Sunday, 24 May 2026

One Spirit, One Body

American Pentecostal pastor: “When did your family become Christians?”

Palestinian Catholic priest: “On the Day of Pentecost.”

That exchange has happened at least once, because I was there. As one of mine for Catholic365 begins: “The whole Church was baptised with the Holy Spirit on the Day of Pentecost, which we celebrate on Sunday, and She manifests that baptism through a rich plurality of gifts, the charisms. The whole Church, and thus every member, is therefore both Pentecostal and Charismatic. Every gift is a charism, and each is always given for the good of the whole body, in response to Her evangelistic activity, in the context of Her sacramental life, and subject to Her gift of discernment. She exercises that gift within Her institutional life, because the institutional Church and the charismatic Church are inseparable, being two aspects of a single reality.”

The Beautiful Game?

Like Tony Blair’s affected support for Newcastle United in his 24 years as the MP for a constituency that would have been evenly divided between Sunderland and Middlesbrough, Keir Starmer is off about how his beloved Arsenal United saw off the competition from Melchester Rovers and Earls Park, the Sparks. It is all very embarrassing.

As is being caught putting up decoy candidates. That has gone on forever, and especially against Independents, since anyone may use the one word “Independent”. But it used to be impossible to prove. Now, though, they make these arrangements on their phones.

Market Forces

There cannot be a single market in any of goods, services, capital or labour (i.e., people) unless there is a single market in all of them. The stocks are sold, the Press is squared, the middle class is quite prepared for the only thing even worse than being back in the EU, namely being bound by its rules without having so much as the tiniest say over their content. We are to be a colony, a satrapy, a vassal state, back in the Customs Union and in Margaret Thatcher’s Single Market. If Switzerland is indeed to be the model, then we are even going to be joining the Schengen Area.

There will of course be no referendum. We are ruled by people to whom the vote is a nice thing to have, but who got their way by other means every day, so they did not really need it. If 60 per cent of the laws to which they were subject were made without the formal participation of their elected representatives, well, those were still going to be the laws that they themselves wanted, because that was how the world worked. We have been telling you this forever.

Discover This

Neither Tony Benn, nor Michael Foot, nor Tam Dalyell, ever made the slightest attempt to modify his accent. Many a hero of the Left has come from a privileged background either in this country or elsewhere, and not least in India. Yet Daniel Sanderson writes:

A newly elected Scottish Green politician who claimed to be from a disadvantaged background in India in fact had a privileged upbringing, including attending an exclusive private school, it can be revealed.

Q Manivannan became a Holyrood MSP this month despite being on a student visa, meaning the politician may be forced to leave the country before the term ends.

Before being elected, Manivannan, who identifies as non-binary and uses the pronouns they/them, told party members that as a “queer Tamil immigrant” they would be a voice for the “working class and marginalised”.

On the campaign trail, Manivannan claimed a disadvantaged, “lower caste” background, implying that they were among the most marginalised groups in Indian society, and said at times that they were “hungry because I was starved”.

Shortly before being elected MSP for Edinburgh & Lothians East, Manivannan also claimed “[I had] saved and worked and lied and begged” to get a PhD, from the University of St Andrews, while loved ones back home faced the “full force of digital, infrastructural, carceral, and affective violence in India”.

However, an investigation by The Sunday Times has found that Manivannan comes from an upper middle-class household in Chennai, one of India’s wealthiest, most cosmopolitan cities. Although the Scottish Greens want to ban private schooling, Manivannan attended both private high school and university, and went on to run a subsidiary of an Indian business that coaches the children of the super-rich to access the world’s elite institutions.

Manivannan claimed to have been descended from “courtesans, dancers, musicians, hunters, and prostitutes”, but the MSP’s family has in fact held professional, high-status roles for at least two generations.

The politician’s father, Manivannan Dasarathi, a tennis champion in his youth, has degrees in chemical engineering and business administration. His public profile says he has “43 years [of] industrial experience in government and private sectors in senior management positions”, including running his own advisory firm since 2004.

Manivannan’s paternal grandmother ran a medical clinic, the MSP revealed in a blog. Manivannan’s mother, Rajachitra Manivannan, has a successful career in academia and the family’s maternal grandmother was a trailblazing gynaecologist who built a hospital in the town of Tirupattur, according to an online interview with Q Manivannan’s sister. It is understood that their parents are now retired.

The family’s success allowed Manivannan to benefit from a private education out of reach of the vast majority of Indians. The MSP did not discuss their own education in India on the campaign trail, and any schooling before St Andrews is absent from Manivannan’s public LinkedIn profile.

The MSP and the party’s press office did not provide details of Manivannan’s schooling when it was requested by The Times, which asked for the information from all MSPs.

Manivannan, who was born Srivatsan Manivannan before adopting the forename Q, attended Bhavan’s Rajaji Vidyashram, a mid-range private school in Chennai, costing about £600 a year. Though the fees are modest compared with the UK, the average annual income in Manivannan’s home state is estimated to be about £3,200.

Students say it is one of the hardest institutions to get into in the city. It is known for impressive sports facilities and runs international excursions, which students fund themselves, such as trips to Nasa in the United States. Manivannan took full advantage of its extracurricular activities, running a school-linked Chennai debate club and founding a quiz club, according to public records and former students.

The MSP then went to OP Jindal Global University, in the state of Haryana, one of India’s best-known private liberal arts and law universities, taking a BA in liberal arts and humanities between 2015 and 2018.

The university caters to the upper-middle classes and is about 30 times more expensive on average than India’s more competitive, and prestigious, public universities. The total annual cost of a BA at the university, including tuition, accommodation and other extras, ranges from from £7,800 to £9,300, compared with under £300 on average at public universities.

A student from Haryana who studied at Ashoka University in Delhi, which serves a similar market, said: “It’s a fairly bougie university. Often it’s fancy kids who couldn’t go to colleges abroad who go to Ashoka and Jindal.” The student asked not to be named.

In 2019, Manivannan went to work at Essai Education, a high-end educational consultancy in Delhi that helps the children of India’s super-rich elite to get places at top international universities such as Harvard, Yale, Oxford and Cambridge.

Those who studied and worked with Manivannan in India described them as kind, conscientious and intelligent. A former colleague recalled the MSP fondly, saying Manivannan was “adorable”, “always smiling” and had a “great sense of humour”.

The job had been to assist “really high-end” clients whose teenage children would be dropped off at the offices in luxury cars by private drivers, they said.

Another former colleague at Essai said Manivannan had been “very justice orientated” helping to organise peaceful sit-in protests about a controversial citizenship law. The consultancy “paid insanely well”, she said.

Since leaving India, Manivannan has maintained close links with Essai and its subsidiary firm, Discover, which connects high school students with PhD researchers to boost their chances of getting into elite overseas boarding schools and universities.

A job advert Manivannan posted last year described Discover as “my research mentorship firm” and said the services it offered included “homework review/delivery” for high school students by PhD-level academics.

Manivannan will be obliged to declare any external income on the Holyrood register of interests. A source close to Manivannan said the MSP was now working with Discover in a voluntary and advisory role but had been phasing it out since the election.

The Scottish Tories said that members of the Scottish Greens, a party with a co-leader who unapologetically favours a ban on private education, might not have supported Manivannan’s candidacy in such high numbers had they known about this privileged upbringing and apparent interest in private education.

Despite having joined the Scottish Greens only in January last year, thanks to internal elections Manivannan was ranked third by members on the party’s candidate list in Edinburgh & Lothians East, where the party has its highest support, in July.

Under Holyrood’s electoral system, in which voters back a party rather than an individual with their second ballot, the number of votes cast for the Greens in Edinburgh & Lothians East was more than enough to get Manivannan a parliamentary seat.

In the candidate statement, the MSP described themselves as a “queer Tamil immigrant” and a “community organiser, teacher, and policy expert” who would fight for “radical change” for the marginalised working class.

A spokesman for the Scottish Tories said: “It appears that Q Manivannan has questions to answer after apparently pulling the wool over the eyes of the Scottish Greens.

“This new MSP wouldn’t be the first left-wing politician to embellish their supposedly working-class credentials to curry favour. But the public expect those they elect to be transparent and honest about their life before politics, rather than peddling false information about what they have done and where they came from.”

By 2020, Manivannan was in Ireland at Trinity College Dublin, studying for a Master of Philosophy in international peace studies. The following year they enrolled at St Andrews in Fife, and two months ago submitted a PhD thesis on “narrating anti-authoritarian resistance”, in pursuit of a doctorate in philosophy.

Dublin and St Andrews are two of the most notoriously expensive places to study as students in the UK and Ireland, outside of London. Fees for international students for the MPhil programme at Trinity are currently €18,720 (£16,200) per year. It is understood that Manivannan took out a loan to support their studies and received a scholarship that went towards undergraduate fees.

Manivannan’s older sister, Aishwarya, travelled to Edinburgh to watch them take the oath to become an MSP this month.

She founded what was described as “Chennai’s premier academy for art & design foundation studies, portfolio development, creative programs, and career mentoring” in 2012, which also offers bespoke private services to help students get into some of the world’s best visual arts institutions. Its headquarters is in the upmarket Adyar district of the city.

Aishwarya also benefitted from a private education, including a qualification from Lasalle College of the Arts in Singapore, the leading institution of its kind in Asia. For non-funded, international students a BA programme costs about £22,000 per year. It is not known whether she received a scholarship.

Manivannan recently sent a message to Green members “begging for cash” to help pay for visa costs. An online crowdfunder set up by Manivannan, since deleted but seen by The Sunday Times, showed that £1,066 had been donated towards the £2,089 cost of applying for a graduate visa, which would allow another three years in Britain.

Manivannan made clear that they will apply for a longer-term global talent visa, which costs £5,049. The crowdfunder said “I already qualify for a global talent visa”, although independent experts questioned the claim, saying it was unlikely that the MSP would receive one under strict rules./ Although approval for a graduate visa is expected to be a formality, it would allow Manivannan to remain in the UK only until 2029. The Holyrood term runs until the spring of 2031.

Saturday, 23 May 2026

Recognising His Weaknesses

Andy Burnham is not the King of the North. Most of the North is north of Manchester, and almost all of it is either north of Manchester, or east of Manchester, or both. Burnham has done nothing for us, and as the Mayor of Greater Manchester, why should he? As to his fiefdom, Joshi Herrmann writes:

Five years ago, I had a phone call with Andy Burnham, who had recently been re-elected for a second term as mayor of Greater Manchester. Burnham’s victory in the 2021 mayoral election was widely predicted, but the scale of it was staggering: he had won not just in every borough of the city region but in every council ward. The deep red electoral map proclaimed that Greater Manchester was now Burnhamland.

Our call wasn’t supposed to be about Burnham, per se. I was writing a profile for The Mill about Sir Richard Leese, the outgoing leader of Manchester City Council, who was stepping down after 25 years running the city, and Burnham had agreed to contribute his thoughts. I wondered if the call would be awkward. The two men had known each other for 20 years but had a difficult relationship.

“We’ve had our moments,” Burnham said, with what we both knew to be considerable understatement. After Burnham became mayor, he had asked Leese to be his deputy, but the region’s two most influential figures were odd bedfellows, and they regularly clashed.

“I am different in style, I guess,” Burnham said, when I asked him to explain what the difference was. Burnham admitted that as his first mayoral term wore on, Leese would accuse him of bringing in his “Westminster ways,” — like announcing things without getting proper sign off. “So, there was a bit of a culture clash.” Leese, he said, “Brings a rigour to what he does, which…” he paused. “I wouldn’t say I lack, but I am a more instinctive politician, in that I will have a feel for something.”

Who is Andy Burnham and what kind of prime minister would he be? I’ve been covering him up close in Manchester for six years now, a period during which few people south of Stockport have cared about the answer to that question. Now, Burnham is running in what might be the most consequential parliamentary by-election in British history, with the chance to grab the prize he’s coveted for his entire career, and suddenly every man and his dog wants to know.

The national media, which rarely covers Manchester in any depth, has this week produced a firehose of podcasts and essays about Burnham and ‘Manchesterism’, his supposed political programme. There are, broadly, two stories being told. In one telling, he’s the saviour Labour needs: a man with a radical analysis of what ails the country and a playbook for change that has been forged and perfected in Manchester. In another, he’s a cynical chameleon – a master communicator who lacks substance and will say anything to advance his career.

Both analyses, I think, miss what Burnham’s great strength really is. And neither deals with what may prove his fatal weakness.

The late-night call

Two weeks after Burnham was first elected mayor, he called Leese in the middle of the night. Just after 10.30pm on 22 May 2017, the Islamist terrorist Salman Abedi detonated a nail bomb in one of the entrances to the Manchester Arena, killing more than 20 concertgoers, including an eight-year-old girl. 

It was a nightmarish start to his mayoralty, and Burnham rang Leese to discuss how they should respond. The next morning, they appeared outside Manchester Town Hall in dark suits, addressing the assembled mourners and a bank of cameras. “We are grieving today, but we are strong,” Burnham told them — urging the city to go about its day as far as possible as normal. His short speech struck a tone that balanced grief with local resilience, but he looked and sounded like a politician: appropriately stoic in a moment of mourning.

Three years later and the two men were again standing next to each other in a moment of national crisis, this time outside Bridgewater Hall, flanked by other local council leaders. Half an hour into the Covid-19 press conference, Leese stepped forward to show Burnham his phone. He’d just received a message from colleagues in Westminster confirming that the government was about to impose Tier 3 restrictions on Greater Manchester, offering only £22m in relief funding after talks between the two parties had broken down.

In the video of that moment, you can see Burnham composing himself as Leese reads out the details from his phone. “DISGRACEFUL” someone shouts from behind the cameras and microphones. Burnham screws up his face and looks at the ground. “It’s brutal, to be honest, isn’t it?” he says. Then he finds his range.

“This is no way to run the country in a national crisis, it isn’t. This is not right. They should not be doing this. Grinding people down, trying to accept the least they can get away with.”

It was instinctive and brilliant. In that moment, Burnham had found something inside himself that we hadn’t seen before, not even after the Arena bombing: a brand of moral leadership that perfectly captured the powerlessness many people felt. No longer a New Labour apparatchik, he had put on a garb we associate with great municipal leaders of the past: charismatic, non-partisan figures who offer their cities solace in painful moments, some guiding values and a sense of protection from the wolves at the gate.

Within minutes, social media was alive with memes christening Burnham the King of the North. Some in the national media felt the phone routine was hammy, even staged. But in Manchester, many of us could feel that Burnham had embodied the anxiety of a city.

“Richard [Leese] is ten times more intelligent than Andy, but Richard couldn’t do that,” says one person who has worked with both men when I mention that scene. The next year, Burnham won his landslide re-election victory.

Long term bets

When he came to Manchester, Burnham was joining a mature political project whose progenitors worried he might mess things up. “My worry was that he wouldn’t get it,” says Dame Diane Coyle, now a professor at the Bennett School of Public Policy in Cambridge and then one of a small group of economists whose work informed the city’s strategy. Coyle was one of the authors of the most influential document in Manchester’s revival: the Manchester Independent Economic Review, first published in 2009.

The review emphasised that the city needed to make long-term investments in things like early years education, transport and public health if it was serious about getting economic growth. Only places with a strong set of infrastructure can get on and do economically valuable things, the thinking went. “What happened in Manchester was a willingness and capacity to make those long-term bets,” Coyle recalls.

Coyle says her concern about Burnham didn’t turn out to be warranted: he seemed to understand what he had inherited and ably kept it on track. “I think he’s very self-aware about not being a policy wonk himself,” she told me. “He has a clear set of values — about making the economy work for working people.”

Something else stood out to Coyle in her conversations with Burnham. “He listens to people,” she says. “A lot of politicians I come across are really not very good listeners.”

Nevertheless, Burnham represented a change in emphasis from Leese and his dynamic council chief executive Sir Howard Bernstein, who had created the structures of Greater Manchester with their own fiefdom – Manchester – very much first among equals. Bernstein was a “Manchester man”, as one colleague of his puts it, and the city region’s growth was heavily predicated on attracting private investment and government largesse into central Manchester, plus parts of Salford and Trafford. Manchester was building a services-led economy centred on the universities, the BBC’s move to MediaCity and a cluster of digital companies and public agencies that had been prised away from London.

Burnham, on the other hand, seemed more interested in the peripheries of Greater Manchester and “left behind” places that had voted for Brexit not long before he was elected in 2017. “I don’t think Andy has ever been comfortable with the idea that we prioritise the regional centre because that is where the investment wants to go,” says one person who worked at the Greater Manchester Combined Authority in those early years.

The dirty work that Manchester’s revival was built on – striking hard deals to get capital flowing into the city, sometimes giving away public land and holding your nose about who you were giving it to – didn’t energise the new mayor. “Andy has always been interested in the people side of the economy, but he’s never shown much interest in the harder infrastructure and investment side,” the former colleague of his says.

‘We don’t ask serious questions’

What Burnham had a real flair for, however, was the symbolic side of leadership. Early on, he announced that he would give away 15% of his salary to help the homeless, something he has stuck to ever since. “I think that’s genuine,” says Vaughan Allen, who leads Manchester’s Business Improvement District. “His ability to embody and enunciate a vision is incredibly good.”

Allen also observed that Burnham’s public profile and tendency to make bold gestures was a double-edged sword. The new mayor’s most well-known promise was “to end rough sleeping by 2020”, a campaign commitment designed to address widespread concern about homelessness at the time and the ongoing “spice” epidemic on the streets. People working in the system saw Burnham’s promise as “ludicrous”, as one puts it, and utterly unachievable.

Allen, whose role involves trying to improve the state of the city centre on behalf of local businesses, realised that having a famous mayor using the phrase “A Bed Every Night” – the name of Burnham’s initiative – on TV was creating its own problem. “Once word got out, we got an influx of homeless from all over the country because they thought they would get a bed,” he recalls.

When The Mill did a big investigation into homelessness in 2022, working with a team of data science students from the University of Manchester, we found that Manchester was warehousing an astonishing number of people in temporary accommodation: up 600% from fewer than 400 households in 2013 to more than 2,500 in 2022, including several thousand children. That rise was nine times faster than the national average, and was costing the council more than £30m a year. 

Manchester’s TA numbers rose nine times faster than the national average. This graph goes up to 2020-21, when our story came out. Burnham’s A Bed Every Night (ABEN) scheme had been a success on its own terms: it reduced the most visible form of homelessness, the number of people sleeping on the streets across Greater Manchester, from more than 250 in 2016 to less than 70 in the official count in 2021. (This number rose again to 154 in Autumn 2024, and I can’t find any announcement on the GMCA website about the 2025 count).

But we obtained a confidential report written for Manchester City Council by a leading homelessness expert who found that ABEN was having an unintended consequence: people referred via the scheme – some of whom were “at risk” of sleeping rough rather than doing so – were getting priority for social housing ahead of those warehoused in grim temporary accommodation blocks and hotels, for example disabled mothers (the Greater Manchester Combined Authority did not deny this was happening). A scheme designed to tackle one form of homelessness hadn’t been properly synced up with the system that housed a much larger group of homeless — the ones in so-called “temporary” accommodation, who we found were staying there for an average of 441 days.

“If what you’re doing is making sure everyone is off the streets straight away, you create a conveyor belt where people just know, come to Manchester and that’s a quick way to get a place to live,” one former senior council worker told us. “I don’t think there is any political ambition to look into this to see how well it [ABEN] is working because I think it will uncover the fact that it creates an anomaly”.

This, in a nutshell, is the sceptic’s case against Andy Burnham as leader: he likes doing big things but he doesn’t like asking the kind of uncomfortable questions that turn great ideas into durable policy. This is what Burnham was hinting at when he said Leese was sceptical of his “Westminster ways”, and what he meant when he told me that Leese was “analytical”, and that he himself was more “impulsive”.

This critique extends to the kind of people Burnham surrounds himself with, or so I’m told by one former advisor. The mayor has a positive, affirmative style of leadership at the combined authority, regularly holding all-staff meetings in which he gives praise and credit to his colleagues, in stark contrast to the more traditional style of Bernstein. But he tends to appoint staff who are “very much in his own image,” this person says. “We don’t ask serious questions about ourselves”.

His most high-profile policy success – bringing the buses under public control, so that Transport for Greater Manchester can determine routes and prices – owes a lot to Burnham’s skill as a salesman. He was the perfect hype-man for a new system, appearing in clever videos explaining the problems with the unregulated private system ushered in by the Thatcher government and posing for endless very yellow press photos. But even the dogs in the street know that Burnham didn’t create the Bee Network. Rather, the Bee Network created him.

Bus reform was a major plank of the devolution deal negotiated with the Conservative government years before Burnham came back north, and Leese was a Bee Network believer avant la lettre. In the early days, Leese “repeatedly reminded” Burnham that bus reform was “the only reason” he had agreed to George Osborne’s proposal for a directly elected mayor of Greater Manchester, Burnham told me back in 2021, and Leese confirmed.

The other big transport initiative of Burnham’s period – the Clean Air Zone – is such a well-known disaster that it hardly bears repeating. Burnham tends to bristle when asked why he spent many millions on a project that caused such anger in the suburbs of Greater Manchester that it had to be abandoned even after the signs announcing the scheme to motorists were already in place: the CAZ was imposed on us by the Conservative government, he says. And yet, it was his team who designed it, and it was their failure to create the right carve-outs for delivery vans and other commercial vehicles that led to an angry revolt in places like Makerfield, which he now seeks to represent in parliament. When the GMCA faced a situation where it needed to ask hard questions, our reporting often found that it preferred to dodge the questions entirely. The combined authority had a headline target, dating back to before Burnham’s election, to reduce cancer deaths by 1,300 per year by 2021, a 20% reduction, which was supposed to be one of the benefits of devolving health and social care budgets.

But when the Greater Manchester Health and Social Care Partnership, of which the GMCA was a key part, released its progress update in 2021 (under the title “Taking charge is working in Greater Manchester”), the cancer target had simply disappeared. When we asked for the updated numbers, we saw that cancer deaths had in fact gone slightly up. No one had highlighted this failure, and it felt like one of the most important aspects of devolution was barely being scrutinised — a sign of the GMCA’s curious reluctance to build proper mechanisms for accountability at the Greater Manchester level.

The lack of proper checks and balances around Burnham was best exposed in 2024, when my colleague Jack Dulhanty published an extraordinary scoop. Sacha Lord, a local nightclub entrepreneur whom Burnham had appointed as his unpaid Nighttime Economy Advisor, had grossly misled the government when one of his companies obtained just over £400,000 of Arts Council relief money during the pandemic by lying about what it did.

Upon hearing about the story, Burnham should have sacked Lord or initiated some procedure to scrutinise his unelected advisor and close friend. Instead, he stood by Lord for a few days until the evidence against him became overwhelming and then launched an investigation that misled the public about its narrow remit. Seven months later when the Arts Council vindicated Jack’s story and asked for the money back, Lord was forced to resign.

On a human level, the episode pointed to a fatal weakness on Burnham’s part: he wants to be liked and he’s not particularly ruthless. He “gets taken in by the blarney”, says someone who has known him for years, especially if the blarney comes from someone working in the music industry, which Burnham adores. “He was warned by people who he is very close to, for years, that he needed to move away from that relationship,” this person says. “Is that a sign that he’s loyal, or that he’s a bad judge of character? I think he’s a bad judge of character.”

The forlorn hunt for ‘Manchesterism’

Last year, the editor of the New Statesman visited Manchester to meet with Burnham. The prime minister’s poll ratings were already under water and Tom McTague, who had recently taken over the magazine, had correctly intuited that this was a good moment to profile the King of the North.

McTague is an excellent journalist, but he sits at the chin-scratching, intellectual end of the British commentariat. What he wanted to know from Burnham was what Westminster journalists usually want to know when they meet a politician: which tribe do you belong to? What’s your ideological programme? What is Burnhamism?

To many politicians, this question would make sense and would be mechanically answerable. National politics tends to be satisfyingly demarcated by tribes that end with ism, if for no other reason than to maintain the sanity of lobby hacks and make politics legible to the public. This is the world in which everyone’s favourite joke about Burnham (some version of: a Blairite, a Brownite and a Corbynite walk into a bar. ‘What are you drinking Andy?’) makes sense. Burnham hates the joke, but it’s quite funny, if only in a very dorky Ed-Miliband-must-have-come-up-with-it way.

But asking Burnham to outline his cogent political programme is like asking my cat, who came from a shelter near the Etihad, whether she supports Man City. You’re asking about something she has no interest in and that forms no part of her life. The terms of the question wouldn’t even make sense to her. She’s a cat! He’s Andy Burnham! He’s a genius at doing one important thing in one specific context and you’re asking him to answer questions about something he’s not interested in and has spent eight very successful years not having to think about.

The result of asking Burnham this question has been farcical. Burnham humbly replied that his programme was not Burnhamism but “Manchesterism”, a concept over which gallons of ink have been spilled in recent days and which only becomes murkier as the by-election carnival progresses. Is Manchesterism the hard-nosed developer-friendly opportunism of Leese and Bernstein, or some soft municipal socialism that Burnham seems to be hinting at and which he has certainly never come close to enacting? How does bringing buses back under public control (a concept he reluctantly embraced) provide a template for other public utilities, like water or trains, which are already – like the Bee Network – mostly run by private companies with oversight from the state? How, as Burnham has suggested, can working well with other parties be considered ‘Manchesterism’ when for most of his mayoralty, he has run a city region composed almost entirely of Labour councils? Without meaning to, McTague has sent the media on a wild goose chase for a political programme that doesn’t exist, from a man who is known for not having one.

The perfect job

Does this make him a cynical chameleon, a shapeshifter, a flip-flopper — all the terms that appear by his name in off-the-record newspaper briefings? I don’t think it does. He appears to be those things when he tries to play the Westminster game, a game that by his own admission he didn’t used to enjoy and that his abject failure in two Labour leadership contests in 2010 and 2015 suggests he wasn’t very good at.

Since 2017, he’s done what we all hope to achieve in life: he’s found a job that he is really good at. Being the mayor of a combined authority like Greater Manchester is a relatively new role in British politics and is markedly different from the roles above it (cabinet minister) and below it (council leaders) in the food chain. Council leaders must manage statutory, mandatory frontline services like social care, and they spend their time cutting library hours, raising taxes and reducing the frequency of bin collections to free up money. Cabinet ministers, as Burnam learned as a young health minister in 2009-10, have similar constraints. Both jobs are structurally associated with scarcity and management. / Metro mayors barely run anything. They have few hard powers, and their budgets are devolved from Westminster specifically for “strategic growth” initiatives: exciting projects like building tram lines, regenerating brownfield land or making investments in green energy. They are there to spend money and build things.

Crucially, they don’t face anything like the scrutiny that Westminster leaders do – no daily trips to TV studios; no hostile questioning from reporters working for partisan newspapers whose mission it is to make you look silly. If Burnham speaks like a normal human being, that’s partly because he doesn’t operate in the media environment that turns our national leaders into robots.

Burnham used to receive tough coverage from the terrier-like MEN political editor Jennifer Williams, but when she left to join the FT in 2022, the MEN left her role open for over a year and have never found an equivalent figure to replace her. Now, the paper largely acts as a cheerleader for the mayor, rarely writing anything remotely critical. The Mill has scrutinised the GMCA, but our editorial budget is roughly a quarter of what the combined authority spends on marketing and communications (£1.3m last year, according to data they release).

To me, the tragedy of Burnham’s wish to return to Westminster is that it means leaving a job that seems custom designed to take advantage of his skills and to mitigate his weaknesses. As the pandemic showed, and as you can see when he engages with voters in regular public Q&A sessions, he has an incredible gift for listening to people, speaking like them and feeling their pain. This is not a con trick or a gimmick: it’s something people need in a world in which it feels like so many of the entities we deal with are giant and remote from our lives. It’s the role that a vicar used to play: the shepherd of the flock; the buffer of communal sorrow and the vessel of hopes and dreams.

It’s built not just through clever digital communications but via something that only local leaders can realistically do: showing up in person, time after time. Everyone you speak to in Greater Manchester has a story about Burnham arriving at their fundraiser on a rainy Tuesday night or turning up to bless a tree-planting initiative at their leisure centre. The job he does is largely about turning up, seeming normal and showing that the person in charge is like one of us, not one of those robotic politicians on the TV. As one biographer wrote of the famous Fiorello La Guardia, mayor of New York City in the 1930s and 1940s – another municipal leader who crossed party lines and was supremely comfortable in his own skin – Burnham’s greatest asset is not his political programme or even his speechmaking, but his unvarnished empathy.

Would Burnham make a good prime minister? No one can know for sure, of course, but I don’t think so. The question reminds me of the scene in the HBO series Succession where Logan Roy, the Murdochian patriarch of a warring media family, is asked by his melancholic son Kendall whether he thinks he was ever cut out to take over the company.

“Do you think I could’ve done it?” Kendall asks. “The top job.”

For perhaps the first time in the show, Logan hesitates before answering.

“You’re smart, you’re good,” he says. “But you’re not a killer. You have to be a killer.

Logan then tacks on a half-hearted word of encouragement. “But... now-a-days... maybe you don’t. I don’t know.” 

My impression after six years of writing and thinking about Andy Burnham is that he’s many good things, but he’s not a killer. He has an endearing emotional vulnerability that is rare among politicians I’ve met, and a wonderful sense of how to take hold of a moment. He’s brilliantly instinctive, as he said to me on that phone call, and he genuinely listens. He’s offered a brand of moral, pastoral leadership to the city that I think is not properly understood in modern politics and that is reflected in his popularity.

But to be prime minister – a job that involves making impossible choices every day and surrounding yourself with tough, calculating people who don’t mind asking hard questions and telling you when you’re wrong – you have to be a killer. Or maybe you don’t nowadays – maybe good vibes and fetching running shorts are enough. I don’t know.

Perhaps the closest thing to Burnhamism that I can divine is his belief in devolving power away from Whitehall. It’s not exactly a distinctive political philosophy but it has the benefit of being correct. We’re one of the most centralised countries in Europe, and economists like Coyle are right that it’s holding us back. Perhaps the best thing for Burnham to do, recognising his weaknesses at wielding hard power, would be to get himself into Downing Street and immediately start giving it away.

Great Rolling Clouds


I really was brought up to believe that, in this country, nobody could be seriously punished without a jury trial. I was told that governments were in general fair, that a free Press and a benevolent Crown kept us safe from tyranny.

When I read the famous Franz Kafka novel, The Trial, about a man arrested and prosecuted by a power he cannot reach, for a crime that is not named, I thought it was about those dark, tyrannical foreign lands to our east, where such things have always happened.

Now I know that all this may once have been true [an interesting turn of phrase; he is there, but he cannot yet say so in print], but now it certainly is not. What is worse, and this fills me with actual rage, hundreds of my fellow journalists could not care less that a British citizen has had his life ruined, and is forced to live in exile, on the basis of a decree issued by a minister long out of office.

Every one of them is, as a result, in danger of being treated in the same way by some future government that does not like them. Only a major fuss will alter this. Only a tiny few, including most notably Toby Young of the Free Speech Union, can see the danger and have lifted a finger.

The English civil courts will not help. The fabled Strasbourg Human Rights Court, supposed friend of the underdog, knows of this man’s plight and does nothing. When he recently appealed to the King for aid, he was told to take his problems elsewhere. (You might note at this point that the powers of the Crown were used by the Blair government to pardon 16 Irish Republicans between 2000 and 2002.)

Now the European Union has joined in the state-sponsored bullying. The main effect of this Brussels intervention is that the man involved now cannot legally get home from the town in Russian-occupied Ukraine where he lives in destitution.

The European superstate has banned him from entering EU territory or airspace, so it is hard to see how he could get back even if he had the money for a ticket.

Last week he was told by the High Court that he must pay council tax on his London home, even though he is legally banned from paying anyone anything, and is stuck nearly 2,000 miles away. If he does not, the council can send in the bailiffs to seize his belongings. If he was in prison, and convicted of a crime, they could not do this.

He is totally unique. He is the only British citizen, holding no other passport, who has been subjected since July 2022 to the unending sanctions which forbid him to pay for anything or be paid for anything. There is no end date for this treatment. Even armed robbers know when their punishment will end.

You might think he must be a money-launderer or an arms dealer, or a recruiter of mercenaries, or an official in a tyrannical government. But he isn’t. You can look him up. He isn’t very nice and he isn’t very wise. But he is not some sort of international mastermind of evil. If he were he’d have another passport and the sanctions wouldn’t really bother him.

He is called Graham Phillips. I don’t like him at all. I have no desire to meet him. But I am obliged by my heritage, my background, my upbringing and everything I believe in to urge that he be freed from this spider’s web of despotic treatment which insults our national tradition of liberty and justice.

Mr Phillips did some rather stupid things while trying to work as an amateur journalist in the midst of the Ukraine war. You can easily research them.

I don’t defend them. On the contrary, I condemn them. But I won’t go into them, as no criminal charges have ever been made against him. Honestly, if they had been, I wouldn’t object, and nor would I try to help him.

The sanctions against him are not even imposed because of these actions but because of a vague catch-all charge worthy of a police state. It says he is ‘a video blogger who has produced and published media content that supports and promotes actions and policies which destabilise Ukraine and undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty or independence of Ukraine’. Ukraine seems to have survived somehow.

But I have observed the flat, cold hard face of the state turned towards him for some years now, and I am sure that they see a precedent in this case.

Let them get away with using these powers to inflict ruin and exile, without charge or trial or verdict, and nobody is safe. So, my fellow scribblers, why don’t you do or at least say something?

And:

Great rolling clouds of burning oil rise over Russian cities. I think we may be sure that there will be many more such raids and fires.

Ukraine, a poor, weak country without advanced technology or especially good spies, has somehow become a major power and is credited with these pinpoint attacks, whose long-term aim is obviously to bring about regime change in Moscow. Will we one day find out about all the help Kiev has been getting?

If this plan succeeds (and Vladimir Putin’s stupid invasion made it possible), let’s hope the regime change goes better than it usually does. For there are people in Russia far worse than Putin.

Europe, which in the joyous 1980s and early 1990s was suddenly reunited after decades of Cold War, is now more severely divided than ever. Real hard war has come to us again and may spread here if not very carefully handled.

I can see why some rather dim but powerful political interests in the USA might have wanted all this. But why Britain should be involved in it, I really cannot tell.

Should Never Be Seen

Although she takes a predictably regrettable turn at the end, Elaine Graham-Leigh writes:

The Green Party’s victory in the February 2026 Gorton and Denton by-election took the party’s MP count from four to five, but felt in many ways more consequential than the already creditable 2024 election results. When coupled with the party’s impressive showing at the 2026 local elections, where it gained control of five councils, and with membership at 215,000 by March 2026, there is a sense that this is the electoral breakthrough the party has been chasing since it won 14% of the UK vote back in the 1989 European elections. That this is finally happening at a time when, under Zack Polanski’s leadership, the party is positioned clearly to the left of Labour raises the question of whether the Greens could be the socialist electoral alternative. Has the answer been in front of us the whole time?

The Gorton and Denton result was clearly a left-of-Labour victory, in that the Green campaign centred on the cost-of-living crisis and opposition to Israel’s genocidal attack on Gaza. In this respect, it did the immediate job of providing a left alternative, demonstrating that this is the most effective way of preventing far-right electoral success by defeating Reform. In the local elections, the Greens were also able to capture previously left, Labour-strongholds like Hackney and Waltham Forest in north London. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the Green Party has become the socialist opposition to Labour that we have been trying to build.

Recent Green converts argue that the left’s distrust of the Greens as the socialist electoral alternative is outdated. It fails to understand the shifts that the Greens have made in their policies and relies on tropes which, to the extent that they were ever true, are not true now. James Meadway, for example, argued in the Morning Star on the eve of the Gorton and Denton by-election that a Green victory could mark ‘the long-delayed arrival of a left politics fit for the 21st century.’ His argument here was that the Greens’ lack of connection to organised labour in the form of the trade unions is an advantage, enabling them to speak to ‘the plumber and the hairdresser’ rather than just to public-sector workers. While not everyone sees the Green Party’s detachment from the trade unions so positively, as an issue, it may at least seem fixable if the party could build links with unions dissatisfied with Labour. Indeed, Polanski is embarking on a tour of trade-union conferences over spring/summer 2026 to try to do just that.

The extension of the argument that the Greens are not connected to organised labour is that they don’t represent or appeal to working-class people. Green supporters contend in response that the idea that ‘the Greens are very white, very middle class, very liberal’ is ‘a by now quite tired stereotype’, as shown for example by the election of Mothin Ali, first as a Green councillor in Leeds and then as deputy party leader. They point out that the Greens’ core supporters are ‘financially struggling and exploited by landlords and employers,’ and thus that the Greens are representing at least a section of the proletariat. To the extent that Greens are more likely to be highly educated professionals in urban areas, they could point out that the same was true of Corbyn’s Labour Party and probably would be for Your Party.

Arguments about the class composition of the Green Party membership only take us so far in understanding the nature of the party and its move to the left. In the first place, it is necessary to be clear about how we are viewing the nature of political parties. Implicit in the argument that the Green Party is, or is developing into, the socialist electoral alternative is that political parties are always blank slates. Regardless of their history, they can adopt any policies their members want, subject only to the extent to which the party machinery is bound to pay attention to the democratic will of the members. Thus, it is pointed out that the Green Party of England and Wales (GPEW) is particularly ripe for influence by the influx of new, socialist members, as its internal party structures are properly democratic.

There are differences of opinion on how long this process has taken within the Green Party. A view that the Greens’ left turn is purely the creation of the collapse of Corbynism and despair at the state of Your Party might see it as a temporary adaptation to the space that has opened up for an electoral vehicle to the left of Labour. Others argue that the party’s left turn is the result of decades of careful work. Zack Polanski’s election as leader was not, in this view, simply the election of a good communicator who happens to be left-wing, but the result of this long campaign to shift the party leftwards. Adam Ramsay, for example, stresses in his account of this process how, although the party wasn’t founded (as People, in 1972) from the left – ‘it’s founders came from a middle-class, Tory-ish milieu’ – it had certainly developed a left current within it by the time it became the Green Party in 1985.

Regardless of the ease of the leftward shift or the time it has taken, the common thread in the arguments that the Green Party is now the left party is that the Greens’ origins and tradition are unimportant as long as the majority of the current members will support left-wing policies and the party’s structures will allow them to be heard. In its most extreme form, the implication would be that we should be wary of putting any effort into any political party, since a left-wing party today might be turned into something very different tomorrow. Even the version which sees the Greens’ transformation as the product of a longer process is, however, in danger of underestimating the extent to which the core nature of a party, the tradition from which it comes and the class interests it represents, may not be as mutable as the new Greens may like to think. This, in turn, limits the ability even of a majority left membership to transform just any party into a socialist electoral project.

The Greens and imperialism

While the Green Party’s 2024 manifesto and subsequent campaigning stances have generally been well to the left of Labour on domestic issues, particularly the cost-of-living crisis, their policies on war are a different matter. It is important to understand this, not only because the policies are important in themselves, but because the Greens’ stance on imperialism demonstrates the class nature of the party.

The Greens clearly see themselves as an anti-war party, opposing the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Gaza and Iran as well as nuclear weapons, and periodically describe themselves or are described by others as ‘the anti-war party’. This does not, however, as Rivkah Brown pointed out on Novara, mean that they are ‘flower power pacifists’, opposing all wars on principle, and therein lies the rub. For Brown, this is a positive statement, showing how the Greens are alive to political realities and are not simple utopians. As an expression though, of how far the Greens are adapting their policies to a section of elite opinion, it is a demonstration of how they cannot serve as a genuine left alternative.

The example that shows that the Greens are not against all wars, only bad ones, is Ukraine, where the party’s position is that ‘the UK must keep supporting Ukraine to defend itself’. What that means is not always spelled out, but their statement on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s invasion, calling on the government ‘to defend Ukraine’s right to self-determination in the strongest possible terms on the international stage, making explicit that the UK will stand against any bad-faith actors who attempt to bully or intimidate Ukraine into appeasing Russia’s demands’, made clear their commitment to Ukraine continuing to fight. The stance on Ukraine is, of course, closely linked to the stance on NATO, with the view that Ukraine should be enabled to fight on, leading to the adoption of a pro-NATO position at the party’s March 2023 conference. This was then reflected in the 2024 manifesto, which stated that ‘the Green Party recognises that NATO has an important role in ensuring the ability of its member states to respond to threats to their security.’

Some of the recent acclaim for the Greens as ‘the anti-war party’ is because Polanski has been signalling a change back to something that appears closer to the pre-2022 position, commenting, in January 2026, that he didn’t think that it was possible to reform NATO from within. It is important to note, though that this was a specifically anti-Trump stance, rather than an opposition to the militarism that NATO represents. Polanski was clear that he was not rejecting any military intervention on principle, assuring journalists that ‘once you’ve exhausted every possible option, then you ask for further military intervention too.’ There is nothing in the Green Party’s position which rejects European rearmament. Indeed, the party’s commitment to rejoining the EU appears to align it with that agenda. The rejection of NATO is a rejection of the US now that Trump is openly pursuing an America-first policy, but with the apparent aim of effectively creating a European version of NATO, without the US, but with the wars in Western interests.

The Green Party is therefore not so much an anti-war party as it is a party aligned with European rather than US militarism. The immediate driver of this stance is clearly the Ukraine war, but it can also be seen to have deeper roots. The party has had an at-best semi-detached attitude to the anti-war movement, at least from the point when Caroline Lucas stepped down as a patron of the Stop the War Coalition (StWC) in 2015 over ‘some recent StWC positions that she didn’t support’ on Syria. That attitude to the anti-war movement itself arises from deep within the basic assumptions the party makes about power and how to win it.

The German Greens are a cautionary tale on the left for how an anti-imperialist party can become an enthusiast for military intervention. In 1998, its election manifesto was clear in its opposition to both ‘military peace enforcement and combat missions’, but in the following year, Green Party leader Joschka Fischer was celebrating the Nato bombing of Belgrade. By 2011, the party was so committed to militarism that Green Party voters were more likely than any other German voters to support German involvement in the Nato bombing of Libya. Its current positions include support for arming Ukraine, continued arms sales to Israel and that supporting the Palestinians equates to antisemitism.

The German Green Party is so notorious that tarring GPEW with the same brush might seem unfair. While Green parties around the world do take inspiration from each other, and the English party changed its name in 1985 from the Ecology Party to the Green Party to capitalise on the popularity and profile of the German Greens, they are separate organisations with their own policies. The important consideration here though, is why the German Green Party has evolved as it has and how that can help our understanding of the parallel evolution of GPEW.

Green attitudes to power

The German Green Party has largely taken the view that the primary objective is to get individual Greens into positions of power, regardless of the policy compromises this may necessitate. Some of this has undoubtedly been driven by the career aspirations of the individuals concerned, but careerism is only a partial, not a complete explanation. The transformation of the German Green Party into a party which was prepared to work with the SPD and other neoliberal parties in fighting imperialist wars represented a victory of the ‘realos’ in the party over the ‘fundis’. Despite the compromises with the right, this was not primarily a fight about particular policies, but rather about how to achieve them in practice. The fundis were opposed to compromise with parties to the right of them and saw elections as a way of advancing the goals of activist greens by getting a wider platform for their ideas. The realos, on the other hand, thought that green goals could best be achieved by using election victories to get people into powerful positions, as close to government as possible, where they could drive through incremental changes from within the system.

This same division between fundi and realo positions clearly exists in GPEW, with long-term tensions between those who wanted the party to be decentralised and to concentrate on local, grassroots campaigning, and those who were pushing for a tighter, national electoral operation. In previous versions of this debate, the left in the party has tended to be on the decentralising (fundi) side, with the realos seen as right-wing careerists, adopting ‘that post-Cold War, Blairite common sense that it was impossible to win elections while admitting that you wanted to nationalise things and tax the rich’.

What has happened more recently is that policy positions for the left have combined with the organisational approach of the realos. This could represent the left in the party adopting a new commitment to electoral strategy, or it could be that a new generation of political realos have perceived that looking socialist can be electoral gold rather than electoral poison. Which is more correct is not easy to judge from the outside, although the party’s willingness to abandon any public concern for environmental issues at a time when political opinion has been concluding that green policies are a vote-loser rather than a vote-winner may indicate that it’s more likely to be the latter than the former. It may, however, be a distinction without a difference, as in both versions, overtly left-wing policies are united with a belief in the electoral process as a way to achieve meaningful change.

This is not simply about winning elections, but about using election victories to get as close as possible to wielding even small amounts of power within the system. The most obvious recent example of this strategy in practice was the 2021 Bute House Agreement between the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish National Party, which gave Greens ministerial positions in the Scottish government, but there are also previous instances, such as when Green London Assembly member Jenny Jones served as London deputy mayor to Ken Livingstone in 2003-2004.

Both of these agreements, in their different ways, involved the Green parties in compromises with forces to their right which they did not control. The check was that the Greens could always resign if some undefined red line were to be crossed in future, although it is worth noting that identifying and acting on that red line was obviously harder in practice than it might appear in theory. Despite what might be thought to be considerable provocation, neither of these arrangements was ended by the Greens. Jones’s deputy mayorship finished when Livingstone won re-election as Labour’s candidate for London Mayor in 2004. In Scotland, the Greens hung on in the Bute House agreement even while the SNP implemented significant cuts to green causes like public transport, active travel and just transition, and dropped the target of cutting greenhouse-gas emissions by 75% by 2030. The agreement was finally wound up in 2024 by SNP First Minister Humza Yousaf.

The record of Greens in government, in Scotland under the Bute House Agreement and in various local councils, shows the difficulties inherent in exercising limited power within the system to carry out left-wing policies. Green-led councils have found themselves implementing austerity, passing cuts budgets in both Brighton and Hove and in Bristol. These may be accompanied by expressions of sorrow and sympathy for those affected: Tony Dyer, Green leader of Bristol City Council, said of its cuts budget in 2025 that ‘they won’t be painless cuts. You can’t make those changes without someone losing out. It feels bloody awful.’ The behaviour of Greens in control of local government has however, not seemed very different in practice from Labour. The Green council in Brighton sparked a week-long bin strike in 2013 when it proposed, much like the then Labour council in Birmingham would go on to do, to equalise pay for different jobs by cutting up to £4,000 a year from the pay of some refuse workers. A subsequent Green administration in Brighton caused the bin workers to go back on strike for several weeks in 2021 by imposing poor working conditions and doing nothing to address low pay.

The results of this are often damaging to the Greens: the party, for example, lost control of Brighton and Hove council in 2023. The accounting at the end of the Bute House Agreement in 2024 was generally that the Greens had achieved some small gains by ‘setting a greener tone’ to the government, but at the cost of working within a neoliberal regime, which was very happy to allow the Greens to act as a scapegoat for government cuts. It is also inevitably dispiriting for Green activists to be ‘told to celebrate budget cuts in housing and environment or cheer for slight policy adjustments.’

The difficulties are, of course, not all of the Greens’ own making. Controlling a council in a time of endless central government cuts to local government funding is always going to be something of a poisoned chalice, so it is not that the Greens are uniquely at fault here. However, this is an inherent part of the strategy of advancing the environmental cause by working within the existing institutions of the state. As Marx said, ‘the working class cannot simply lay hold of the readymade state machinery, and wield it for its own purposes.’ The Greens’ record in power can be seen as a demonstration of one of the ways in which such an attempt will fail, by being co-opted by ruling-class interests and by accepting small gains at the price of not threatening the status quo.

This is why the Greens’ position on imperialism is so important. The centrality of imperialism and war to the British state means that any left party’s position on NATO is an indication of how far they understand the realities of the system they’re confronting. The Greens’ failure to oppose all forms of imperialism functions as the price of entry to the system. It makes them a safer left opposition in a way that a consistently anti-imperialist party cannot be. It also undercuts the system change they think they stand for. A party which takes the view, explicitly or implicitly, that it is possible to combine fighting for justice and equality at home with supporting the state’s military adventures abroad is one whose capitulation to the state will ultimately undermine all its policies, foreign and domestic.

The uses of elections

Given the problems in the strategy of achieving system change by working your way to power through the institutions of that system, it is worth asking why Green parties continue to pursue it. It is not that such a strategy is inherent to any electoral project. Marx and Engels consistently argued that participation in elections was important for revolutionaries as a way of building the revolutionary movement, pointing out, for example, that being elected to the Reichstag gave German comrades August Bebel and Wilhelm Liebknecht a platform from which ‘the entire world can hear them’. Lenin also stressed the need to fight elections, writing in Pravda in 1912 that ‘we must take part in the elections, firstly, to rally and politically enlighten the mass of the workers during the elections, when party struggles and the entire political life will be stimulated and when the masses will learn politics in one way or other; and, secondly, to get our worker deputies into the Duma.’

Lenin went on to commend the worker deputies in the Duma, who, he said, ‘have done, and can do, a great deal for the working-class cause’. This might sound like an endorsement of the Green view of the importance of getting people into positions where they can exercise power, but it is nothing of the kind. Lenin makes clear that the elected deputies could only play a useful role ‘provided they are true worker democrats, provided they are connected with the masses and the masses learn to direct them and check on their activity’. In other words, they were elected to the Duma so that they could amplify the extra-parliamentary struggle, not primarily in order to use elected office to implement reforms.

The Green Party, however, does not have a connection to the movement in this way. Growth and electoral success for GPEW does not translate into amplification of the green movement in general. The recent Green surge, after all, has come at a time when the level of activity in the green movement is low and when the climate crisis has fallen off the mainstream political agenda. That the Green Party’s reaction to this is to exclude environmental issues from its own headline campaigning is a demonstration of how electoral success as a route to power, rather than electoral success to help build the movement, is at the core of its strategy.

It is, of course, easy for any electoral project to slip into thinking that electoral victories are pre-eminent in and of themselves. The Green Party’s disconnection from the movement is not, however, an accident or easily overcome, but reflects a major current in green thinking which does not see mass organisation for system change as important, or even desirable.

The Greens and revolution

That the capitalist system is the root cause of the climate crisis and other environmental problems is now a fairly mainstream position within green thinking. ‘System change not climate change’ was, after all, the slogan of the demonstrations at the Copenhagen international climate talks in 2009 and for many other international protests since. This does not mean, however, that the green movement has adopted a revolutionary position. Views of how to achieve the necessary system change are many and various, but have a tendency to avoid calling for revolutionary organisation, even where that would seem to be the logical conclusion to their diagnosis of the problem.

In part, this is likely to be the result of the historic distrust of socialism within green circles. As Derek Wall points out, ‘eco-socialism’ as a concept was coined out of an understanding that unmodified socialism was by definition not ‘eco’, and adoption of an eco-socialist position often involved an explicit rejection of the socialism bit. Despite the left-wing policies of GPEW, for Greens on the left, the best that can be hoped for in terms of an open commitment to socialism is still apparently that their leaders wouldn’t ‘see any need to centre the word socialism, but wouldn’t deny it if asked.’

Green thinking also has a tendency to distrust central, state-controlled organisations, perhaps seeing it as redolent of Stalinist five-year plans. For many greens, the idea of organising to seize control of the means of production on a national or international basis is therefore anathema. The gap in green thinking where calls for revolutionary organisation could be is often filled instead by proposals for local and individual ways to withdraw from capitalist production and consumption, such as co-ops for food production and power generation, in the vein of the Utopian Socialists. In the same way that if what you have is a hammer, every problem starts to look like a nail, this then drives an understanding that small, local, community organising is green and that it represents system change.

This understanding sits alongside what is often a profound distrust of ordinary people, in Western countries at least. In much green thinking, the working class in the West is at best unenlightened about the climate crisis and at worst addicted to its ‘imperial mode of living’ with which it is destroying the planet. That these views can sit alongside organising for what have at times been substantial demonstrations on green issues can seem a paradox. For many in the wider green movement, however, the point of street activity is to raise awareness so that individuals will be inspired to make changes in their own lives, and to put pressure on the government to act to enable those changes. This lends itself in particular to direct action rather than mass demonstrations, seeing ordinary people as the target as much as they are potential recruits to a wider movement.

These veins of thought in the wider green movement affect the Green Party. This can be seen in debates on its policies, where positions argued for by the left are limited by the assumptions now deep within the green movement. A recent example was the vote at the Spring 2026 conference to change the party’s previous commitment to electricity nationalisation to allow for ‘diversity of ownership including private, public, municipal and community schemes,’ such as the small-scale, local community electricity generation, which is the bedrock of much green thinking on power generation.

They are also the source of the Green Party’s theory of how to get change. Since the green movement in general does not have a theory of change which allows for proletarian mass action, for the Green Party, there is no organised movement whose cause it could be amplifying through electoral success in the way that Marx, Engels and Lenin set out. To the extent that greens see any point in trying to change the system, rather than simply withdrawing from it, it is a separate activity from the movement work of raising awareness of the climate crisis.

The recent Green electoral successes are undoubtedly an expression of people’s desire for a genuine left alternative to Labour. The Green Party’s ability to look like an answer to that desire is likely to make the task of building a genuine socialist electoral project more difficult than it has already proved to be, by taking the space and raising questions about splitting the vote and letting Reform in. In many ways, it would be much easier if we could abandon attempts to create a new electoral vehicle and simply all join the Greens. Unfortunately, parties are not blank slates. However socialist some of their policies may appear, the Green Party represents a different understanding than ours of what a left electoral project is for and what it can achieve. For socialists, it is no sort of answer.

National Intelligence?

It is amazing, and yet somehow not, how many people are fooled when, sanctions or blockades having led to economic collapse and to all of its consequences, those who had imposed such measures felt able to say that they had been proved right all along, with regime change to follow. But the United States has tried before to take Cuba, which on paper ought to be easy. We do not, though, live on paper. And Tulsi Gabbard has finally had enough, as Donald Trump prepares for a war with Cuba to distract from the war with Iran, which failed to distract from the war with Venezuela, which failed to distract from the Epstein Files.

With too few stamps to qualify for the lowest pension in any comparable country, Sarah Ferguson is angling for some sort of royal income to keep her mouth shut. She is four years too young to be a WASPI woman, but lower-upper-class women will and can do pretty much anything to keep the show on the road. Casting herself as a woman wronged by the Establishment, and allying to other such of her own generation, would be in character both for her and for her sort.

Andy Burnham is courting the WASPIs, thereby courting Labour MPs. For all the convulsions in the Parliamentary Labour Party between 2015 and 2024, the one thing on which they all agreed was WASPI. Did even the seceders to Change UK dissent from that? Even if each of the 3.6 million WASPIs had been paid the full £2,950, then that would have added up to £10.62 billion, most of which would have rapidly made its way into the consumer economy that employed the young. Now keep an eye out for everything that cost more than that.

As for the trans thing, no one seriously doubts that the 56-year-old Burnham has always really thought what the 42-year-old Bridget Phillipson has just confirmed. There was not a whiff of anything else when Burnham was Health Secretary. For that, you had to wait for a Conservative Government that was really quite aggressive about it, complete with the then Jamie Wallis, Britain's first and so far only transgender MP, though not Britain's first transgender parliamentarian, since that was Nikki Sinclaire, elected as a Member of the European Parliament as long ago as 2009 under the Leadership of Nigel Farage, having twice sought election to the House of Commons under that banner after having left the Conservative Party.

Reform UK has welcomed the endorsement of Bonnie Blue, and its grandee, Ann Widdecombe, opines that men who had "undergone extensive surgery" should be sent to women's prisons even though every cell of their mutilated bodies still contained a Y chromosome and they themselves had been socialised as males. Widdecombe was a faithful Junior Minister under John Major, a Minister of State under Michael Howard as he began the shredding of civil liberties in a bidding war with Tony Blair, a Shadow Cabinet stalwart under William Hague, twice a cheerleader for the putative Leadership of Ken Clarke, a scourge of foxhunting, the only Conservative MP to vote with Gordon Brown for 42-day detention without charge, an autobiographical praiser of Michael Heseltine for having killed off the British coal industry, and an avowed opponent of the Assisted Suicide Bill only because it contained insufficient "safeguards".

And why not? Richard Tice wants to legalise cannabis, Farage concurs with the Green Party in wanting to legalise drugs across the board, and Lee Anderson signed a select committee report in that direction in 2023. Although Anderson changed sides having initially supported assisted suicide, Tice and Sarah Pochin voted for it all the way to Third Reading. That Farage felt the need to stop courting Ben and Zac Goldsmith indicated how far that courtship had advanced. Who needs the Greens? Numerous Reform figures were fanatical supporters of the Prime Minister of Net Zero, of very big spending long before Covid-19, of the highest net migration ever, of Stonewall, of the lifting of the requirement that jobs in Britain be advertised first in Britain, of the lockdowns, of the Northern Ireland Protocol, and of the war in Ukraine. If the line is now that "immigration hasn't gone down, it's emigration that's gone up", then not only is that factually incorrect, but emigration was around double its current level when the Minister responsible was Robert Jenrick.

Jenrick was so bent that even Boris Johnson felt obliged to sack him, but their differences were not political. Nor were those between Johnson and Scott Benton, whom Reform nevertheless refused to take, and who is therefore now running Restore Britain's by-election campaign at Makerfield, where he is telling canvassers to move on if anyone told them that they intended to vote Labour, since the point was to take votes from Reform. Extremely right-wing gay men with Theology degrees are of course routine, and among Old Testament specialists arguably especially so, but Benton came out to his parents just before his wedding to one Harry Symonds. Perhaps they had assumed until that point that he was going to be marrying Carrie Symonds? Indeed, have Harry and Carrie ever been seen together?

Friday, 22 May 2026

Imaginary Polity

Now that everyone is saying what some of us had always said about what colour a snowflake was, who had always been doing the cancelling, and whose was the omnicause, Sohrab Ahmari articulates our long-latent view that the Epstein Class Right’s hysterical nightmare of Britain mirrored the Epstein Class Left’s hysterical nightmare of America:

In November 2014, several hundred protesters marched through London’s West End before gathering in front of the old US embassy on Grosvenor Square. They were there to vent anger at a police killing that had taken the life of a black teenager, Michael Brown, nearly 5,000 miles away in Ferguson, Missouri. Their arms raised in the air, they chanted, “Hands up, don’t shoot!”, echoing a slogan of the then-nascent Black Lives Matter movement in America.

For the British Left in the “peak-woke” era, America was less a concrete place than an imaginary polity: not a constitutional republic with an admirable history of overcoming its shortcomings, but a hellhole of racist, capitalist tyranny that delighted in killing men who looked like Michael Brown and George Floyd.

Nowadays, the mirror image is taking shape on the American Right and spreading through the influence of Elon Musk: an imagined Britain lorded over by Comrade Starmer and his totalitarian minions, bent on enabling migrant and minority criminality and silencing patriots who dare to resist.

For Musk & co., the case of Henry Nowak — the Essex student allegedly stabbed to death by a Sikh man, Vickrum Digwa, late last year — epitomises this state of affairs. Digwa claims he acted in self-defence after Nowak racially abused him; Musk’s crowd are insisting that, for this reason, the police withheld medical aid to Nowak as he bled to death on the pavement. In other words, they are constructing a reverse mythos around Nowak well before the complexities are fully understood, and with the same ideological frenzy that characterised the British Left’s understanding of American conditions in an earlier era.

With “post-woke” hindsight, it’s easy to mock the British Left’s imaginary America, where cops beholden to “systemic racism” snuffed out black lives for the kicks. But to the Britons who took up BLM, their Manichaean picture of the United States was no joke — it lent an epochal importance to their local causes.

As one observer noted at the time, the Metropolitan Police officers assigned to escorting the London protesters “seemed in no mood to hassle anyone”. They kept a polite distance and ensured that everyone could exercise their freedom of speech and assembly. Indeed, most of the London police wouldn’t have been carrying guns — a fact that lent a ludic aspect to the importation of the BLM slogan.

Even so, the London progressives seemed to identify, at an intense emotional level, with the racial oppression suffered by black folks in the American Midwest. “The London Metropolitan Police move around this city like an occupying force,” one white trade unionist complained to Vice. Just like in America, with its “system that is predicated on the oppression of black people — institutionalized racism”.

The London protesters couldn’t have known that less than a year later, the Obama Department of Justice would exonerate the police officer who killed Brown after “the most definitive account yet of the shooting”, as The New York Times reported. The testimony of some 40 witnesses belied the claim that Brown had innocently raised his arms; and the DOJ, like a Missouri grand jury earlier, couldn’t contradict the officer’s assertion that he was put in reasonable fear after Brown “leaned into his patrol car, punched him, reached for his gun, and then, after running away, turned and charged at him”, as the Times put it.

When, half a decade later, another racially charged police killing took place — George Floyd’s in Minneapolis — the entire UK establishment recalled that America is a terribly, terribly racist place. They took the knee, published columns, tabled a Black Lives Matter resolution in the House of Commons, and so on. With his bureaucratic piety, Keir Starmer intoned that Floyd’s death had “shone a light on racism and hatred experienced by many in the US and beyond”.

The upshot was more “Hands up, don’t shoot!” protests in front of police officers without guns, and vandalism targeting the Cenotaph and Churchill’s statue at Westminster. Americans moved on; the cult of Floyd didn’t survive subsequent scrutiny of his life; and the Democratic Party quietly concluded that police officers are good and necessary, actually, and that defunding their departments is a dangerous — not to mention unpopular — thing to do.

Yet the tendency of America and Britain to fantasise and jump to conclusions about each other didn’t go away. It merely shifted in direction, geographically and politically. Over the past year or so — ever since Musk decided that no one had heard of the grooming-gangs scandal until he publicised it — American Right-wingers have come to develop a picture of Britain that is no less distorted than the one that the UK Left entertained of the United States.

In the US Right’s imaginary Britain, all-too-real crises are similarly magnified to monstrous scale. This Britain isn’t a constitutional democracy, blessed with an ancient and robust tradition of rule of law, in which individual and institutional actors sometimes make mistakes and sometimes act badly, even as society as a whole attempts to uphold freedom and justice. No, this Britain is a conspiracy writ large — against its white citizens, by Leftist authorities in cahoots with malevolent foreigners.

Musk’s treatment of the Nowak case is telling. As I write on Thursday, the Tesla and SpaceX boss has published no fewer than four X posts or reposts on the case in a matter of two hours: several asking why the likes of Starmer and Angela Rayner, who took the knee for Black Lives Matter, have failed to do the same for Nowak, or even to mention his name. Another post asserts that the killing of “this innocent English boy” was “aided by police”.

Musk also pledged to fund a wrongful death suit against “these disgusting excuses for law enforcement” — that is, the police officers who initially responded to the scene. Musk’s framing of the case, hourly amplified to his quarter of a billion followers, seems to rest upon accounts offered by those such as Tommy Robinson, who insists that the police “left [Nowak] to die because they heard the word ‘racism’”. Replied Musk: “Unconscionable.”

Yet this simplistic telling — oi, you were racist, mate? Then I guess we’ll let you bleed! — is being cast into doubt as the alleged killer’s trial unfolds at Southampton Crown Court.

Nicholas Lobbenberg, the prosecutor, noted that the police did initially handcuff Nowak “and started giving him first aid when he then collapsed”, as the BBC summarised his statement. “Shortly afterwards,” the prosecutor told the court, “Henry became unconscious, then police began to set to work to give him first aid and summon an ambulance, a doctor flew in by helicopter but there was nothing that could be done to save Henry and he was declared dead.”

The prosecution’s account still leaves many questions unanswered, not least why the police handcuffed Nowak. But what we know so far — first-aid application, a physician flown in — makes it hard to believe that police “left [Nowak] to die” because they thought he was a racist.

The far more plausible interpretation is that the police initially misunderstood what was happening as they were trying to make split-second decisions amid a chaotic scene. Is it possible that progressive police training played some role in their decision-making? Maybe. The responding officers should face questioning about all of this, and no doubt will. And if ideology was a factor in their conduct, they should face consequences, and reforms must be instituted.

But that’s just the thing: very little of this has been carefully examined and analysed, while already, Musk and his local allies like Robinson are jumping to a stark conclusion: white lives don’t matter in modern Britain. Much as, a decade or so ago, British progressive activists and too many in the liberal establishment permitted a similarly ideologised lens to distort their perception of justice, race, and policing in America.

Will the reductive passion plays and martyr cults of the racial Right prove any less destructive — of institutions and truth procedures — than did those of the Left? Either way, Musk won’t be the one paying the price.