The two-hundredth
anniversary of the beginning of the War of 1812 is upon us, and I’m shocked
and surprised the War Party hasn’t planned a celebration: after all, as Jefferson
Morley points out in Salon, this was the first neocon war, i.e. an
unnecessary war of choice. Perhaps the reason for this shameful lack of
hosannas is that it wasn’t particularly successful: the Brits burned Washington
and routed our militias, while the glorious conquest of Canada – where,
Americans were told, the inhabitants would shower us with rose petals at the
moment of their “liberation” – was rudely repulsed by the ungrateful
Canadians.
The stated reason for the war – the forcible impressments
of British deserters and American citizens on the high seas – had little to do
with reality. After all, the Brits had been doing this since the Revolution,
and their actions, while hardly conducive to Anglo-American relations, in no
way threatened the survival of the Republic. Much more important, as a factor
in starting the war, was the agitation of the “warhawks,” a group of younger
members of the Jeffersonian (or Democratic-Republican) party in Congress, who
charged that His Majesty’s Government was encouraging attacks on American
settlers by the Indians, and who dreamed of conquering Canada. Indeed, the
latter motivation was underscored by the libertarian congressman John Randolph,
who declared:
“Sir, if you go to war it will not be for the
protection of, or defense of your maritime rights. Gentlemen from the North
have been taken up to some high mountain and shown all the kingdoms of the
earth; and Canada seems tempting to their sight. That rich vein of Gennesee
land, which is said to be even better on the other side of the lake than on
this. Agrarian cupidity, not maritime right, urges the war. Ever since the report
of the Committee on Foreign Relations came into the House, we have heard but
one word- like the whip-poor-will, but one eternal monotonous tone- Canada!
Canada! Canada!”
The warhawks, led by John Calhoun, were motivated
less by outrage over British harassment of American persons and commerce than
by the emerging delusion of Manifest Destiny that energized the earliest
advocates of an international American empire. The Appalachian and southern
states were the epicenter of this ultra-nationalistic agitation, and the
editors of the Nashville
Clarion gave voice to the imperialist impulse when they asked:
“Where is it written in the book of fate that
the American Republic shall not stretch her limits from the Capes of the
Chesapeake to Noorka Sound, from the isthmus of Panama to Hudson Bay?”
Before the neocons there were the warhawks of
1812. On the eve of war, their leader, the protectionist Senator John Calhoun,
smugly declared:
“I believe that in four weeks from the time a
declaration of war is heard on our frontier, the whole of Upper Canada and a
part of Lower Canada will be in our power.”
Secretary of War William Eustis enthused:
“We can take the Canadas without soldiers, we
have only to send officers into the province and the people . . . will rally
round our standard.”
We’ll be greeted as liberators
– don’t worry, it’ll be a cakewalk. Does any
of this sound familiar?
Aside from their complaint that the US government
hadn’t killed enough native Americans, the warhawks longed for war with the
British, who were aiding the desperate guerrilla defense mounted by the
“Indians.” The frontiersmen resented
competition from British-Canadian fur traders, who had good relations with the
tribes.
In any case, the war was a disaster for the
militarily weak fledgling republic, which might easily have been soundly
defeated, and reabsorbed back into the empire. Think of it: If London hadn’t
been busy fighting another
war in Europe, we might all be speaking British.
American forces were surprisingly successful on
the sea, handing the Brits several stinging defeats, but on land it was a
different story. The British army struck at the very heart of the young
republic, burning Washington to the ground.
The Nashville Clarion’s consultations with
the Book of Fate turned out to be a serious misreading of the text: the
projected conquest of Canada turned into a rout. American militiamen, called up
for duty, were organized around the understanding that they would be defending
their own country, not invading somebody else’s. One big reason for the failure
to take Canada was the militias’ frequent mutinies. After the American defeat
at Detroit, another march on Canada was launched, this time under the command
of Gen. Stephan Van Rensselaer. This adventure came to an inglorious end,
however, when the militiamen refused to cross the US/Canadian border. As one
commentator notes:
“Another invasion attempt, on 19 November
1812, collapsed when American troops refused to leave New York State and forced
their leader, Gen. Henry Dearborn, to march them back to Pittsburgh. Less than
two weeks later, Gen. ‘Apocalypse’ Smythe twice ordered his troops to cross the
Niagara, both times failing in his courage and calling off the attacks. On
returning from the second attempt, the soldiers turned their weapons on Smythe,
forcing him to flee to Virginia.”
The war was unpopular, both here and in Britain.
The New England states, where the Anglophilic Federalists held sway, were
hot-beds of antiwar sentiment – and outright sedition. Led by Massachusetts
governor Caleb Strong, a cabal of Federalists held secret negotiations with the
British government, proposing the secession of the New England states from the
Union.
The most famous American victory, the battle of New Orleans, took place
after the peace treaty was signed – a treaty in which the Americans received
virtually nothing. While the British agreed to stop harassing Americans
citizens on the high seas, the territorial gains envisioned by the
expansionists failed to materialize. Canada remained a British possession, and
the American claim to Florida – a state that, from the beginning,
has given us nothing
but trouble – went
unrecognized by the British, or anyone else.
The war of 1812 could fairly be characterized as
America’s first defeat: militarily the result was, at best, a stalemate, but
the political and economic aftershocks were the real disaster. As Murray
Rothbard put it:
“Even the war of 1812 – seemingly a harmless
little escapade – was evil, and also in the domestic sense, in that it ruined
the Jeffersonian Party for a long time to come, it established Federalism which
means monopoly State-capitalism in essence, it imposed a central bank, it
imposed high tariffs, it imposed domestic federal taxation, which never existed
before, internal taxation, and it took a long time to get rid of it, and we
never really did get back to the pre-War of 1812 level of minimal State power.”
The young republic was infected with the virus of
imperialism at an early age, and it ate away at the central organs of the body
politic. The carriers were the intelligentsia, the social climbers, the
politicians-on-the-make – those who, ironically, wished to emulate the British
by building an American version of the Empire.
In the interests of good taste and diplomatic
decorum, our Canadian allies are loyally ignoring the anniversary of our
ignominious defeat at their hands: Detroit, the supposed launching pad for the
conquest of Canada, was surrendered to British troops and Canadian militia
without firing a shot.
The conquest of Canada was torpedoed by the
stubborn refusal of American state and county militias to countenance the
invasion. The defense of the country was one thing, but the conquest of a
foreign land – why, it was un-American! They simply refused the order to
invade.
Oh, but that we had such a militia today! A
standing army is a curse: a military priesthood with more than a few would-be
Caesars in its higher ranks. Exactly what the Founders feared.
Impossible, say you: we have too many enemies,
it’s a dangerous world! Any gangster can say the same: he, too, has many
enemies. His world is rife with danger, and with good reason. If you go around
killing people, their relatives and friends tend to hate you, and are often
impelled to seek revenge.
Naturally, any resemblance between US foreign policy and the activities of a criminal gang are purely coincidental….
Naturally, any resemblance between US foreign policy and the activities of a criminal gang are purely coincidental….
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