Lawrence Wilkerson writes:
When it comes to Korea, Americans are
reliving the past without understanding it.
In 1994, the United States and its
ally South Korea had reached an impasse with the North Korean leadership headed
by the current leader’s father, Kim Jong-il. Tensions reached such a pitch that
the Korean Peninsula seemed perilously close to war.
It was somewhat unexpected
at the time because the previous few years had produced a positive dialog on
the peninsula.
Indeed, in 1992 an agreement was signed aimed at
denuclearizing the peninsula, and all manner of cooperative efforts were
envisioned between the South and the North—from economic cooperation to limited
reconciliation of long-simmering grievances among those who had family members
living on both sides of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the area separating the
two Koreas after the 1953 armistice that ended the Korean War.
As if such progress were simply too much for North Korea
to handle, it all came into serious question when intelligence sources began
reporting efforts by the North to reprocess plutonium produced by its nuclear
reactor at Yongbyon.
A nuclear weapon seemed the logical objective. It is
important to note here that North Korea was at the time a signatory to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), foreswearing by treaty ever building
such a weapon.
Thus such actions seemed particularly perfidious.
Such apparent perfidy could not go unheeded by the United
States, and the peninsula was plunged into crisis.
Confronting that crisis on the U.S. side was a team with
exquisite diplomatic and military skills—secretary of state Warren Christopher,
secretary of defense William Perry, and chief negotiator Robert Gallucci,
former assistant secretary of state for political-military affairs.
Eschewing war as a viable alternative but
never vocally foreswearing it, U.S. diplomats began negotiations with North
Korea.
With the full participation of U.S. ally South Korea, on October 21,
1994, the negotiators reached what became known as the Agreed Framework (AF)
between the United States and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea [North
Korea].
It was a simple bargain: if North Korea ceased
reprocessing plutonium, a consortium led by the United States would provide
Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) in sufficient quantities to make up for the loss in
electricity caused by the shutdown of the plutonium reactor and, for the
long-term, would begin building less dangerous Light Water Reactors (LWRs) to
replace North Korea’s plutonium reactor.
Further, the AF envisioned an eventual restoration of
diplomatic relations between the agreeing powers, the establishment of consular
offices in the two capitals, and generally much-improved relations.
It also
called on North Korea to abide by the NPT, its additional safeguards agreement,
and basically to cease any attempt to build a nuclear weapon.
As with the nuclear agreement with Iran
today, key members of the U.S. Congress—a Congress turned Republican in that
“year of Newt Gingrich”—strongly opposed any rapprochement with North Korea.
They immediately began to undermine the AF. As Ambassador Steven Bosworth, first head
of the consortium, said at the time: “The Agreed Framework was a political
orphan within two weeks after its signature.”
There were—and are today with
respect to Iran—various reasons for these undermining actions.
First, a few members of Congress genuinely believed North
Korea could not be trusted, that it was a threat to the United States, and that
therefore its regime should be eliminated.
Outspoken individuals such as the fiery
neoconservative John Bolton shouted support for these members, just as Mr.
Bolton does today with respect to Iran.
Second, quite a few members—mostly Republicans but with a
scattering of Democrats, just like with Iran today—wanted to protect America’s
imperial reach.
That is to say, they saw—not unreasonably—that the U.S.
military presence on the Korean Peninsula gave America a dramatic advantage
should it ever find itself in a Northeast Asian confrontation.
These members
did not want to see a unified Korea, one that might ask the United States to
leave the peninsula.
Their aim seemed to be to keep North Korea alive and
threatening.
Third, it seems fair to speculate that some members
feared a loss of personal political power.
In other words, they were beholden
to defense contractors for massive donations, and to protect their cozy
relationships with these companies they may have felt a need to foster ongoing
animosities with potentially threatening countries.
North Korea was readily
available, as Iran is also today.
Finally, some Republicans saw political benefit in
undermining the Democrat in the White House, President Clinton, by opposing the
AF.
Similarly, some congressional Republicans today seem particularly hostile
to the nuclear agreement with Iran because it was achieved by President Obama.
Whatever the intricacies underlying this congressional
opposition, by the late 1990s the United States was not living up to its side
of the AF.
There also emerged a dilatory process of financial support by
consortium members, which angered North Korea.
The fuel oil under the HFO
program was delivered late and in serial amounts rather than in quantities and
at times tacitly agreed.
Construction of the concrete foundations for the first
two LWRs was behind schedule.
Though other consortium members (South Korea,
Japan, Australia, and the European Atomic Energy Community) generally were
providing the appropriate funding (though tardily), the U.S. was not.
We’ll probably never know whether the North Koreans
decided on a hedging strategy before the AF was inked or if they only decided
to construct an alternative path to a nuclear weapon after they saw the tardy
financial process, experienced the U.S. reneging on elements of the bargain,
and read in U.S. newspapers strong statements opposed to the AF by congressional
Republicans and their media mouthpieces.
It’s an important question, but one CIA analyst told me
in 2002 that it likely would never be answered.
While some inside and outside
the U.S. intelligence community insist they know the Koreans never intended to
live up to the agreement, I have been able to study the intelligence data
thoroughly, and there is no definitive evidence one way or the other.
Moreover, some experts thought the leadership in
Pyongyang, having witnessed what they could get by relinquishing a plutonium
program, thought they could repeat the process with an HEU program and gain
even more.
These experts thought that what the North Koreans deeply desired was
a more or less normal relationship with Washington, and Pyongyang calculated
that such a process of blackmail was the surest way to achieve it.
Today, it
appears that process of blackmail now includes nuclear weapons and ballistic
missiles, the final steps perhaps in a very dangerous game.
In any event, in the early 2000s the North Koreans were
detected enriching uranium. This is the second path to a nuclear weapon,
highly-enriched uranium (HEU).
When Assistant Secretary of State Jim Kelly went
to Pyongyang in October 2002, essentially to confront the North Koreans over
their secret HEU program, he got a surprise.
His North Korean counterpart,
First Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju, admitted to the
program—almost as if it were an expected development, given the U.S. tardiness
in fulfilling its part of the AF and the Bush administration’s nearly two-year
delay in resuming substantive talks with the North or even continuing the
warming relations fostered by the previous Clinton administration where there
had even been talk of high-level dialog between Pyongyang and Washington and an
eventual exchange of ambassadors.
But the admission by North Korea to a secret alternative
path to a bomb killed all diplomacy instantly, despite the fact the North
Koreans denied that Sok-ju had made the admission to Kelly (four years later,
in an effort to resume positive diplomacy, Washington backed away from
long-held assertions that North Korea had an active clandestine program to
enrich uranium at the time).
What eventually resulted, however, was not war but a
resumption of negotiations by the George W. Bush administration under what
became known as the Six-Party Talks, bringing in all interested parties.
In
addition to the United States and North and South Korea, the participants
included Russia, Japan, and China. China in particular was judged by the U.S.
as having special leverage over North Korea.
These talks lasted for several years but proved
unavailing.
As a result, North Korea became not only a nuclear power, testing
its new weapons several times, but also deeply involved in ballistic missile
testing and nuclear weapon miniaturization—the two principal developments
needed to produce a nuclear-tipped ICBM.
This is where we are today—with several added dimensions:
First, President Trump seems willing to match
word-for-word—and perhaps action-for-action—the bellicose and ultimately
desperate North Koreans.
Such bombast, unbecoming of a man in charge of the
most powerful military instrument on earth, is made the more reprehensible by
the reality that North Korea, a much less powerful yet rational state, cannot
accept any significant negative change in the balance of power on the
peninsula.
Second, Trump is surrounded by officials with little or
no experience on matters involving North Korea, and this has deepened the
dangers inherent in the current U.S.-North Korean crisis.
He has not even put a U.S. ambassador in
Seoul, a considerable affront to that key ally.
Third, the president has compelled others to try to
backfill his vacuous policy.
Some, such as Secretary of State Tillerson, insist
negotiations are still possible, even desired.
Others, including Defense
Secretary Mattis, seek to give some strategic shape to Trump’s bellicosity.
Then there is South Carolina Senator
Lindsey Graham’s unwise statement: “If thousands die, they’re going to die over
there. They’re not going to die here [in the United States]”.
Graham seems to
imply that any war will be on the Korean Peninsula and not in America, so
Americans need not worry.
This is an insult to South Korea.
Moreover, there are
nearly 200,000 American citizens living and working in South Korea, most of
them in Seoul, where the war’s worst ravages will be felt.
Thus Graham’s remark
was utterly wrong as it related to the safety of American citizens.
Finally, the nature of the situation on the peninsula is
completely misunderstood.
Since 1953, we have had 64 consecutive years of peace
in an inherently volatile and complex region.
The reason: periodic talking and
diplomacy.
Were we to do such talking and conduct such diplomacy
today, what might be the game plan?
First, we need to put ourselves in our
enemy’s shoes.
By doing that we would understand what the North Koreans are
after—namely, the preservation of their regime.
Second, we must determine what makes North Korean leaders
so desperate about their capacity to fulfill that goal?
That too is not hard to answer: the
military power of the United States, power that has been used to unseat Saddam
Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi and in the attempt to unseat Bashar al-Assad.
Recently, President Trump even threatened Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro
with a possible U.S. military intervention in that country.
Third, what can the U.S. do to begin to alleviate that
North Korean angst about U.S. military power to the extent that they might
reciprocate positively?
Here the answer could be any number of actions.
Stop
military maneuvers in such a provocative manner (we did this before when we
cancelled the huge exercise called Team Spirit).
Stop the more egregiously
threatening overflights of the peninsula by U.S. warplanes and limit the close
runs along the peninsula by ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
Perhaps we could
even suggest less provocative military moves from such locations as Guam and
Okinawa.
Fourth, what might we ask from the North in exchange for
such U.S. moves?
That too is fairly clear: stop testing ballistic missiles
and nuclear weapons.
There should be serious discussions on which nation should
move first, U.S. or North Korea—or should such actions perhaps occur
near-simultaneously?
What could we do to sweeten the deal?
Provide the more substantive things we
said we would provide under the AF such as closer relations, economic
assistance, embassy openings, sanctions relief, and assistance with the North’s
electrical power grid, which is obsolete and falling apart.
Neoconservative figures such as John Bolton will scream
that we are dealing with criminals, with devils, and should be ashamed of
ourselves.
This is nonsense.
At various points in U.S. history we have dealt
with “devils” such as those who ran the Soviet Union and the Chinese Comintern.
No one—certainly not a U.S. president, let alone a U.S. senator—should be
willing to trade the hundreds of thousands of casualties that will result from
a war on the Korean Peninsula for regime change in Pyongyang.
In fact, any
president should be willing to negotiate with any leader to prevent such an
outcome so long as the resulting situation is manageable, and this one with
North Korea is very much so, as history has well-demonstrated.
Deterrence works.
North Korea could build nuclear weapons
and ballistic missiles for the next fifty years and still not catch up to the
U.S. nuclear arsenal.
Were North Korea to fire a nuclear-tipped missile at the
U.S., Pyongyang would disappear from the face of the earth.
Kim Jong-un and all
his generals undoubtedly know this.
Moreover, those who say we should fear the sale of
nuclear material to other states or to terrorist groups don’t understand the
development of nuclear explosion forensics since the revelations of the A.Q.
Khan network.
The quality of such forensics is excellent today and any nuclear
explosion’s ultimate provenance would be 60-90 percent determinable.
No
American president could fail to act given such surety, even at the lower end.
Potential sellers of such weapons know that.
To sell a weapon to another state
or a terrorist group is a certain death warrant for the seller if the buyer
uses the weapon on the U.S. or its allies—and probably on anyone else as well.
That also represents deterrence.
If there is any credibility to the recent reporting that
elements in Ukraine, deprived of the dollars from Moscow for their ballistic
missile engine work, sold such technology to North Korea and thus helped them
overcome some of their missile challenges, we need to be more aware of these
potentialities and provide the sort of economic and financial support that
eliminates such perverse incentives.
Or, as with the manner in which we dealt
with some elements of the A.Q. Khan network, we need to ferret out such
enterprises, criminalize, and eliminate them.
At the same time, we need to stop the international
swagger that translates into feelings of being threatened in other nations.
Trillions of dollars spent on combating terrorists who have the likelihood of a
lightning strike to kill one of us is absurd, as is holding up the specter of
North Korea and Iran as existential threats.
As one of my lifelong South Korean friends said recently,
“This Kim [Kim Jong-un] is the last of the Kim dynasty. The generals will replace him when he is
gone, and we can deal with the generals.”
That’s probably right.
In a few
years, perhaps a generation at the longest, the two Koreas could be unified and
a peaceful, democratic nation of some 75 million people would result.
All that
is required is wise patience and astute diplomacy.
Lawrence Wilkerson is Visiting Professor of Government and
Public Policy at the College of William and Mary. He was chief of staff to
secretary of state Colin Powell from 2002-05, with a portfolio that included
North Korea; special assistant to Powell as an Army colonel when Powell was
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1989-93), where he also watched over the
Korean Peninsula; deputy director and director of the USMC War College
(1993-97,) where he made military visits to Korea—including in 1994 at the
height of the crisis there—and he served in the US Army’s Korea forces on the
peninsula.
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