Brian Wilson writes:
What did the political map of Western Europe look
like as the 18th century dawned? To say it was heavily fragmented is an
understatement. It would take another two centuries of wars and diplomacy to
define most of the states we recognise today.
While Scotland and England were entering into
peaceable and prosperous union, assorted kings and princes were still knocking
lumps out of each other over Catalonia. A unified Italy was scarcely a glint in
the most visionary eyes. Much of Europe was a plethora of fragmented states.
Another century of French, Spanish and Hapsburg blood was yet to be spilt
before Belgian unity emerged.
One could go on. Suffice to say that if you start rolling back European history by 300 years, there is no shortage of ghosts to be awakened or ancient grievances to pursue. Not many sane people are interested in doing that. But the inevitable corollary of European history is that the continent is littered with nationalist movements which object to the state they are in.
One could go on. Suffice to say that if you start rolling back European history by 300 years, there is no shortage of ghosts to be awakened or ancient grievances to pursue. Not many sane people are interested in doing that. But the inevitable corollary of European history is that the continent is littered with nationalist movements which object to the state they are in.
Most of them are marginal, some of them are strong
and all of them are watching Scotland. Every existing state which contains such
movements has a parallel right to take an interest in Scotland’s referendum and
the messages it sends out. To pretend otherwise is naïve and disrespectful of
their legitimate concerns.
Last week, the prime ministers of Spain and
Belgium asserted that right in order to stake out clear positions on the
question of EU membership. While the referendum is an internal matter, the
question of EU membership is very much the
business
of all member states. The white paper’s ex cathedra assertions on the right of
an independent Scotland to “a smooth transition” into the EU were provocative,
for if Scotland had that undisputed right, then so too would every other
potential seceder.
By acquiescing in the white paper’s assumptions,
however hypothetically, governments within the EU would be clearing the way for
their own secessionist movements to assert the same “right” either now or in
the future. So it was no surprise that two prime ministers for whom this is no
mere hypothesis but a live political issue spoke out, in order to cut that
presumption off at the pass.
What I found curious was that the white paper
itself was entirely silent on the implications of its own assertions for the
future of Europe or the EU – beyond the narrow question of Scotland’s potential
membership. Since it is the wider implications that alarm some EU governments,
this was surely the opportunity
to address their concerns one way or another.
For decades the SNP has fraternised with other
separatist parties in Europe and endorsed their parallel ambitions. That is
understandable, since nationalism is a philosophy, rather than a specific. But
by the same token, they must expect their own aspirations to be seen in that
wider context. When they talk of “a seat at the top table”, they must surely
have some idea of how large they think that fabled piece of furniture should
become?
Thirteen pages of the white paper are devoted to
international relations and defence. We learn much about the virtues of the EU
and the proud new commitment to Nato membership. We have endorsements of the
Nordic Council of Ministers, the Council of Europe and every other slice of
global, institutional apple pie that is convenient to mention.
But not a word about the international question
to which the SNP’s objectives are most directly relevant – the future shape of
Europe’s nation states. There is certainly no statement
of principle on the rights of national minorities. Or if our own Nationalists
prevailed, would they continue to support, for example, the Basques and
Catalans in their aspirations to become independent states? Would they
proselytise within the EU for the principle that anyone who wants a binding
referendum should have one?
Consistent with their own principles, it is
difficult to see how they could fail to do so. It is not even necessary to
believe that this would be wrong in order to confirm the crucial point – that
those EU member states which have good reasons to take the opposite view are
entirely justified in stating their positions now, rather than later.
Dismissing Mr Rajoy as some sort of Franco throw-back for having the temerity
to do so is scarcely an adequate response.
Even if the SNP would prefer to kick these
questions into touch, their admirers in Europe have no such inhibition. The
leader of Italy’s Northern League (with which the SNP used to share group
membership in the European Parliament before discernment set in) declared:
“What has happened in Catalonia and Scotland and what I hope will happen in our
region is exactly the same – we want to change Europe.”
I’m sure the current SNP leadership wants
absolutely nothing to do with the Northern League or the other dodgy outfits
which would attach themselves to the coat-tails of a successful referendum
campaign. But that is not the perspective which concerns other European states.
What they fear is an upsurge of nationalist movements within their own
countries, fortified by the gift of an EU membership “guarantee”.
There is also quite a fundamental question here
for Scottish voters. Just as the SNP cannot isolate its domestic ambitions from
their wider implications for Europe, so should we all consider whether we want
Scotland to become a European standard-bearer for fragmentation and
disputation. Is that a 21st century role to which we really want to appoint
ourselves? I doubt it.
Just one other point about the international
chapter of the white paper. I see that we are to have embassies and consulates
in 70 countries – which means that we will not have embassies and consulates in
140 countries where Scots can currently look – as a matter of right – for
consular, commercial and emergency support.
Yet in every one of these countries, there are
Scots living, working and trying to do business. Indeed, the more obscure the
country, the greater is the proportional likelihood of our citizens having to
call on the services of diplomats who are there to represent all British people
and businesses which need their services.
Maybe someone can point out what the gain would
be in throwing all that away, while spending a shed-load of money on creating a
partly parallel network which covers only a fraction of the world?
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