks.
A very good and clear explanation of the forces in play, by Patrick Cockburn, can be found here.
Yet the policy is not changing. One of the main organs of the Blairite establishment, The Guardian, today counsels strongly against allying with Mr Assad against ISIS.
Most of the Guardian argument is moralising piffle of the sort that would have no force at all if ISIS were truly the existential threat our leaders claim it to be. But some of it makes a sort of sense. The key passage is this :
‘Allowing Assad to become what the Americans used to call “our sonofabitch” would only increase the appeal of Isis to mainstream Sunni opinion in Syria and beyond, boosting the very forces the international coalition is set on destroying.’
To which one replies, what is this ‘mainstream’ Sunni opinion? How does it express itself?
In the columns of the Aleppo Guardian? Or the Riyadh Guardian? Or perhaps the Cairo Guardian (Military Edition)? Or even the Benghazi Guardian, if such a paper can be published amid the screams and flames?
In Syria, mainstream opinion among sane people by now consists of a simple plea that the fighting and destruction, which have ruined the economy, killed countless thousands, driven millions from happy homes and turned a peaceable country into a murderous hellhole, should stop.
It doesn’t stop, and won't stop, because the ‘opposition’, such as it is apart from ISIS, demands the departure of President Assad.
This intransigence, backed by the 'West', makes any kind of brokered compromise impossible and ensures that the war goes on its ghastly way forever.
Were I a Syrian husband and father, I would be tempted to beat my brains out against the nearest wall, in frustration at the West's casual willingness to let my country slide ever deeper into misery, supposedly in the name of principle.
As for ‘mainstream opinion’ beyond Syria, it is touching, after the ‘Arab Spasm’, that The Guardian still believes in the power of public opinion in the Arab world.
Those living in fear of ISIS do not care all that much where deliverance comes from. Shias in Iraq are presumably sympathetic to the Assad state. Sunnis in Iraq are much more concerned about getting rid of the sectarian Shia-dominated government in Baghdad.
I suspect that what The Guardian means by ‘mainstream’ here is in fact the opinion of the wealthy Sunni oil elites in the Gulf, who have always hated Assad as an infidel, and as an ally of Iran, which they hate too.
And as these Gulf despotisms are at the heart of Western policy in the region, their views are decisive.
But to make this out to be some sort of public revulsion against the wickedness of the Assad regime (which by the standards of the Gulf is not significantly more repressive than they are, and has claims to be considerably more religiously tolerant than Saudi Arabia) is plain ridiculous.
The Guardian editorial continues ‘It would be all but impossible to convince moderate Sunnis of the legitimacy of western policy if this war were to be run, in any way, in coalition with Assad’s military. The opposition Free Syrian Army has doubts enough about this intervention already.’
It would take a heart of stone not to laugh at this piety.
Who are these ‘moderate Sunnis’? Where and how do they exercise power? Why are they worried about ‘legitimacy’, so many of them being iron-bound tyrannies?
As for the ‘Free Syrian Army’, it is a political figment. The military opposition to Assad has from the start been sponsored, manned and wholly dominated by Sunni militants of the sort which make up ISIS.
The fact is, our policy is a nonsense.
Our key ‘ally’ and fellow NATO member, Turkey, has at the very least, and the very kindest, a foot in both camps.
We refuse to give material aid or diplomatic backing to the most effective fighters against ISIS, the Syrian Army and the Syrian Kurds.
A year ago we wanted to support the very people we now wish to bomb into oblivion. We have yet to explain or retract or apologise for this apparently mad policy, or even admit that it might have been mistaken.
And our supposed allies from the Sunni world, all of them heavily armed, seem unwilling to lift a finger to defeat ISIS.
I find it hard to think of any previous example of our foreign policy being in such a hopeless, contradictory mess. And I like to think I am a bit of an expert on stupid British foreign policies.
You might have thought that NATO, that mysteriously undead Cold War alliance so often cited as crucial in the recent anti-Russian frenzy, was a serious alliance.
You might, though readers here have few excuses, have believed that Turkey’s ‘mildly Islamist’ (Copyright The Economist) government was a firm ally of the ‘West’.
In that case, you’ll be having trouble working out what’s happening at Kobani (or Kobane), a Syrian town on the Turkish border, besieged for some time by ISIS forces and defended rather courageously by Syrian Kurds.
It’s important to stress that they are Syrian Kurds, because the war against ISIS is well-known to have embraced Iraqi Kurds, who are, at the moment, our warm and well-beloved allies.
There’s not much difference between Syrian and Iraqi Kurds, in terms of who they are.
The main difference is that the Syrian Kurds have actually been putting up quite an effective fight against ISIS, whereas the Iraqi Kurds have failed.
Alas, the Syrian Kurds are also closely allied to Kurdish factions in Turkey which have long been at war with the Turkish government; see below.
The other main difference is that our struggle against ISIS is apparently not that urgent in Kobane (despite the fact that an ISIS victory there will not be a pretty sight), because we, the ‘West’ decline to support the Syrian Kurds with the heavy weapons they need.
I believe we have also declined to send liaison officers to them to co-ordinate with US airpower, thus making the air attacks on ISIS near Kobani far less effective than they would otherwise have been.
My own impression is that there may have been a shift in this last policy in the past few hours, but I am only guessing. If so, I doubt that it will be officially acknowledged, and it may be too late.
Then there’s the Turkish problem.
For many months, Turkey has been allowing foreign fighters to surge across its border with Syria, in the hope of overthrowing the Assad state, which Turkey took against very severely a few years ago, having formerly been on rather good terms with Damascus.
But Turkey absolutely forbids Kurdish fighters from within Turkey to head across the same border to aid their compatriots in the battle for Kobani.
This policy has caused severe street clashes with Kurds in many parts of Turkey, and looks like ending President Erdogan’s long alliance of convenience with Turkish Kurds, many of who backed him in the belief that he would end Turkey’s policy of discrimination against them.
I find it very hard to work out what Mr Erdogan’s aim is, as he veers so much, but he seems to have decided to line himself up completely with Sunni Saudi Arabia in the new Shia-Sunni confrontation in the Muslim world.
His last election campaign is said to have shown signs of being quite blatantly pro-Sunni, or certainly felt that way to Turkey’s understandably sensitive Alevi minority, who are more or less Shias.
The Assad State in Syria is dominated by Alawis, a grouping hard to describe but certainly more Shia than Sunni, and Syria is allied with Shia Iran, and with Lebanon’s Shia Hezbollah.
Anyway, the naïve beliefs of some reporters, who greeted the arrival of Turkish tanks on the border near Kobani as a threat to ISIS, have since been exploded by the inaction of these tanks.
A very good and clear explanation of the forces in play, by Patrick Cockburn, can be found here.
Yet the policy is not changing. One of the main organs of the Blairite establishment, The Guardian, today counsels strongly against allying with Mr Assad against ISIS.
Most of the Guardian argument is moralising piffle of the sort that would have no force at all if ISIS were truly the existential threat our leaders claim it to be. But some of it makes a sort of sense. The key passage is this :
‘Allowing Assad to become what the Americans used to call “our sonofabitch” would only increase the appeal of Isis to mainstream Sunni opinion in Syria and beyond, boosting the very forces the international coalition is set on destroying.’
To which one replies, what is this ‘mainstream’ Sunni opinion? How does it express itself?
In the columns of the Aleppo Guardian? Or the Riyadh Guardian? Or perhaps the Cairo Guardian (Military Edition)? Or even the Benghazi Guardian, if such a paper can be published amid the screams and flames?
In Syria, mainstream opinion among sane people by now consists of a simple plea that the fighting and destruction, which have ruined the economy, killed countless thousands, driven millions from happy homes and turned a peaceable country into a murderous hellhole, should stop.
It doesn’t stop, and won't stop, because the ‘opposition’, such as it is apart from ISIS, demands the departure of President Assad.
This intransigence, backed by the 'West', makes any kind of brokered compromise impossible and ensures that the war goes on its ghastly way forever.
Were I a Syrian husband and father, I would be tempted to beat my brains out against the nearest wall, in frustration at the West's casual willingness to let my country slide ever deeper into misery, supposedly in the name of principle.
As for ‘mainstream opinion’ beyond Syria, it is touching, after the ‘Arab Spasm’, that The Guardian still believes in the power of public opinion in the Arab world.
Those living in fear of ISIS do not care all that much where deliverance comes from. Shias in Iraq are presumably sympathetic to the Assad state. Sunnis in Iraq are much more concerned about getting rid of the sectarian Shia-dominated government in Baghdad.
I suspect that what The Guardian means by ‘mainstream’ here is in fact the opinion of the wealthy Sunni oil elites in the Gulf, who have always hated Assad as an infidel, and as an ally of Iran, which they hate too.
And as these Gulf despotisms are at the heart of Western policy in the region, their views are decisive.
But to make this out to be some sort of public revulsion against the wickedness of the Assad regime (which by the standards of the Gulf is not significantly more repressive than they are, and has claims to be considerably more religiously tolerant than Saudi Arabia) is plain ridiculous.
The Guardian editorial continues ‘It would be all but impossible to convince moderate Sunnis of the legitimacy of western policy if this war were to be run, in any way, in coalition with Assad’s military. The opposition Free Syrian Army has doubts enough about this intervention already.’
It would take a heart of stone not to laugh at this piety.
Who are these ‘moderate Sunnis’? Where and how do they exercise power? Why are they worried about ‘legitimacy’, so many of them being iron-bound tyrannies?
As for the ‘Free Syrian Army’, it is a political figment. The military opposition to Assad has from the start been sponsored, manned and wholly dominated by Sunni militants of the sort which make up ISIS.
The fact is, our policy is a nonsense.
Our key ‘ally’ and fellow NATO member, Turkey, has at the very least, and the very kindest, a foot in both camps.
We refuse to give material aid or diplomatic backing to the most effective fighters against ISIS, the Syrian Army and the Syrian Kurds.
A year ago we wanted to support the very people we now wish to bomb into oblivion. We have yet to explain or retract or apologise for this apparently mad policy, or even admit that it might have been mistaken.
And our supposed allies from the Sunni world, all of them heavily armed, seem unwilling to lift a finger to defeat ISIS.
I find it hard to think of any previous example of our foreign policy being in such a hopeless, contradictory mess. And I like to think I am a bit of an expert on stupid British foreign policies.
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