It is over three decades since Iranian students stormed the
US embassy in Tehran crying, “Death to America!”
The embassy complex still
stands, but it now serves as a training complex for the Revolutionary Guard.
Next to memorials to Ayatollah Khomeini and the “martyrs of the revolution” is
the “Den of Spies” museum.
One highlight on display there is the “glassy room”
– a room US diplomats would go to for top-secret conversations.
It is a
suspended box made of Plexiglas, with transparent walls, floors and ceiling
that make it impossible to conceal bugs.
The hope of the great powers is that
the historic deal struck with Iran on 13 July will make the country’s nuclear
programme as transparent and as contained as this.
If the agreement is ratified by the US Congress – given
Republican hostility, this cannot be taken for granted – it will, it is hoped,
stop Iran from covertly developing nuclear weapons and avert a bombing raid by
Washington or Tel Aviv.
However, even if the deal is passed, there will be
little hope for peace in a region that is already in flames: witness Libya,
Syria and Yemen. How will a nuclear deal affect this instability?
The nightmare scenario is one of “Tehran unbound”: a
situation where all constraints are lifted and an emboldened Supreme Leader and
the Revolutionary Guard are allowed to wreak havoc in the region with impunity.
The question is whether the EU and the US – which have successfully negotiated
the deal that lifts sanctions on Iran but places strict limits on its nuclear
programme – can influence Iran’s regional policies more effectively with
engagement than they have done with containment.
Or could Iran eventually even
play a constructive role in the region?
It is an open question. Visitors to Tehran are always
struck by the dizzying complexity of Iranian politics and society.
The paradox
of 1979’s religious revolution is that it has given birth to the most secular
society in the region.
More than 70 per cent of Iranians were not even born
when the revolution took place, and they are self-consciously more pragmatic,
moderate and open to the west than any of their peers in the Middle East.
But
in terms of its role within the region, Iran is one of the leaders of a violent
sectarian conflict; and its leaders are enjoying the new space that has been
accorded to them by the toppling of Saddam, the Taliban, and by western
mistakes in the region.
George W Bush’s war on terror set off a chain of events
that is now putting irresistible pressure on the states created after the First
World War.
Borders that the US has guaranteed in the post-colonial era are now
dissolving and new units – such as Kurdistan and Islamic State – are emerging
from the ruins.
If you want to find out about the decline of US power in the Middle
East, go to Tehran.
Few chant “Death to America” these days, and when such
chants are heard they come across as more of a nostalgic echo than a rallying
cry for Iran’s future.
When I talked to Iranian policymakers last year, they told
me US hegemony in the Middle East and global affairs is giving way to a
multipolar order.
The Great Satan for them is no longer the United States – it
is Saudi Arabia.
Iranians complain about the Saudis drilling more to reduce oil
prices and weaken Tehran; they are concerned about the enhanced military
co-operation between members of the Gulf Co-operation Council, oriented against
Iran; and about Saudi Arabia challenging them in Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon and
Syria.
In Riyadh I find an exact mirror image of those suspicions.
Saudis are obsessed with Iranian activism in Bahrain, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and
Yemen.
The geopolitical tussle between these two nations is emblematic of a new
Middle East where emancipated local powers are battling it out. Order is no
longer defined and defended by Washington.
Instead, the US is seen as a
resource that Tehran and Riyadh can manipulate in their struggle against one
another.
So, what role can the US and EU hope to play in this new
Middle East?
For the US, the challenge of getting the deal through Congress
will demand that Obama go to great lengths to reassure Riyadh and Tel Aviv it
is not abandoning them in its links to Tehran or its pivot to Asia.
It can
continue to co-ordinate its strikes against Isis with Tehran but will be wary
about being seen to be getting too cosy with Ayatollah Khamenei.
But Europe, for which the stakes
are even higher than for the US, is less constrained in its ability to
reach out to different players.
As Ellie Geranmayeh argues in an interesting
policy paper, Engaging With Iran: a European Agenda, there is a
unique chance to construct a regional strategy on the foundations of the Iran
nuclear deal.
The EU high representative Federica Mogherini has an
opportunity to build on the nuclear talks by quickly opening an EU embassy in
Tehran and exploring how economic links could lead to a bilateral détente.
More
importantly, she should explore whether the “E3+1” grouping – of France,
Germany, the UK and the EU – could be reconfigured from having a nuclear focus
to one pushing for regional peace.
The agenda should be to try, over time, to
find ways of reducing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
This could
involve confidence-building on Yemen, co-ordination of the anti-Isis campaign
in Iraq and Syria, and discussing other thorny issues such as Hezbollah’s role,
or even relations with Israel.
There are limits to what can be achieved in the short term.
Both Tehran and Riyadh are enjoying their moment in the sun and for both sides
the rewards outweigh the risks.
However, the successful conclusion of the
Iranian nuclear deal showed the power of strategic patience.
The challenge now
will be to show the same level of diplomatic creativity in a quest for peace.
For Europe and the US – as well as for the regional powers locked in a conflict
that neither side can win – the hope must be to contain the conflict before the
whole region gets sucked into a Thirty Years War.
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