The Vicious, Anti-Democratic Cycle

Professor Thomas Fazi writes:

This is a story which exemplifies the vicious, anti-democratic cycle that underpins the EU’s political dynamics. It is about decision-making processes which alienate voters and lead to weakened and discredited governments. It is about Ursula von der Leyen finally managing to ram through one of her favourite projects, while alienating one of her staunchest supporters.

The EU has been trying to finalise a free-trade deal with the Mercosur bloc — which includes Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay — for the past 25 years. But it has been met by intense political resistance. The bloc’s leading agricultural producers, most notably France, have long argued that the agreement would destroy their industry, paving the way for substantial imports sold at more competitive prices and produced under less stringent environmental and health standards than those mandated in Europe, where the EU is imposing ever-stricter regulations on farmers to curb greenhouse-gas emissions.

Macron is widely blamed for von der Leyen’s failure to finalise an agreement during her first term. Following the farmers’ protests that swept Europe, the French government further dug in its heels — also, no doubt, out of concern that the deal would exacerbate anti-EU sentiment in the country, boosting support for Marine Le Pen. In January, it was reported that the European Commission had stopped negotiating with the South American countries at France’s request; indeed, up until a few months ago, many regarded the deal to be dead in the water. Yet, last week, in a surprising turn of events, von der Leyen announced that the agreement had finally been clinched. So what changed?

For one thing, von der Leyen is in a much stronger position today than she was a year ago. Back then, she already had her eyes set on a second term at the helm of the Commission, and couldn’t afford to alienate one of the bloc’s most powerful leaders, whose support she needed to get re-elected. But that problem is now behind her; von der Leyen no longer needs to be quite so concerned about appeasing member states.

Moreover, the new von der Leyen Commission is a rather different beast from its previous incarnation: this time round she has loyalists in strategic roles and has established a complicated web of dependencies — in other words, she has secured complete control over the EU’s executive body. That she feels strong enough to dismiss the opposition of one of the bloc’s most powerful states indicates what the next five years are likely to bring.

Indeed, the symbolism of von der Leyen landing in Latin America to finalise the Mercosur agreement, while Macron was dealing with the aftermath of the government’s collapse, didn’t go unnoticed in France. “Ursula von der Leyen could not have chosen a worse moment than this. It’s a big mistake to do this now. It really gives the impression of taking advantage of the crisis in France to try and get ahead on her own,” said Christophe Grudler, an MEP from Macron’s party.

While this assessment is difficult to dispute, it is strikingly ironic coming from a representative of one of the bloc’s most staunchly pro-EU parties. Von der Leyen has a long history of exploiting crises to assume more authority, so this latest episode is part of an all-too-familiar trend of creeping supranationalisation of the bloc’s politics — one that Macron directly contributed to by supporting her re-election.

All is not lost for the farmers though. The agreement still needs the approval of the European Council. This means that France, potentially, still has a chance to block the deal. Macron maintains that the accord remained unacceptable in its current form. “We will continue to defend our agricultural sovereignty,” the Élysée said. Though other countries opposed to the deal include Poland, Austria, Ireland and the Netherlands, that still leaves Macron short of the 35% of the EU population needed to halt the agreement. Note that Germany is strongly in favour of the deal.

The only country, then, that could tip the scales is Italy. Sources at Giorgia Meloni’s office have said that Italy will not sign the Mercosur trade deal unless there are stronger safeguards for European farmers; however, it remains to be seen whether the Italian government, which is strongly divided on the issue, will really follow through. Given Italy’s precarious fiscal situation, Meloni is all too aware that she can’t afford to alienate von der Leyen’s support. Thus, the most likely outcome is that the Commission will pay lip service to Italy’s concerns, possibly with an addendum to the treaty containing certain recommendations aimed at minimising the deal’s impact on the bloc’s agricultural sector — thereby allowing Meloni to sign off on the deal while saving face.

But why is von der Leyen so eager to push the deal forward? Trade is, in many respects, embedded in the very DNA of the European Union. It’s why the bloc today boasts the largest free-trade regime in the world. In recent years, though, the EU’s commitment to free trade has come under challenge, as the bloc has increasingly aligned itself with the logic of geopolitical competition adopted by the US — a policy that Trump has promised to double down on. In this context, the EU’s trade policy has become increasingly politicised and subordinated to the “democracy versus authoritarianism” paradigm, aimed at decoupling from the West’s official adversaries and competitors. That means Russia, of course, but increasingly China as well. In this context, strengthening trade ties with “values-aligned” nations represents an attempt by the EU to reconcile the focus on trade liberalisation with its adoption of the US-driven New Cold War logic.

As von der Leyen said of the agreement: “In an increasingly confrontational world, we demonstrate that democracies can rely on each other. This agreement is not just an economic opportunity, it is a political necessity.” Von der Leyen left out how it also serves as a means for her to solidify her position as the principal architect of the EU’s geopolitical strategy, particularly in countering member states who might be inclined to pursue independent paths. Trump’s election, and expectations of a more protectionist US policy, doubtless gave von der Leyen, as well as the Mercosur countries, further impetus to conclude the deal.

The change of guard in Argentina — with radical free-marketeer Javier Milei replacing his Left-wing, more protectionist predecessor, who had rejected the trade agreement — did the rest. Unlike most leaders in Latin America, Milei is a firm believer in free trade. Following the announcement of the EU-Mercosur agreement, Milei stated: “While neighbours like Chile and Peru opened up to the world and entered into trade agreements with the protagonists of global trade, we locked ourselves in our own fish bowl, taking more than 20 years to close an agreement that we celebrate today.” It’s hard to imagine two stranger bedfellows than von der Leyen and Milei, but as the old Roman saying goes, pecunia non olet — money doesn’t stink.

There’s one final factor to take into account. From the European Commission’s perspective, the fact that the Mercosur deal will harm European agricultural producers by increasing cheaper imports is an acceptable trade-off in view of the fact that it will boost European industrial exports, such as cars. This is also why Germany is among the main supporters of the deal. In other words, agricultural production is being treated as a bargaining chip — a sector worth forfeiting in exchange for gaining access to new markets.

But there is a fundamental problem with this logic. Agriculture may not be “worth” much, but it does provide the most important product in any society: food, the building block of life. It makes little sense to sacrifice Europe’s long-term food security and sovereignty for short-term economic gains. Indeed, the whole “reshoring” debate stems precisely from a heightened awareness of the need to avoid dangerous dependencies for critical goods and materials. But if this applies to microchips, surely it applies — even more so — to food? This Mercosur deal is, ultimately, another reminder that entrusting critical decisions to unaccountable supranational institutions prone to capture by powerful vested interests isn’t just bad for democracy — but also for the long-term sovereignty of Europe as a whole.

It also reflects how von der Leyen often leverages divisions among member states to consolidate her own authority. The Mercosur agreement can be interpreted as a concession to Germany, following the Commission’s decision to impose tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles — a move supported by Paris but opposed by Berlin. Germany found itself on the losing side of that vote, while France celebrated a significant victory.

This demonstrates how the Commission, by aligning its policies with the interests of certain member states while alienating others, is able to shift the balance of power among nations and solidify its position as the EU’s primary arbiter and power broker. However, by exacerbating divisions among member states — and further antagonising European farmers — von der Leyen is taking a considerable risk, potentially fuelling social and political unrest across the continent. And her second term has only just begun.